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ABSTRACT 
“AN ILL-JUDGED PIECE OF BUSINESS”:
THE FAILURE OF SLAVE TRADE SUPPRESSION IN A SLAVEHOLDING
REPUBLIC
by
Sarah A. Batterson 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2013
This dissertation examines the U.S. suppression of the slave trade from the 
ratification of the Constitution in 1789 to the onset of the Civil War in 1861. Instead of 
studying the slave trade in isolation, this dissertation evaluates U.S. slave trade policy 
within the context of the development of federal power during the early republic and 
antebellum period. This work assesses the disconnect between the harsh laws against the 
slave trade and the United States’ ineffectiveness at suppressing the trade, especially 
since, at its founding, U.S. involvement in the African slave trade seemed to have a 
looming expiration date.
By separating the importation of slaves into the United States from the U.S. 
participation in the foreign slave trade, this study evaluates why the federal government 
was much more effective at suppressing the former, rather than the latter. U.S. slave 
trade suppression always remained subordinate to higher federal priorities, namely 
preserving the union through the protection of U.S. commerce, its own borders, and 
slavery itself. In fact, this dissertation argues that anti-slave trade laws were enforced 
generally only as a tool through which the U.S. could assert its federal authority against
other national powers. Disputes with Great Britain rendered the foreign slave trade 
suppression increasingly ineffective for all nations as slave trading under the American 
flag increased exponentially after 1830. This dissertation addresses the many barriers 
that affected U.S. anti-slave trade policy and examine how the shifting national priorities 
directly impacted the trajectory of American participation in the slave trade and in its 
extirpation. Only the abolition of slavery would effectively end the slave trade to the 
Americas, a full seventy years after the first U.S. law against the “inhuman traffic.”
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of September 8,1858, a lookout aboard the U.S.S. Marion sighted 
a vessel off the coast of Africa. Immediately, the twenty year old, sixteen-gun, sloop-of- 
war, took on sail to overtake the vessel. Henry Eason, a seaman aboard the Marion and 
five-year veteran of the U.S. Navy, described the chase. After an hour “we fired a shot 
across her bows & in the twinkling of an eye, the Stars & Stripes were floating at her 
peak, no colours have ever been hoisted faster than these were. She had evidently been 
waiting for us to hoist our Ensign first, so the she might hoist false ones & thus blindfold 
us.”1 The ship, which turned out to be the Brothers, was an American ship containing all 
the equipment needed for a slave voyage. Although its captain had tried to thwart the 
approaching warship by raising the American flag, his mistake would cost him.
Or would it? The Brothers was taken to the United States, where, in 1859, a jury 
in South Carolina refused to indict the captain and crew for violating slave trade laws. 
Citing a lack of evidence, the jury dismissed the case. Henry Eason and his fellow 
shipmates would never receive their long-awaited prize money with the exception of a 
few casks of black, moldy bread.2
During the nineteenth century, time and again, U.S. policy would show that, 
despite being a country bom out of Revolutionary rhetoric, the U.S. government would
1 Henry Eason, Marion Ship Journal, G.W. Blunt Library, Mystic Seaport, Log 902, 26.
2 Eason, Marion Ship Journal, 26.
1
absolve its own citizens for transporting enslaved Africans to the Americas. Time and 
again, events would show that despite having the harshest laws against slave traders on 
the books, the U.S. government would prove ineffective at suppressing the trade. As the 
nation matured into a slaveholding republic, American participation in the slave trade to 
foreign ports would increase dramatically. This is worth analyzing more fully, especially 
since, at its founding, the U.S. seemed prepared to end the traffic altogether. Thomas 
Jefferson wrote Edward Rutledge, of South Carolina, in 1787: “I congratulate you, my 
dear friend, on the law of your state [South Carolina] for suspending the importation of 
slaves...This abomination must have an end, and there is a superior bench reserved in 
heaven for those who hasten it.”3 How could a jury turn a blind eye to the “abomination” 
of the trade, a full seventy-two years after Jefferson wrote, and many others denounced it 
so strongly? Since the slave trade did end, if it was not the laws themselves that 
eventually stopped the trade, then, what did? The questions are what this dissertation 
aims to answer.
Although human trafficking remains a problem to this day, the abolition of the 
African slave trade took place relatively rapidly, if one accounts for the scale and 
persistence of the slave trade in human history.4 It took less than one hundred years for
3 Merrill Peterson, ed. Thomas Jefferson Writings, (New York: Library o f  America, 1984), 702.
4 For more on modem day trafficking consult the following journals: Trafficking and Slavery, 
Human Rights Quarterly, Violence Against Women. For additional published literature see for 
example: David B. Batstone, Not fo r  Sale: The Return o f  the G lobal Slave Trade — and How We 
can Fight It, (New York: Harper San Francisco, 2007); Karen Beeks and Delila Amir, Trafficking 
and the Global Sex Industry, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); Obi N. I. Ebbe and Dilip 
K. Das eds., G lobal Trafficking in Women and Children, (Boca Raton, LA: CRC Press/Taylor & 
Francis, 2008); U.S. Congress, Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization o f  the Anti- 
Trafficking Programs: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, House o f  Representatives, 
One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, October 31, 2007, (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 
2008); Christien van den Anker, ed., The Political Economy o f  New Slavery, (New York, NY:
2
the slave trade abolition movement to carry out the intentions of its followers and end the 
“nefarious traffic” in Africans. Yet, when one examines the suppression of the slave 
trade, both legally and as a social movement, its development appears slow and unsteady; 
for the United States, abolition seems to have a backward trajectory.
In modem eyes, where hindsight is 20/20 and the African slave trade has ended, 
one can claim that the United States triumphed in its quest to eradicate the inhuman 
traffic, but such a claim would neglect many factors that both helped and hindered the 
federal government’s supposed success and, ultimately would give government action 
more credit than is due.5 Enforcing slave trade regulations throughout the nineteenth 
century remained subordinate to the federal government’s goals to protect U.S. 
commerce and to defend its borders against international threats. While the slave trade to 
the United States decreased dramatically because of the Slave Trade Act of 1807, the 
federal government was less interested in regulating American participation in the trade 
to foreign ports. Conflict with Britain over freedom of the seas hamstrung the U.S. 
policy on the right-of-search, which in turn allowed for an increased slave trade carried 
on by American citizens and of human trafficking occurring under the American flag. 
While the British navy was becoming the international police force against the slave 
trade, the American-affiliated trade skyrocketed during the 1840s and 1850s.6
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Sheldon X. Zhang, Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: 
All Roads Lead to America, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2007).
5 See the works o f  Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account o f  the United 
States Government's Relations to Slavery, (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) and David 
Waldstreicher, S lavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification, (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2009).
6 Here, I refer to “American affiliated” trade as being both the American participation in the 
foreign slave trade, as well as the trade carried on under the U.S. flag. While the latter did not
3
The story of the U.S. suppression of the slave trade experienced many twists and 
turns. The single constant in the story is that, during the first eighty years of the United 
States’ history as an independent nation, the abolition of the slave trade was never a 
federal priority. The majority of Americans would publicly criticize the slave trade, but 
public opinion was divided on the question of the federal government’s role in regulating 
the trade. The domestic slave trade and the naturally increasing American slave 
population ensured a steady supply of slaves, which all but eliminated the United States’ 
reliance on slave imports. Unlike the West Indies, Cuba, and South America, where high 
mortality rates meant that slave economies required a steady influx of new victims, the 
proponents of slavery boasted that slaves in America were contented, docile, and 
preferred lives enslaved on plantations to the wild barbarianism of Africa.
Disputes over the federal regulation of the slave trade prevented its effective 
suppression from the start. Compromises made during the Constitutional Convention in 
1787 set the precedent that the preservation of the Union would stand as the highest 
priority, effectively ensuring that the Constitution would remain a pro-slavery document 
and that the federal government would condone the institution of slavery. Therefore, 
although laws reduced the slave trade to the United States drastically even before the Act 
of 1807, which prohibited the slave trade altogether after January 1st 1808, these laws 
would be difficult to enforce. This would become especially apparent during the 
antebellum period, when the American flag became the flag of choice for slave traders, 
and American citizens continued to profit from the slave trade to foreign ports. Even 
though the slave trade to the United States after 1808 was negligible compared to slave
necessarily involve Americans per se, these voyages tended to have at least one American citizen 
involved, particularly in the transfer o f  ownership and possession o f  duplicate papers aboard.
4
imports to Brazil and Cuba, it must be kept in mind that the majority of the ships that 
sailed their human cargo across the Atlantic Ocean after 1830 were in some way 
affiliated with the U.S. flag and with American citizens.
During the Constitutional Convention in 1787, delegates drafted a document that 
placed the regulation of the slave trade squarely under the jurisdiction of the federal 
government, while slavery itself remained under state power. This was a significant 
allocation of federal power, but U.S. regulation of the slave trade remained dependent on 
other aspects of federal policy, especially as the United States developed into a nation 
strong enough to compete on the global stage.7 And, while the ban on slave imports was 
generally supported, particularly as it protected the domestic slave trade, before the Civil 
War laws against the foreign slave trade were essentially hollow, enforced only when the 
United States needed to assert its national authority in the protection of U.S. commercial 
interests or to prove its strength against another national power. Although by 1820 the 
United States had the toughest laws in the world against the slave trade, the laws lacked 
specific wording on how they were to be enforced. Mistrust o f centralized power 
compounded federal ineffectiveness. For example, in spite of the 1820 Piracy Act, which 
made slaving a capital offence, only one man was ever sentenced to death for trading in 
slaves, and that was not until 1862, when the Civil War had already begun.
Strained relations between Britain and the U.S., as well as the unwillingness of 
American leaders to enforce laws against the slave trade, impeded the efforts of those 
committed to its abolition. Because the history of the slave trade stands at the 
intersection of politics, culture and race, it is important to examine slave trade
7 David F. Ericson, Slavery in the American Republic (Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 
2011), 30, 34.
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suppression against the backdrop of a society divided in its views of slavery, states rights 
and international diplomacy.8 This dissertation will address the many obstacles affecting 
the United States’ efficacy in prohibiting the slave trade. While roughly chronological, 
each chapter will focus on a certain aspect of the suppression of the trade, such as U.S. 
diplomacy or legal action, and show how attitudes and policies changed during the years 
leading up to the Civil War. These chapters will form the “spokes” that give structure to 
understanding the factors that made suppression so difficult. The overall argument, that 
the effectiveness of the U.S. suppression of the slave trade from 1789 to 1862 was 
secondary to the United States’ commitment to maintaining national sovereignty and 
protecting its commerce, forms the wheel to which these spokes are attached. Throughout 
its history, the authority of the federal government has been challenged, both from within 
its borders and by external forces. Anti-slave trade laws were employed by the federal 
government to protect U.S. borders from those who threatened federal authority. It was 
in these episodes, when slave trade abolition goals were consistent with maintaining 
national sovereignty, that they were supported by the American public. In the case of 
international efforts to stop the slave trade, its abolition ran counter to American claims 
to national sovereignty and freedom of the seas, and therefore the suppression of 
American participation in the foreign slave trade was generally ineffectual. As the nation 
developed, the necessity of becoming a “treaty-worthy” nation led to a focus on U.S.
8 For more on the origins o f  slave trade abolition see: Roger Anstey, Atlantic Slave Trade and  
British Abolition, (London, 1976); Christopher L. Brown, M oral Capital, Foundations o f  British 
Abolitionism, (Chapel Hill, 2006); Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era o f  
Abolition, (Pittsburgh, 1977) and From Slavery to Freedom: Comparative Studies in the Rise and  
Fall o f  Atlantic Slavery, (London, 1999); Stanley Engerman and Barbara Lewis Solow, eds., 
British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy o f  Eric Williams, (Cambridge, 2004), 
Judith Jennings, The Business o f  Abolishing the British Slave Trade, (London, 1997).
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economic and political interests.9 These goals overshadowed the idealistic aims of men 
like Jefferson and Madison, who hoped to see the day the slave trade would come to an 
end. These founders would see the development of a strong, internationally-recognized 
nation, but one in which other national priorities would take precedence over the plight of 
enslaved Africans carried to foreign shores. After 1840, increasing sectional tensions 
would only act to exacerbate the problem.
Historiography:
The literature of the Atlantic slave trade is as vast as the area the trade affected. 
Hugh Thomas and Herbert Klein both provided syntheses of the history of the African 
trade from its beginnings in the 1400s to its abolition in the nineteenth century.10 Some 
historians have examined British or American slave trade abolition efforts, while others 
have worked to quantify the number of enslaved brought to the Americas during those 
five hundred years. An increase in attention on the slave trade occurred after the online 
publication of the 2008 Slave Trade Database, comprising information on 35,000 
voyages, creating the beginnings of a comprehensive and systematic look at the extent of 
the slave trade. However, this database does appear to under-represent the role of U.S. 
citizens in the trade.11
9 See Eliga Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 
3; Sam W. Haynes, Unfinished Revolution, (Charlottesville: University o f  Virginia Press, 2010),
9, 22-3; for the slave trade and federal authority, see Ericson, 1, 34.
10 Herbert Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade, (Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Hugh 
Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story o f  the Atlantic Slave Trade, (New York: Simon & Shuster, 
1997).
11 Chapters four and five discuss the difficulties in identifying American-affiliated ships. As the 
slave trading practices became more covert, it was increasingly difficult for law enforcement 
officers to track ownership. The database reflects these problems, especially when American- 
owned ships were sailed to Cuba where a Spanish or Portuguese captain and crew would be 
waiting to sail it to Africa. The database also does not take into account American-built vessels,
7
The debate over the cause and consequences of slave trade abolition remains hotly 
contested. Much has been written on the anti-slave trade movement in Britain as well as 
the Atlantic world during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Philip 
Morgan commented that the movement was made up of “marginal misfits” with racist 
attitudes one would (or should) find shocking today, while Seymour Drescher examined 
the practical aspects of this moral revolution and the use of the media.12 Eric Williams’s 
assertion that the collapse of the slave trade was caused by the industrial revolution and 
economic decline in the sugar economy remained the dominant paradigm for fifty years, 
although most historians today would agree with Drescher that the mix of economic, 
political and social change led to the abolition of slavery in the 19th century.13 Slave 
trade abolition did not arrive as a progressive wave crashing over the Atlantic world. 
Efforts to suppress the trade, by both governments and individuals, was limited, sporadic, 
and interwoven with a complex mesh of social, political, and economic issues.14
involvement o f  American-based trading companies, suppliers, or crew. For debates see Philip 
Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, (Madison, University o f  Wisconsin Press, 1969); 
David Richardson, Extending the Frontiers, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); J.E. 
Inikori and Stanley Engerman, The Atlantic Slave Trade, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992); 
Klein 1999.
19 David Brion Davis, The Problem o f  Slavery in the Age o f  Revolution, 17.
13 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, (UNC Press, 1944); Drescher’s Econocide, 180.
14 See Herbert Klein; see also Robert Edgar Conrad, In the Hands o f  Strangers, (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Anne Farrow, Joel Lang, Jenifer Frank, Complicity, 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2005); Paul Finkelman, Slave Trade and M igration,(New  York: 
Garland Publishers, 1989); Svend Green-Pedersen, The Abolition o f  the Atlantic Slave Trade, 
(Madison, University o f  Wisconsin Press, 1981); Gerald Home, The Deepest South, (New York 
University Press, 2007); David Lightner, Slavery and the Commerce Power, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006); David Northrup, The Atlantic Slave Trade, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 2002); James Rawley and Stephen Behrendt, The Transatlantic Slave Trade, (Lincoln: 
University o f  Nebraska Press, 2005).
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The most complete work on the U.S. suppression of the slave trade was written by 
W.E.B. Du Bois over a hundred years ago. Du Bois argued that the suppression of the 
slave trade was primarily driven by a fear of slave revolts after the Haitian Revolution of 
the 1790s and that the United States government was ineffective at enforcing laws against 
the American participation in the foreign slave trade, particularly because of 
compromises made during the Constitutional Convention on the subject of slavery and 
the slave trade. Historians David Eltis and Paul Finkelman have taken up Du Bois’s 
torch, providing increasing detail and depth to the study of the U.S. slave trade. 
However, more work needs to be done. The role of the United States in the transatlantic 
slave trade was multi-faceted and complex. U.S. citizens actively participated in slaving 
expeditions- both in the transport and importation of slaves. Understanding the political 
and social climate in which the slave trade was allowed to continue is essential to 
understanding the underlying causes of complicity.15
In 2008, David Eltis wrote, “it is rather startling to consider that half a century 
after the first awakening of scholarly interest in slavery and the slave trade in the United 
States, which has generated many thousands of monographs and articles, there is still no 
book on the U.S. transatlantic slave trade.”16 Several historians have approached various
15 W.E.B. Du Bois focuses on the continuance o f  the slave trade after 1808 in Chapter VIII o f  The 
Suppression o f  the African Slave Trade, 96-102, specifically providing (much debated) evidence 
for violations o f  slave trade laws in Section 61. Peter D. McClelland and Richard Zeckhauser 
attempt to quantify the number o f  slaves smuggled into the United States in Demographic 
Dimensions o f  the New Republic: American Interregional Migration, Vital Statistics, and 
Manumissions, 1800-1860, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 44-47 and 122-23.
16 David Eltis, “The U.S. Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1644-1867: An Assessment,” Civil War 
History, LIV No 4, 2008, p. 348; there has been renewed interest in the study o f  the slave trade in 
recent years, but there has been no new paradigm since Williams and David Bryon Davis. See 
Eltis, “Was Abolition Significant?” Eltis argues that the moral reform movements had a much 
greater effect on the abolition o f the slave trade than the British and U.S. anti-slave trade laws o f  
1807-8. More assessments o f  the trade can be found in Eltis and Finkelman’s other works, as
9
aspects of the U.S. slave trade. Donald Canney has analyzed the role of the U.S. Navy in 
the suppression of the slave trade, while Steven Deyle looks at the domestic trade, which 
led to a stronger southern economy and, ultimately, the Civil War.17 Hugh Soulsby’s 
1933 work on the slave trade and the right-of-search remains the definitive authority on 
the U.S. slave trade and diplomacy.18 Many scholars have focused on the abolition of the 
slave trade in 1808, but there has been little written that examines the U.S. slave trade 
within the context of the development of federal power. As I hope to show, shifting 
national priorities had a direct impact on the trajectory of the American participation in 
the slave trade and in its eradication.
Some scholars have looked at the relationship between federal power and slavery. 
David Ericson argues, in Slavery in the American Republic, that slavery, rather than being 
on the periphery or an impediment, was fundamental in the development of government 
in the United States.19 Like Ericson’s analysis of slavery, this work explores the role of 
the slave trade in the development of federal power in the United States. It argues that 
slave trade suppression was not a national priority except when anti-slave trade laws were
well as in Walter Hill, “Living with Hydra,” a National Archives publication and David Eltis and 
Walvin eds: The Abolition o f  the Atlantic Slave Trade: Origins and Effects in Europe, Africa, and 
the Americas, (Madison, WI, 1981).
17 Donald Canney, Africa Squadron (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006); Steven Deyle, 
Carry me Back: The Domestic Slave Trade in American Life, (New York, 2005); Warren Howard, 
American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862, (Berkeley, 1963).
18 There is a vast body o f  literature on U.S. slavery. For works addressing slavery and the federal 
government see: Davis, The Problem o f  Slavery, Ericson, Slavery in the American Republic, 
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth; Donald 
Robinson, Slavery and the Structure o f  American Politics (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1971); Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution. Waldstreicher provides an excellent 
historiographical sketch in his Notes.
19 See Ericson, Slavery in the American Republic, 1-2, 14-7, and 25-52.
10
used as a tool in diplomatic negotiations, particularly in protecting U.S. borders and 
merchant vessels from foreign search and seizure. Except for two periods in South 
Carolina’s history, in 1803-7 and in the late 1850s, all states banned slave importations 
from outside the U.S., without great opposition.20 Resistance to the enforcement of 
federal laws against the slave trade against American citizens was rooted not in a moral 
support of the trade, but rather in the American people’s commitment to ideas of free 
commerce and national sovereignty. Because the United States consistently demanded 
that its merchant vessels remain unmolested by foreign patrollers, U.S. anti-slave trade 
laws actually encouraged slave traders to participate in the trade under the safety of the 
American flag, allowing for the foreign slave trade to increase and prosper. By placing 
slave trade suppression within this framework, we can better understand the 
contradictions between law and enforcement.
Framework and Overview:
This dissertation examines the many factors that led to the apparent disconnect 
between the strict laws against the slave trade in the U.S. and the increase in slave trading 
by Americans, or under the American flag, from 1787 to 1862. Chapter One examines 
the Act of 1794, including the first anti-slave trade law in the United States, the political 
context in which it was enacted and the underlying reasons why it was passed. Most 
historians have ignored its significance. This chapter examines the slave trade debates in 
the Constitutional Convention and in Congress in the 1790s, and why many federal 
legislators (North and South) spoke out against the slave trade. In 1794, the United
20 See Matthew Mason, “Slavery Overshadowed: Congress Debates Prohibiting the Atlantic Slave 
Trade to the United States, 1806-1807.” Journal o f  Early Republic, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 2000), 
and Manisha Sinha, The Counterrevolution o f  Slavery (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 2000).
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States was desperately trying to avoid war with Britain, and, while Congress began 
preparations for this war, it also negotiated several commercial treaties and passed acts to 
protect U.S. merchant vessels. The Slave Trade Act of 1794 represented a novel use of 
federal authority to regulate commerce and it provided a bargaining chip in U.S. 
negotiations with Britain. On an international level, the Act of 1794 extended the reach 
of the federal government, by prohibiting Americans from participating in the foreign 
slave trade while protecting domestic imports. Like the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law, which 
aided slave-owners in the recovery of their “human property,” it was also an assertion of 
federal power.
The second chapter examines the factors that led to stronger anti-slave trade laws 
between 1818 and 1820, and how these later Acts were used to strengthen the 
government against foreigners and to improve the protection of U.S. commerce along the 
Atlantic coast. The United States continued to be plagued by European conflict, illegal 
smuggling, and problems with trade during the early nineteenth century. As the U.S 
became more assertive on an international level, especially after the War of 1812, the 
federal government was less willing to compromise with other nations over its 
sovereignty, even if this meant less effective suppression of American participation in the 
slave trade. The chapter focuses on three case studies to illustrate how the so-called 
foreign threat led directly to the implementation of the Supplemental Slave Trade Acts of 
1818-1820.
The United States’ policy towards the slave trade went through several 
transformations. The 1807 Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves provided that 
confiscated ships carrying slaves would be turned over to the nearest state. Individual
12
state laws then determined the fate of the smugglers and slaves aboard. In slave states, 
these slaves were often sold for profit. Slaves were therefore still treated as property and 
the immorality of slavery was not reflected in the law.21 This changed in 1819, when an 
amendment to the 1807 Act created a U.S. patrol of the African coast, although the 
African Squadron was not made official until 1842. This new act, according to Paul 
Finkelman, resulted in a new definition of piracy. An 1820 law, which labeled all 
citizens participating in the slave trade as pirates and thus punishable by death, 
criminalized the trade to the extent that it was considered treason. While some scholars 
argue that the threat of execution was enough to prevent many crews from engaging in 
the trade, the actual enforcement of this act proved difficult.22 These Acts succeeded in 
discouraging the importation of enslaved Africans into the United States through stepped 
up efforts to protect U.S. borders. However, they had relatively little effect on the 
participation of Americans in the foreign slave trade because the government was less 
willing to allocate funding to halt a trade that did not directly compromise national 
security.
While the domestic slave trade, a natural increase of American-born slaves, and 
the fear of slave insurrections kept the slave trade to the United States in check, 
Americans’ participation in the foreign slave trade, especially to Cuba and Brazil, 
increased dramatically during the nineteenth century. The federal government’s use of its 
enumerated powers often resulted in better enforcement of slave trade laws when slave 
traders interfered with legal merchants or challenged U.S. borders, or when regulating the
21 Finkelman, “Regulating the Slave Trade,” Civil War History, 401.
22 See for example Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 150.
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slave trade coincided with other national concerns, like neutrality in 1794, which resulted 
in a much better policing of slave imports into the United States. The extirpation of the 
foreign slave trade was much more difficult, primarily because the U.S. refused to 
surrender maritime sovereignty to Britain. Because of this, after 1820 the foreign slave 
trade under the U.S. flag increased. The U.S. creation of an African Squadron did more 
to reaffirm maritime sovereignty than provide any effective measure against the slave 
trade. At home, as well, the court system failed to acknowledge slave trading as a serious 
crime, rendering anti-slave trade laws even more unenforceable.
Chapter Three addresses the link between the right-of-search policy and the 
suppression of the slave trade. While few white Americans would voice their support for 
the slave trade, the regulation of the anti-slave trade laws from 1794 to the late 1850s was 
notably lax, especially in comparison to the increasingly vigilant, and expensive, British 
suppression policy. Because of the persistent diplomatic tension between Britain and her 
former colony over British threats to U.S. maritime sovereignty, U.S. and British efforts 
to control the trade were hindered by the U.S. refusal to allow Britain the right to search 
the former’s merchant vessels. This refusal, in turn, led to the opening of a significant 
loophole in international slave trade suppression, allowing slave traders to increasingly 
turn to Americans and the American flag, to protect their voyage from search and seizure. 
Failure to resolve the right-of-search issue prolonged the slave trade and markedly 
decreased the effectiveness of existing anti-slave trade laws and treaties. Instead, the 
U.S. focus on maintaining freedom of the seas under international law took precedent 
over any multi-national cooperation in eradicating the slave trade, and the U.S.’s failure 
to compromise rendered its own anti-slave trade laws ineffective and unenforceable. The
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U.S. flag, which symbolized liberty and freedom for so many, offered liberty and 
freedom for the slave traders hiding behind the stars and stripes rather than to the slaves 
they carried. Using the flag as a cover, slave merchants and traders successfully 
manipulated political and legal disputes to gain U.S. protection despite the illegal nature 
of their trade.
Chapter Four assesses the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy’s slave trade regulation 
and how this commitment changed over time, examining the problems of regulating the 
trade and how each problem was addressed. Although the United States had committed 
itself in 1819 to monitoring U.S. merchant activity off the coast o f Africa, British 
pressure to enter into a right-of-search agreement in the 1840s motivated the U.S. to 
sidestep their demands by setting up its own squadron, a measure far more expensive 
than accepting British treaty requests. As anti-slave trade media turned some of its 
attention to the U.S. involvement in the foreign slave trade, the federal government 
slowly began to focus more on slave trade suppression, although this, too, was primarily 
due to British threats to U.S. commerce. In the 1850s, the media frenzy over the call by a 
vocal southern minority to reopen the U.S. slave trade catapulted government inaction 
against the trade into the spotlight, linked the slave trade more openly to the institution of 
slavery, and put pressure on the federal government to improve its Navy Squadron. The 
ineffectiveness of the African Squadron did not stem from the lack of effort on the part of 
ordinary seamen. With a case study of the slave ship Orion, which was twice captured by 
the British but escaped seizure by American ships, this chapter examines the multifaceted 
issues that rendered the African Squadron so ineffective.
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The last chapter aims to uncover the legal obstacles that permitted the 
continuation of the slave trade. The chapter focuses on challenges to federal authority on 
the eve of the Civil War by legally trained Southern nationalists who questioned the 
constitutionality of the 1820 Piracy Act. Historically, many juries were sympathetic to 
slave traders, believing that slave trading was merely a minor offense and should not 
carry with it the death penalty. By the 1850s, it was all but impossible to convict slave 
traders in the U.S. court system. But, when federal authority was challenged from within, 
the government was forced to act and assert control.
This dissertation is not an exhaustive study of the slave trade, but an examination 
of the causes and consequences of the federal government’s steps to suppress the slave 
trade. It aims to create a clearer picture of why the American participation in the trade 
continued long after anti-slave trade laws were put in place. The abolition of the foreign 
slave trade was never a priority for the federal government and the trade was intimately 
connected with America’s commercial, national, and diplomatic development, and it is 
important to unpack these ideas and connect them to the human history of those involved 
in slave trade suppression, to assess why slave trade abolition was so problematic and to 
understand why slave trading persisted despite international laws against it.
The U.S. suppression of the slave trade was both dependent on and influenced by 
the changing cultural, diplomatic, and political climate leading up to the Civil War. In 
1861, the United States formally abandoned its participation in the African Squadron. 
The onset of the Civil War moved the Union’s priorities closer to home, but with the 
added goal of restricting the Confederacy’s resources by denying them access to slave
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labor. Importantly, the Civil War also expanded Presidential powers to allow a wartime 
right-of-search treaty to be signed with Britain- after decades of U.S. refusal for 
peacetime cooperation. In the end, time would tell that abolition had to occur at home, 
rather than on the high seas. Only with the end of the demand for slaves, would the 
supply would be rendered obsolete and the Middle Passage finally cease to exist, a full 
seventy years after the Congress enacted its first federal law against the slave trade.
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CHAPTER I
THE ACT OF 1794: THE SLAVE TRADE AND FEDERAL POWER IN THE EARLY
NATIONAL PERIOD
In 1794, the United States was on the brink of war. Caught between the warring 
powers of France and Great Britain, it appeared as though armed conflict might be 
inevitable for the new nation. Despite rising outrage by Americans against the British 
destruction of commercial vessels, most knew that war would be destructive to the U.S. 
which possessed no navy to speak of and only a voluntary militia. As Noah Webster 
wrote to American citizens in the American Minerva, “if you plunge into war, would not 
your agriculture languish, your commerce be annihilated... and perhaps your infant, your 
favorite government, be overthrown.”1 Many political leaders agreed. Desperate to avoid 
conflict, President Washington sent an envoy to London in the hopes of negotiating a 
new treaty between the two nations. The envoy was armed in part with the news that 
Congress had just passed a slave trade act that banned slave ships from being fitted out in 
U.S. ports. While only a minor response British protests that U.S. ports were being used 
to provision enemy ships, this act, in combination with Washington’s Neutrality 
Proclamation and Congress’ non-importation and embargo threats against British trade,
1 Curtius (Noah Webster), “To the People o f the State o f  New York,” American Minerva, March 
4, 1794.
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paved the way for John Jay to successfully negotiate a treaty that protected and expanded 
U.S. trade and reinforced its neutrality laws.
The Act of 1794 was, on paper, an impressive piece of legislation and represented 
a novel use of federal power. Claiming constitutionality through the Congressional 
regulation of foreign commerce, this Act did not outlaw the slave trade altogether, and it 
did not prohibit slave traders from importing slaves into the United States. There is very 
little recorded debate over the passage of this Act, either in newspapers or in Congress, 
and therefore the meaning of this anti-slave trade act is difficult to interpret. Because the 
Act neither stirred up debate nor halted the slave trade historians have often ignored it 
relegating attention to a mere footnote in the historiography of the slave trade.2 Using the 
federal government’s power to regulate commerce, the Act of 1794 gave government 
officials the power to search foreign ships and stood as a warning to other nations that the 
United States would regulate its own trade. It also stated plainly that slave ships could be 
captured as privateering prizes, allowing private citizens to involve themselves in the 
Act’s regulation.3 A federal allocation of funds for customs houses also increased U.S. 
tariff revenue and improved immigration control through the use of customs manifests.
On March 22, 1794, George Washington signed into law “An Act to Prohibit the 
Carrying on the Slave Trade from the United States to any Foreign Place or Country.” It 
was a step forward in the regulation of the slave trade, but its deliberate wording is
2 W.E.B. Du Bois only briefly mentions the Act o f  1794 in W.E.B. Du Bois, Suppression o f  the 
Slave Trade (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), chapter 47.
3 This stipulation barred slave ships from U.S. protection, thus tacitly condoning the capture o f  
American slave vessels by foreign warships. The case o f  theA m elie  would uphold this limited 
right-of-search, although, as it will be shown in future chapters, this point would be hotly 
contested in the fifty years after the War o f  1812.
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nonetheless reminiscent of the Constitution’s importation clause. Even though this Act 
prohibited U.S. participation in the foreign slave trade, it allowed both American and 
foreign ships to carry slaves into American ports with the intent of selling them.4 The 
Act carried with it penalties and confiscation of property for those caught outfitting ships 
and it also granted informants the right to half of the fines incurred. To prevent slave 
states from losing their own slaves, slave traders could not sell U.S. slaves in foreign 
countries, although the domestic trade was left untouched. Anti-slave trade societies 
could claim a victory against the “inhumane traffic,” while slave owners could ensure 
that their supply of African slaves was safe and the federal government was authorized to 
regulate and protect commerce. Because it specifically prohibited American slavers from 
trading between Africa and the Caribbean (and therefore the United States’ agricultural 
competition), this Act had a more direct effect on slave trading companies in Rhode 
Island and New York than it did on slaveholders.
The Act of 1794 allowed the U.S. to better control foreign shipping within U.S. 
ports, giving customs agents the right to search vessels in port. In addition, it also 
partially placated British concerns over the fitting out of enemy vessels in U.S. ports, 
while appealing to Britain’s growing abolitionist movement. In the wake of British 
captures of U.S. merchant vessels in the West Indies, the Act also aimed at regulating 
foreign commerce, although the U.S. would continue to threaten Britain with embargoes 
and nonimportation.5
4 See “An Act to Prohibit the Carrying on the Slave Trade from the United States to any Foreign 
Place or Country,” Statutes at Large, 1.347.
5 Combs, 142-4. Federalists like Hamilton understood that America’s prosperity was linked to 
that o f  England and it was absolutely necessary to protect America’s commerce during France
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The Slave Trade in the Constitutional Convention:
In order to understand the United States’ regulation of the slave trade, it is 
important to first analyze the role of the slave trade during the formation of the 
Constitution. Historians have long debated the significance of the Constitutional 
Convention concerning the slave trade. In his 1896 Harvard doctoral dissertation, The 
Suppression o f  the African Slave Trade to the United States, 1638-1870, W.E.B Du Bois 
argued that the delegates compromised over slavery and the slave trade for the sake of 
union.6 This is an argument with which most historians have agreed. According to Du 
Bois, the founders knew that the success of their republican experiment relied upon all 
the states joining the new United States. Historians disagree, however, on whether or not 
there was a moment during the Constitutional Convention where the slave trade (and 
even slavery) might have been abolished.
Many historians have argued that anti-slavery issues did not become part of the 
national rhetoric until well into the nineteenth century. If anything, they argued, slavery 
remained on the political periphery. Lately, “more recent scholarship depicts African 
slavery in the eighteenth century as a dynamic, changing, modem institution.”7 Slavery
and England’s wars, or else the “republican experiment” would fail. See Stanley Elkins and Eric 
McKitrick, The Age o f  Federalism  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 112.
6 Du Bois, Suppression o f  the African Slave Trade, 197.
7 David Waldstreicher, S lavery’s Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 14 and George 
Van Cleve, A Slaveholders ’ Union: Slavery Politics, and the Constitution in the Early American 
Republic (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2010. For an excellent overview o f  the 
historiography o f  slavery and its abolition, see Waldstreicher’s introduction. After outlining the 
arguments o f  Beard and others from the progressive school as well as Bailyn and Wood o f  the 
republican school, Waldstreicher advocates for a “middle ground” between these two stances. He 
effectively negotiates Bailyn’s more “idealistic” view o f  the founders with Beard’s assertion that 
the Constitutional Convention was strictly a political struggle among economic interests. 
Fehrenbacher asserts that slavery was a peripheral part o f nation building in the early republic, 
while David Ericson argues that the institution o f slavery was an integral part o f  America’s nation
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was not destined to decline with the advent of modem, industrial society; rather slavery 
flourished alongside manufacturing.8 Nor was slavery incompatible with the republican 
rhetoric of the day, because there was so much focus in republican thought on protecting 
personal property and keeping the powers of the federal government in check. The 
founders of the U.S. Constitution never intended to give the central government the 
power to abolish slavery.9 The question of jurisdiction over the slave trade, however, 
became a point of contention and resulted in a compromise that southern slave owners 
claimed as a major victory. While a few delegates in the Constitutional Convention and 
political commentators denounced this compromise as a crime against humanity, the 
federal and state constitutional debates reveal that the so-called “slavery compromise” 
was indeed a triumph for pro-slavery and pro-commerce interest groups.10 In fact, 
Southern slavery became more entrenched in the decades after the Revolution, with pro­
slavery justifications developing from the apologist, “necessary evil” argument to that of 
the cultivation of a society of benevolent patriarchs.11
building, in Slavery in the American Republic. David Brion Davis has focused on the moral 
dimensions o f  slavery and its abolition, showing the centrality o f  the institution in the 
development o f  industrialization.
8 See David Eltis, “The U.S. Transatlantic Slave Trade,” Civil War History, 54 (2008): 362, 371; 
also, Eltis, “The Volume and Structure o f  the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment,” 
William Mary Quarterly. 2001; 58(1): 2001; David Eltis and Engerman, “The Importance o f  
Slavery and the Slave Trade to Industrializing Britain,” Journal o f  Economic History Vol. 60, No.
1 (Mar., 2000), 123-144; David Lewis, “Competing Interpretations: Ending the Atlantic Slave 
Traffic,” Keynote Address.
9 Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution, 101 and throughout.
10 See William Wiecek, The Sources o f  Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 62, and Waldstreicher general.
11 David Ericson, Slavery in the American Republic (Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 2011), 
30; Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic (Oxford University Press, 2001), 32-3, 40- 
2; Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age o f  Jefferson (Armonk,
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The final draft of the Constitution was very deliberate in its word choice. The 
authors consciously avoided using the word “slavery” for the sake of appeasing slave 
owners and maintaining unity in the Convention. But, as historian David Waldstreicher 
asserts, the subject of slavery is widely implicit in the final draft of the Constitution: from 
the sections on representation, commerce, revenue, federal power, to the election of the 
President.12 In fact, “in the founders’ design, slavery informed the successes of the 
movement for a stronger national government and shaped its limits.”13 Far from avoiding 
the issue of the slave trade, the founders were very much aware of the problem and were 
most concerned about keeping it from becoming a sticking point in the Constitution’s 
ratification.
The slave trade debates at the Constitutional Convention during the summer of
1787 in Philadelphia often did not focus on slavery itself. Deliberations centered on the
allocation of federal power, and specifically, commercial power. One of the main
problems with the Articles of Confederation had been that Congress lacked the power to
regulate commerce, therefore foreign countries could not effectively negotiate trade
treaties with the United States.14 Because of the immense state and federal debts incurred
during the Revolutionary War, America could not afford to inhibit commercial growth.
For the agricultural south, the labor shortage caused by the war prevented the area from
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 21-29. For the debates in Congress, see Max Farrand, ed., The 
Records o f  the Federal Convention o f  1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937) vol. II and 
James Madison, Notes o f  Debates in the Federal Convention o f 1787, especially 7/9/1787,
7/11/1787 and 8/20/1787-8/22/1787.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/debates/0808.html, accessed August 12,2012.




recovering its pre-war prosperity. Planters were so focused on rebuilding their enslaved 
labor force that many went into debt in order to purchase new slaves.15 By the eve of the 
American Revolution, slavery had already become so entrenched in the South that slave 
owners believed slave trade abolition would have disastrous results, for both national 
security and the southern economy. Because of the wariness of centralized government 
that might take away their labor supply, slaveholding states were adamant about the 
protection of slavery.16
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was not considered 
contradictory to be pro-slavery and anti-slave trade. The high mortality rate of the 
middle passage and the preference for American-born slaves prompted slave owners and 
anti-slave trade supporters alike to condemn the trade. The federal government’s 
inability to control the trade successfully in the early national period lay in the 
disagreements over the expansion of federal power. It was in areas with the weakest 
support for federal power that the anti-slave trade laws were most often ignored.
Even though many Americans were against the slave trade, most considered 
slavery a “necessary evil.” Slavery was an institution that had already set down firm 
roots into America’s soil by the time of the Revolution. While some may not have liked 
the idea of slavery, it “had penetrated all aspects of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
American life.”17 Many states relied upon the labor of slaves and, while some advocated
15 See Elizabeth Donnan, Documents Illustrative o f  the H istory o f  the Slave Trade to America 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution o f  Washington, 1935), vol. IV.
16 Eliga Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 
and Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic.
17 Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution, 17.
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for its abolition, the idea of free blacks populating the country alarmed most of the white 
population particularly in light of the threat of slave insurrections both at home and 
abroad. Far more important to the union was strength and stability of the federal 
government, a concern that resulted in the silencing of much of the anti-slave trade 
discourse at the Convention. It did not matter that revolutionary rhetoric professed 
liberty; only a small minority believed that this privilege should extend to Africans. 
While some at the Convention spoke out against the slave trade, the more important issue 
on the minds of the delegates was creating a more effective union, beginning first with 
rebuilding the nation’s labor force and repaying the enormous war debt. The intent of the 
delegates in Philadelphia was to draft a new constitution “to give the new national 
government the power to regulate international and domestic commerce.”18 The main 
focuses of the Convention were, therefore, national security, economic stability, and 
improved trade relations.
The slave trade debates at the Convention were limited, but their significance 
rests in how they helped define the powers of the federal government. Southerners feared 
that the more commercial North would dominate the weaker South and, because of the 
North’s growing shipbuilding, create a monopoly on the transport trade. The South, 
reliant on agricultural exports, feared that Congress could unfairly tax the South if the 
North maintained a Congressional majority. At the eleventh hour, a backroom 
compromise was struck between delegates from the Deep South and New England, with 
both sides claiming victory. The relevant clause stated that Congress could not prohibit 
“migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
18 Paul Finkelman, “Regulating the African Slave Trade,” Civil War History, 384; see also 
Donald L. Robinson, Slavery and Structure o f  American Politics, 210-214.
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proper to admit,” but Congress that could levy a tax on such importations. While the 
meaning was obscured, there was no doubt that this clause was intended to sanction the 
slave trade to the United States. James Madison lamented that “twenty years will 
produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty to import slaves.”19 
Those from states that did not rely on slave imports argued that denying Congress the 
power to immediately outlaw the slave trade would limit federal power too much. This 
federal weakness would Madison prophesized, would strengthen an institution that many 
found embarrassing in a republic rhetorically centered on “liberty”. Nevertheless, 
Madison also agreed that compromise was essential for the union, and, importantly, the 
clause did stipulate that, after 1808, the regulation of the slave trade would fall under 
federal jurisdiction.20
One of the many repercussions arising from the ratification of the Constitution 
concerned the regulation of American participation in the foreign slave trade. The 
Constitution gave the federal government power to regulate the slave trade, but not until 
1808, placing the onus on the states to regulate the slave trade before that date. This 
posed jurisdictional problems for those wanting to prohibit the trade before 1808. In 
1790, the Abolitionist Society of New York had originally petitioned their state 
legislators but the state had determined that the slave trade was to be regulated by the 
federal government. It seemed as though neither the state nor the federal government had 
full control over regulation of the slave trade.
19 quoted in Waldstreicher, S lavery’s Constitution, 97.
20 Ericson, 34.
26
In settling the jurisdiction of the states over the trade, one key case was that of the 
Abeona, which came before the Supreme Judicial Court in Boston in 1792. Instead of 
public officials, it was a private citizen, Stephen Cleveland, who charged two ship 
owners, Joseph Waters and John Sinclair, with fitting out a ship in Salem, Massachusetts 
for the purpose of transporting slaves. After sailing to Africa, the Abeona took on board 
ninety slaves and departed for the West Indies to sell them. When the case came before 
the Court of Common Pleas, the judge fined the two owners $4,700 for violating the 1788 
Massachusetts anti-slave trade law. Waters and Sinclair refused to pay the fine, stating 
that Massachusetts had no jurisdiction over affairs conducted on the high seas. While 
Massachusetts had prohibited the slave trade in 1788, the federal government now was 
authorized to regulate commerce, the slave trade included. According to the defendants, 
conflicting state laws undermined the plaintiffs arguments. The case dragged out, 
“entangled in discussion of [the court’s] competence.” Eventually the owners lost the 
case, but they refused to pay the fine, and the Abeona continued to sail.21 Like Waters 
and Sinclair, many others from northern sea ports rose to prominence through profits 
from the slave trade. While some tried to prosecute these slave traders for participating 
in traffic considered illegal in their home states, as the Abeona case shows, prosecution 
proved difficult and ineffective, especially when defendants challenged the authority of 
state laws over the slave trade after the ratification of the Constitution.
21 Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story o f  the Atlantic Slave Trade, (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1997), 334; Donnan, vol III, 89-96. Although the verdict o f  the jury pronounces two 
alternatives: one if  the state law superseded the federal Act, and the other if  the opposite was 
correct, apparently the judge ruled that the defense would be prosecuted under the state law.
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The Quaker Petition and the Debate of 1790
In the three years following the Constitutional Convention, the United States had 
been strengthened financially and economically with the easement of debts and creation 
of a National Bank. The anti-slavery Quakers maintained a strong presence in 
Philadelphia, but most Americans, including the lawmakers, were content to allow 
individual states to abolish slavery on their own and to postpone the slave trade debate 
until 1808. Quakers, however, were adamant that the government act before the 
Constitutional prohibition expired.
Because the state slave trade laws did not assign federal officers to enforce the 
laws, often it was the Society of Friends, or Quakers, who brought charges against slave 
traders. The Quakers were originally seen as radical religious activists, but by the 
American Revolution, their reputation for peace and morality had taken hold. The 
transnational networks of Quaker societies acted as a particularly active voice against the 
slave trade. In the eighteenth century, Quakers and abolition organizations tended to be 
synonymous, but this would change. The goals for these societies ranged from 
pressuring their own members to emancipate their slaves, to building cases against slave 
traders, to lobbying both state and federal legislators for immediate emancipation. 
Several legislators mostly from Pennsylvania, belonged to the Society of Friends.22
22 For Quakers and Abolitionism see David Huw, “Transnational Advocacy in the Eighteenth 
Century: Transatlantic Activism and the Anti-slavery Movement,” Global Networks, Jul2007,
Vol. 7 Issue 3, p367-382, and James Walvin, “Slavery, The Slave Trade and the Churches,” 
Quaker Studies, Mar2008, Vol. 12 Issue 2, pl89-195. See also Paul Finkelman, “The 
Pennsylvania Delegation and the Peculiar Institution,” The Pennsylvania Magazine o f  History 
and Biography, Vol. 112, No. 1 (Jan., 1988). Ben Franklin had the opportunity to protest against 
slavery and the slave trade in the Constitutional Convention, but did not submit the petition, most 
likely in order to avoid continued conflict and prolonged debate. The Pennsylvania Society for 
the Abolition o f  Slavery, o f  which Franklin was President, had solicited the aging Founder to 
argue against the immorality o f  slavery during the Convention, but Franklin remained mostly
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The American anti-slavery movement gained strength along with the British 
abolitionist crusade as this new energy crossed the Atlantic in the last few decades of the 
eighteenth century.23 The immorality of slavery was expounded upon from pulpits all 
over Europe and the United States. Ministers, including Jonathan Edwards, ranted 
against the “injustice and impolicy of the slave trade” and widely published their 
sermons. In early February 1790, during the second session of the First Congress, the 
Society of Friends submitted a petition to both houses of Congress to abolish the slave 
trade. Petitions to state and local governments had become the Friends’ modus operandi, 
yet this particular petition had unintended results. The anti-slavery petition of 1790 is 
significant not because of its content but because of the debate over the reach of federal 
power that ensued. This petition provoked conflict not only over slavery but also over 
the role of the federal government in the slave trade’s regulation. It also marked one of 
the first tests for the new government in the proper procedure within Congress.
On February 11, 1790, the Society of Friends formally appealed to the now 
stronger national government to enact federal anti-slave trade regulation, although they 
had been prevented from petitioning in previous Congressional sessions. Using a mixture 
of religious and Enlightenment rhetoric, the petition entreated legislators to end the slave 
trade, by using “the full extent of your power to remove every obstruction to public 
righteousness.”24 John Lawrence, a representative from New York, also submitted a
silent during the formal debates, giving sage advice in private conversation. Franklin understood 
how important consensus was in saving the union, choosing to withhold his petition for the sake 
o f the Convention.
23 See Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade, 190-1, for more on Quakers and spread o f  
abolition.
24 Annals o f  Congress, vol. I, 1224-5.
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petition from the Society of Friends of New York. There was a motion to refer the 
petition to committee, which broke from the proper protocol of Congress, since 
discussion usually preceded the creation of a committee.
Several representatives voiced dismay at the petition. To them, the meddling of 
the Pennsylvania and New York Quakers was not to be tolerated. The Convention 
compromise had been clear that the federal government would not take up the slave trade 
until 1808. Many considered this petition unconstitutional. William Smith, a 
representative from South Carolina who had married into a wealthy planter family, 
denounced the motion as running “contrary to our usual mode of procedure,” which was 
to read the petition, then open the floor for debate or committal the following day.25 
James Jackson, a Georgia planter, continued the objection with less restraint. He 
questioned why the House was even considering committing the petition that day and, 
with words dripping with sarcasm, asked, “is it because the feelings of the Friends will be 
hurt?”26 He argued against allowing the Friends special attention. Referring directly to 
the Constitutional Convention, in which he had been a delegate, he argued “if Congress 
are disposed to interfere in the importation of slaves, they can take the subject up without 
advisers, because the Constitution expressly mentions all the power they can exercise on 
the subject.”27 Jackson was a staunch anti-federalist and later a Jeffersonian Democrat. 
His fiery and opinionated speeches got him into trouble more than once; however, this 





concerning the ability of the people to petition the government. His being a Georgian 
planter only added fuel to the fire.28
Other legislators supported the Quaker’s petition, or at least believed that their 
petition should be submitted to a committee for review. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, 
who had been so quick to compromise with South Carolina in 1787, argued that the 
petition should be taken to committee although a representative from each state should 
form the committee. Southern slave owners saw individual state emancipation as a 
threat to the balance of power in the federal government, and to their economic prospects, 
which were in dire straights in the early 1790s.
Fearing an impasse caused by the objections of the South Carolina and Georgia 
delegates, the slight and soft-spoken James Madison intervened. He reminded legislators 
that all slave importation was to be regulated by the states and that a committee could 
determine whether the petition was constitutional. A principal figure in the design of the 
Constitution, Madison knew moderation and compromise were necessary to maintain a 
union. While disappointed in the final Constitution, Madison nevertheless was 
committed to limiting centralized power. For him, the issue concerned federal versus 
state jurisdiction, and the Constitution was quite clear that total abolition of the slave 
trade was not within Congress’ realm, at least before 1808. To him, the words of the 
Constitution settled the debate.
The petition over the slave trade let loose a Pandora’s box over the workings of 
the federal government, threating to grind all productive debate to a halt. Congressmen 
opposed to the petition argued that it was unconstitutional for citizens to petition the
28 See William Omer Foster Sr., James Jackson, Duelist and M ilitant Georgia Statesman, 1757- 
1806 (Athens: University o f  Georgia Press, 1960).
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government since the 1st Amendment had not yet been added. Some southerners feared 
that the abolition of the slave trade would lead to conflict over the abolition of slavery. 
Emancipation, one legislator prophesized, “would never be submitted to by the Southern 
States without a civil war.”29 Few, aside from the Quakers, spoke about the petition’s 
desire to improve the living conditions of the slaves and end the cruelty of the slave 
trade.30 In the end, the petition was committed, with forty-three representatives in favor 
and fourteen against. The majority of the nays came from Georgia, South Carolina and 
Virginia.
Almost a month later, the committee returned with a report to the House on the 
Quaker petition. This report was significant in its specifications concerning the power of 
Congress. It stated that, according to the Constitution’s commerce clause, Congress had 
the power to lay a tax or duty on importation of slaves, although they did not use the 
word “slave” directly. Congress could use this power to regulate the international slave 
trade, insure the “humane treatment of slaves,” and prevent foreigners from preparing for 
slave-trading voyages on American soil.31 On the other hand, it was reiterated that 
Congress did not have the authority to prohibit the slave trade until 1808, nor could 
Congress emancipate slaves or affect state laws concerning slavery. By this time, most 
delegates seemed to want to lay the matter to rest, since very little debate followed. 
Despite the recommendation that federal power should extend to the regulation of the 
foreign slave trade, Congress did not seem eager to put this to the test, and tabled the
29 Annals o f  Congress, vol. 1 ,1240.
30 One exception is Gerry o f  Massachusetts, who had refused to sign the Constitution in part 
because o f  the slave trade clause.
31 Annals o f  Congress, vol. II, 1465.
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report. The regulation of the slave trade would not be discussed directly in Congress 
until 1794. Nevertheless, the report did establish the role of the national government in 
the slave trade and shows an agreement on one aspect of the federal exercise of power in 
the early national period, ironing out the wrinkles in a still forming republic.
The Society of Friends was not just content to lobby Congress. President George 
Washington was also a target for Quaker petitions. Encouraged by the creation of a 
stronger executive, Warner Mifflin, a prominent Quaker leader, wrote to Washington 
directly on March 12, 1790. Promising that the Friends’ goals included “Harmony and 
concord,” Mifflin appealed to Washington, as the “first Majestrate of this Nation,” to 
meet with him concerning the recently tabled Quaker petition. According to 
Washington’s journal, the two did meet four days later.32 Unlike Southern legislators, 
Washington apparently felt that the government should receive solicitations from the 
people, yet Washington may have arranged this meeting merely to silence the Friends. 
Washington’s letter to David Stuart, a Virginia statesmen and overseer of the 
construction of the District of Columbia, shows that Washington truly believed that the 
federal government did not have jurisdiction over slavery or the slave trade. He 
described the Quaker petition as “mal-apropos” and wrote that the issue of the slave trade 
“has at length been put to sleep, and will scarcely awake before the year 1808.”33 
Washington would be proven wrong.
32 Dorothy Twohig, ed. The Papers o f  George Washington: Presidential Series, Vol. 5, 
(Charlottesville: University Press o f  Virginia, 1987), 222-3.
33 John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., Writings o f  Washington, Vol. 31, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. 
Office, 1931), 30.
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What Washington perhaps did not see was how closely linked the slave trade was 
to other national concerns. The main focus of Washington’s letter to Stuart in March 
1790 referred to sectional divisions. Commercial interests of the North had caused 
“jealousies [that were] poisoning the minds of the southern people.”34 Despite the 
compromises made between slave and free states during the writing of the Constitution, 
these conflicts nevertheless remained and were a constant threat to the Union. 
Washington was one of many who ascertained the potential threat, writing, “common 
danger brought the States into confederacy, and on their union our safety and importance 
depend.”35 If the southern states could not find ways to unite, then they would be the 
ones to blame. Compromise from both sides would be necessary to preserve the union.
One of the main reasons Congress and Washington were unwilling to act on the 
prohibition of the slave trade was that the United States was still struggling economically. 
As Southerners pointed out, any measure taken to abolish slavery or even the slave trade 
would be economically detrimental to the development of the nation. While South 
Carolinians did not mention that many planters were in debt because they had purchased 
slaves on credit, Northerners were not willing to push the slavery issue in a time of 
financial crisis. As historian Gary Nash points out, economic security trumped any moral 
argument over slavery during this time.36 Even though, by themselves, South Carolina 
and Georgia were not a strong force, their votes were absolutely necessary in order to 
maintain union. Observers could see “the connection between [the North’s] collapsing
34 Ibid, 28.
35 Ibid,. 29.
36 Hamilton’s propositions included a stronger federal government which assumed all state debt, 
see Gary Nash, Race and Revolution, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), 41.
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principles concerning slavery and their intense desire to adopt Hamilton’s funding 
program, which would implement their vision for the economic development of the 
country” and make use of the federal government’s powers.37 Since most white 
Americans could not come to terms with the economic sacrifices necessary in total 
emancipation nor could they fathom a biracial society, support for the Quaker petition 
declined.38
Another major problem legislators had with the Quaker petition was rooted in a 
deep-seated fear of slave insurrection. Several legislators were concerned about the 
repercussions the petition might carry. Both James Madison and Thomas Tucker were 
wary that discussion of abolition might lead to slave uprisings or at least a destabilization 
within slave states. Madison and Tucker may have been right: according to a letter 
written by David Stuart, the publication of these debates in newspapers had indeed led to 
rumors that Congress was planning on abolishing slavery altogether. He claimed that this 
rumor caused several slave owners to sell-off many slaves at low cost and caused themto 
lose faith in the federal government.39 George Washington’s response to Stuart reveals 
the complex balancing act necessary in maintaining union. Rumors and inaccuracy of the 
press were dangerous and, Washington concluded, “the introductions of the (Quaker) 
Memorial respecting Slavery, was to be sure, not only an illjudged piece of business, but 
occasioned a great waste of time.”40
37 Nash, Race and Revolution, 41.
38 This argument comes from Nash’s Race and Revolution, 35.
39 Writings o f  Washington vol 31, 50.
40 Ibid, 52.
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On the other side of the Atlantic, the British abolitionist movement was taking 
shape. Beginning in 1788, William Wilberforce, Granville Sharp, and others petitioned 
British Parliament for the abolition of slavery. As more abolitionist societies formed, 
their pressure on the government increased. Despite this increase, merchants and West 
Indian planters formed a formidable bloc against the passage of any anti-slavery bill 
during the 1790s. In England, Wilberforce’s abolitionists could not pass any legislation 
through Parliament until 1807, thirteen years after the United States passed the Act of 
1794. Until 1807, British slave trading operations would multiply and thrive.41
In the United States, Quaker petitioners were losing ground in Congress. In 
November of 1792, Warner Mifflin again broached the subject of abolition in Congress. 
This time there was very little debate. Mifflin’s petition was called a “mere rant and 
rhapsody of a meddling fanatic.”42 The petition was returned to him without being sent 
to committee. Congress was now unified against any legislation that might reach beyond 
the scope of federal power that had been outlined two years earlier. Neither a rumored 
slave insurrection in North Carolina nor a petition from the Abolition Society of Rhode
41 For more on the British antislavery movement see Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade And  
British Abolition, 1760-1810, (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1975), Christopher 
Leslie Brown, M oral Capital: Foundations o f  British Abolitionism  (Chapel Hill: University o f  
North Carolina Press, 2006); David Brion Davis, The Problem o f  Slavery in the Age o f  Revolution, 
1770-1823 (Ithaca, N. Y., 1975; Seymour Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery In The Era O f  
Abolition, (Pittsburgh : University o f  Pittsburgh Press, 1977); J. D. Fage, The British Anti-Slavery 
Movement, (London, F. Cass. 1964); Judith Jennings, The Business O f  Abolishing The British 
Slave Trade, 1783-1807  (London: F. Cass, 1997); James A. Rawley, London, M etropolis O f  The 
Slave Trade, (Columbia: University o f  Missouri Press, 2003).
42 John Agg, H istory o f  Congress: exhibiting a classification o f  the proceedings o f  the Senate, and 
the House o f  Representatives (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1843), 730, 
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/scd0001.00272721762, accessed November 12, 2012.
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Island in February 1793 initiated a Congressional debate over the regulation of the slave 
trade.43
The Act of 1794 in Context:
The Congressional debate of 1790 might have been the last slave trade debate on 
the national level until 1808 if it had not been for events occurring around the Atlantic 
and within U.S. borders that forced Congress into action. In the 1790s, the federal 
government’s authority was tried and tested on many fronts. These challenges ultimately 
led to a stronger and more stable centralized power as Federalists succeeded in creating a 
national bank, reducing the public debt, and improving trade.44 When the Whiskey 
Rebellion broke out, Washington led his troops to meet the protestors in an 
unprecedented show of federal force.45 Additionally, victories on the frontier, such as 
that of “Mad” Anthony Wayne at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, proved that the United 
States could defend its borders. The majority of the acts of Congress during the 1794 
session address national defense, including making appropriations for the military, 
building post roads and lighthouses, establishing a Navy, securing duties, paying off the 
foreign debt and the loan from the Bank of the United States.46
Congress also passed the Fugitive Slave Act, which granted the federal 
government authority to return human property to their owners, despite the existence of
43 New Jersey Journal, 8/22/1792; Norwich Packet, 3/13/1793.
44 See Joseph Ellis, American Creation  (New York: Knopf, 2007), 192.
45 Ellis, American Creation, 195.
46 See “Acts passed at the Third Congress o f  the United States o f  America”, (Philadelphia:
Francis Childs Printer, 1795).
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state laws to the contrary. Federal enforcement of its new authority proved problematic. 
The Constitution did not specify how fugitive slaves should be returned to their masters 
and what the federal government’s specific role was in the recovery of these slaves. 
When it became clear that conflicting state laws were leading to interstate court cases, 
legislators began drafting a bill to ensure federal supremacy. This Fugitive Slave Act 
was introduced in 1790, but it took three years of Congressional debate, some of them 
bitter, to finally pass in 1793. Signed by George Washington on February 12, 1793, the 
Act charged state governors with the task of bringing offenders to justice. A fine would 
be levied against anyone impeding this process.47 The constitutionality of this Act was 
not questioned, in part because, as Paul Finkelman asserts, “the political activists most 
likely to raise a constitutional question about federal legislation were the followers of 
Thomas Jefferson, who were mistrustful of national power and centralized 
authority...were also the most proslavery element in American politics.”48 The assertion 
of federal protection of private property would extend the reach of the federal 
government.
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 asserted and reaffirmed the federal government’s 
supremacy over state law, which would in turn have a direct effect on the regulation of 
the slave trade before 1808. The United States Constitution contained a fugitive slave 
clause allowing slave owners to reclaim their human property even if the state in which 
the slave had escaped outlawed slavery. Proposed by Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney 
of South Carolina during the Constitutional Convention, the clause was passed without
47 Finkelman, Slaveiy and the Founders, 99.
48 Ibid, 100.
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debate.49 This fact shows that delegates understood property, even human property, to be 
a fundamental right in a republic. In light of the British capture of slaves during the 
Revolution, ensuring one’s right to property was fundamental to founding of the nation.50
Even though some states “boldly defied the Act of 1793 by passing laws 
protecting any person within their borders from being taken back to slavery,” the Courts 
would continue to uphold the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act.51 The Fugitive 
Slave Act upheld one’s legal status across state lines, allowing slave owners to claim 
their property when slaves escaped to another state. This was a significant extension of 
national power—a power that condoned slavery.
During this period of internal nation-building, international crises would also 
challenge the reach of U.S. national sovereignty. The first external threat came from the 
destabilization of the West Indies. The Haitian Revolution had a major impact on the 
United States and prompted the federal government to act in order to protect its people 
and individual property rights. After several years of unrest, on May 6, 1794, Toussaint 
L’Ouverture led a successful revolt against France in St. Domingue. In that same year, 
U.S. Congress pledged money to aid white refugees arriving from St. Domingue on U.S.
• o  ,
soil. The crisis in the West Indies also had a direct impact on the regulation of the slave
49 See Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and the New Social Order: Republican Vision o f  the 1 790s, 
(New York: New York University Press, 1984) and Douglas Irwin et al, Founding Choices: 
American Economic Policy o f  the 1790s, (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 2011).
50 Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, 82.
51 C. W. A. David, “The Fugitive Slave Law o f  1793 and its Antecedents,” Journal o f  Negro 
History, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan. 1924), 23. The 1842 case o f  Prigg  v. Pennsylvania upheld the Act, 
and the Fugitive Slave Act o f  1850 assigned U.S. Marshals to the task o f  carrying out the law.
52 Du Bois argued that the Haitian Revolution did more to end the slave trade than abolitionist 
movements.
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trade in the United States. Individual states acted to curb their slave trade began doing so 
in earnest. By 1798, all states had some form of prohibition against, or strong regulation 
of, the slave trade primarily directed at halting the importation of West Indian slaves.53 
Slave owners wanted slaves from Africa, not the so-called dangerous slaves who had 
been influenced by the insurrection in Haiti. As Du Bois wrote, the “wild revolt of 
despised slaves [in the West Indies]... frightened the pro-slavery advocates and armed 
the anti-slavery agitation.”54 Before 1808, the two states that sporadically allowed slave 
trade imports, Georgia and South Carolina, allowed only African imports, banning the 
trade in West Indian slaves.
The Act of 1794 and American Neutrality:
The Congressional debates leading up to the Act of 1794 were less contentious 
and were of shorter duration than those generated after the Quaker petition of 1790. 
There were several reasons for this lack of debate. First, in the four years since 1790, the 
federal government had proven itself to be a strong unifier. Its citizens and other nations 
began to acknowledge the United States’ staying power. Second, events occurring within 
the Atlantic world generated support for the abolition of the slave trade although 
arguments for its abolition varied. Within the context of a growing sense of American 
nationalism, the Act of 1794 can been seen as a federal tool against the use of American 
ports by foreigners, even though enforcing these laws against its own citizens was not a 
national priority. Therefore, the enacting of anti-slave trade laws, and the inability to 
enforce these same laws are not contradictory.
53 See Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 57.
54 Ibid.
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The Act of 1794 stemmed from a petition from several Abolitionist Societies, 
presented to the House and Senate in January 1794. Instead of rejecting the petition or 
making a motion to postpone debate, as Congress was more typically to do, this Congress 
chose to take up the petition for discussion. This petition was presented against the 
backdrop of several national and international crises. While the complete debates 
concerning the slave trade act do not exist, legislators spent weeks speaking out against 
the transgressions of Great Britain, primarily in her interference in American trade. 
While legislators could not agree on which country to support in the war between 
England and France, most agreed that the United States had to protect its commerce from 
foreign nations, especially in the wake of the British destruction of American merchant 
ships in the West Indies. Enacting a commercial bill under the guise of regulating the 
slave trade would increase federal control over commerce while maintaining neutrality in 
the conflict between France and Britain.
Utilizing religious and moralistic language, the memorial that initiated the anti­
slave trade proposal itself highlighted the injustices of the trade, insisting that “this cruel 
commerce” itself weakened the United States. The memorialists also warned against the 
dangers of depriving others of liberty and allowing foreigners to use American ports for 
the fitting out of slave ships. The petition linked the inhumanity of the slave trade with 
that of the capture of Americans by Algerian corsairs, thus connecting the United States 
with liberty on one hand and pirates with slavery on the other.55 Without much debate, a 
committee was formed to take up the petition. Several weeks later, the House committee
55 Gazette o f  the United States, No. 49 o f  Vol. V, February 7, 1794.
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returned. Instead of sending the Abolitionists packing, as Congress had done in the past, 
the committee proposed an anti-slave trade bill.
The wording of the report of the Committee offers particular insight into the 
ultimate goal of the Act of 1794. While the memorialists had focused on the immorality 
of the slave trade and the hypocrisy of the United States concerning slavery, the report 
focused only on the final aspect of the petition: that of foreign trade. Evidently the 
Committee had no intention of officially condemning the slave trade, which would have 
led to division and conflict, nor were they as concerned about Americans supplying U.S. 
slave owners with African slaves. Instead they focused on the use of American ports by 
foreigners.
The report, written by delegates from Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, 
Virginia, and North Carolina, began with the disclaimer that the Quakers had no intention 
of lobbying Congress for the abolition of slavery, thus placating slave owners. Their only 
goal was to “obtain an act of Congress, prohibiting the trade carried on by citizens of the 
United States, for the purpose of supplying slaves to foreign nations, and to prevent 
foreigners from fitting out vessels for the slave-trade, in the ports of the United States.”56 
One can only infer what was discussed during this committee meeting, but it is clearly 
noticeable how specific the report is compared to the lofty goals of the original petition. 
Also important to note is how little the wording of the finalized Act of 1794 differed from 
this original report.
The significance of the Act of 1794 is not that it was groundbreaking in 
prohibiting the foreign slave trade, but that it put into action Congress’ power to regulate
56 American Convention for Promoting the Abolition o f  Slavery, Philadelphia, 1794, Broadside.
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trade. Compared to that of the slave trade debates in the Constitutional Convention, and 
again in 1790, there was very little discord during the passage of the bill. The 
Congressional session of 1793-4 is rife with the creation of laws intended to enhance the 
power of the federal government. The successful passage appears to be the result of this 
good timing. In addition to destabilizing forces along America’s western borders and the 
threat of insurrection in the wake of unrest in St. Domingue, by 1794, France and 
England were once again at war, and the United States was being dragged into the 
conflict.
In 1787, founders like Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison, had 
banded together to create, from the Articles of Confederation, a strong, federated 
republic. They aimed to “increase opportunities for foreign trade... secure its borders 
and have foreign nations respect them,” and most of all, “avoid war.”57 These men 
differed in opinion over the limits of federal power by the 1790s, but all of them still 
hoped to avoid war, particularly as the conflict escalated in 1793.
George Washington announced a Declaration of Neutrality in 1793. In George 
Washington’s address to the Senate and House of Representatives on December 3, 1793, 
he asserted that, in light of the problems in Europe, it was his “duty to admonish our 
citizens of the consequences of a contraband trade... and to adopt general rules, which 
should conform to the treaties and assert the privileges of the United States.” 58 
Washington believed that the time was ripe for the federal government to regulate the
57 Combs, 16.
58 David R. Hoth, ed., The Papers o f  George Washington, Presidential Series, volume 14 
(Charlottesville: University Press o f  Virginia, 2008), 462-469.
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commerce in order to prevent damage to U.S. shipping and as leverage in its diplomatic 
negotiations.
The founders understood that, while the United States had very little military 
strength, it did have a great deal of bargaining power in its commercial activities. Great 
Britain, and France to a lesser extent, relied on exports to the United States and depended 
on U.S. provisions in supplying its West Indian plantations. At the same time, Britain 
had not yet delivered on her promises in the Treaty of Paris in 1783, which included the 
abandonment of forts on the western frontier, compensation for slaves captured, and non­
interference with American shipping. While there was dispute between Hamilton, 
Jefferson, and Madison over the ideal extent of commercial sanctions, all knew that by 
placing trade restrictions on either France or Great Britain, the U.S. would obtain 
significant bargaining power in negotiating free trade agreements, which in turn would 
expand U.S. trade.59
As Britain’s war with France spread across Europe and the Americas, news came 
to the United States of the British capture of American merchant ships off the coast of 
France and the West Indies. This, to Americans, violated the Neutrality Act, while the 
British countered that American ships were violating the British blockade.60 As a South 
Carolina paper reported, “it becomes a question of national honor and interest,” to right 
this violation of the “law of nations.”61 Representative Foster of Massachusetts favored 
supporting France, arguing “Britain is now at war against republican principles [and] the
59 Combs, 25-7
60 Ellis, American Creation, 194, see also George Washington’s speech to Congress Dec 5, 1793 
in Annals o f  Congress, vol IV, 16 and Combs, 120.
61 City Gazette and Daily Advertiser, 7/15/1793.
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balance of our trade with France has always been in our favor.”62 Others were not as 
convinced.
William Smith, a federalist from South Carolina, delivered a long speech in which 
he argued “the intervention of Great Britain therefore, may, in most cases be considered 
as a mean of extending, instead of abridging our commerce.”63 The reality was that, 
despite the war and lingering mistrust towards the mother country, the United States 
relied heavily on British imports, to the tune of $15 million annually, according to Smith. 
Such a trade deficit concerned many political leaders, including James Madison, who 
drafted an embargo bill intended to decrease American dependence on foreign imports. 
Federalist leaders, like Hamilton, argued that such an embargo would be devastating to 
the United States, as “90 percent of the revenues flowing into the Treasury Department 
came from customs duties, the vast majority from British imports.”64 The fact stood that 
the U.S. economy was fastened like an umbilical cord to Britain. Within the debate 
concerning the role of the United States in European affairs, a Quaker petition proposing 
a prohibition of the foreign slave trade, found its way into Congress, and passed both 
Houses with relative ease.65 This new piece of legislation would aid in the future 
negotiations with British ministers in the months to come.
62 Dwight Foster, quoted in American Minerva 2/20/1794.
63 William Smith, quoted in American Minerva, 2/5/1794.
64 Ellis, American Creation, 194.
65 See proceedings o f the 3rd Congress in Annals o f  Congress, vol 4; and U.S. Statutes at Large,
Vol. 1, 4th Congress, 1st Session, Chapter 41. As Madison spoke on Jan 3, 1794: “It is in the
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By the time Washington sent John Jay to Britain to negotiate a new treaty with 
Britain at the end of 1794, the federal government was much stronger and its powers of 
commerce much more clearly defined than they had been the previous year. Congress, at 
the request of Washington, had seen to that. Jay sailed across the ocean with specific 
directions to maintain neutrality in European affairs to ensure that the Treasury’s coffers 
remained full from import duties by improving trade with Britain (while putting a stop to 
Royal Navy seizures of American shipping). With Congress having prohibited the 
foreign slave trade from U.S. ports, and threatening further economic sanctions against 
Britain, Jay was able to negotiate a treaty with Britain that, in part, secured American 
shipping rights to the British East and West Indies, while keeping U.S. ports open to 
British trade. While Jay received huge criticism for conceding to British demands, the 
treaty resulting from Jay’s negotiations nevertheless maintained American neutrality, and 
ensured that American commerce was protected, at least on paper.66
In reality, the closing of the foreign slave trade to American citizens at that time 
had very little real effect. Between 1787 and 1794, there had been 112 slave voyages 
recorded as flying the American flag, mostly to Cuba or the Dutch West Indies, and 
twenty-two of those landing in U.S. ports. In comparison, there were 1,073 British slave- 
trading voyages and 727 French voyages that sailed from African slave ports to the 
Americas. The American slaving voyages, primarily undertaken by trading companies in 
Newport and Salem, were extremely profitable, but the destruction of over 250 American 
ships in the West Indies by the British in just a few months points to the fact that West 
Indian trade not related to the slave trade was significantly crippled by the war between
66 Ellis, American Creation, 197.
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France and Britain. Losing a small market in slave trading (under an Act that was poorly 
enforced because of limited patrols), and extending an olive branch to the British, was 
seen as an adequate sacrifice for keeping open other lucrative trading opportunities.67
The Act of 1794 in Action:
It is difficult to determine if the Act of 1794 had any real effect against the slave 
trade. It was a very specific law, and, because there was no real mechanism for enforcing 
the act, prosecuting slavers proved difficult at best. What is clear, however, is that the 
African slave trade overall was on the rise, particularly as parts of South America 
developed as major slave plantation sites. A cursory examination of customs house 
entries shows that few American slave ships heeded the Act of 1794, as the Americans 
used thinly veiled disguises or delivered insincere promises not to trade in slaves.68 
Americans continued to outfit ships for the slave trade, including ports in states with 
prohibitions against importing slaves. For example, the logbooks of the Mary reveal the 
accounts of a slave voyage that began in Rhode Island, then sailed to Africa to purchase 
slaves, where they were sold in Georgia. This was legal trade.69
Not surprisingly, the Quakers were the most vocal in attempting to enforce the 
new anti-slave trade law. In May 1795, the Providence, Rhode Island Abolition Society 
printed the results of their annual meeting in the local United States Chronicle. They 
lamented the narrowness of the 1794 Act but pledged to “take such measures as may
67 Statistics come from the Slave Trade Database, slavevoyages.org, accessed March 4, 2013.
68 Donnan, Elizabeth, Vol III, 358 and 378. In the note, Donnan asserts that o f  the customhouse 
entries from Rhode Island, many more slave voyages were not recorded. Some slave ships may 
have found loopholes for the legitimate trade in slaves, but many did not heed the law.
59 Donnan, Vol III, 360-378.
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appear necessary to secure the execution of the said Act of Congress against all such 
persons as have or may violate it.”70 After 1794, Abolition societies would meet in 
Philadelphia to discuss the past years’ accomplishments (and failures) in the abolition of 
slavery. During the 1795 meeting, the convention agreed that no amendment was 
necessary for the Act of 1794, and that it was more important to ensure that the current 
Act was enforced.71 By 1796, morale in the Abolition Societies seemed to be low, since 
most chapters had failed to submit petitions to their state governments, and the 
Convention discussed the lack of compliance by these chapters. Nevertheless, the 
Philadelphia chapter considered itself “successful in prosecuting the law.”72
The Philadelphia chapter’s above comments reveal much about the changing 
tactics of the Abolition societies during the 1790s. Where originally these groups aimed 
to persuade state and federal governments to create laws against slavery and the slave 
trade, now their goals were to ensure enforcement of the laws. These societies, 
particularly in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, began to use their resources to bring cases 
against suspected violators.
In Pennsylvania, it was discovered that some ships were illegally using the Danish 
flag to evade the law. The Abolition society also discovered that a small number of 
merchant ships were departing American ports with legal cargo but carrying along with
70 United States Chronicle, May 21, 1795, Vol. XII, No. 593.
71 American Convention for Promoting the Abolition o f  Slavery, “M inutes... o f  the Second 
Convention,” Philadelphia, Poulson, 1795.
72 American Convention for Promoting the Abolition o f  Slavery, “M inutes... o f  the Third 
Convention,” Philadelphia, Poulson, 1796, 3.
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them a handful of slaves to sell in foreign ports.73 In this way, captains could more easily 
smuggle their illegal cargo while plying their legitimate trade. Unlike the large slavers, 
these merchant ships looked exactly the same as legal traders. Despite efforts of 
Abolitionist Societies, it was evident that the federal government simply did not have the 
effective power to prohibit the trade until 1808.74
In Virginia, questions arose concerning what to do with the slaves once a vessel 
was captured. On February 4, 1801, nearly seven years after the Act of 1794 went into 
effect, Thomas Newton, U.S. Representative from Virginia, wrote to Governor James 
Monroe asking what should be done with the thirty slaves found aboard a New England 
vessel off the coast of Havana. Monroe appears not to have known the answer, as seven 
days later he received a letter that stated, “the Act of Congress does not conflict with this 
[state] Act in its provisions since it is silent as to the disposition of the negroes on 
board.”75 Apparently federal silence sanctioned state profit, as Thomas Newton later 
wrote, “if there are any condemned negroes to be transported, there is an opportunity to 
sell about 30 to a place from which there will be no danger of their returning to 
Virginia.”76 The Act left much to the interpretation of those involved, particularly in how 
the law would be enforced. Presumably, the Africans were sold into slavery, with the 
support of the federal government.
73 American Convention for Promoting the Abolition o f  Slavery, “M inutes... o f  the Fourth 
Convention,” Philadelphia, Poulson, 1797, 20.
74 Annals o f  Congress vol 1,1227.
75 Donnan, vol IV, 167.
76 Ibid, 166n2.
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These reports highlighted real problems in the enforcement of the anti-slave trade 
Act of 1794. In 1797, the Abolition Society Convention moved to lobby Congress to 
strengthen and amend the Act of 1794. The Society sent a letter to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, Oliver Wolcott Jr., of Connecticut, to apprise him of the ineffectiveness of the 
law.77 The Act had initially deterred slavers but when it soon became clear that customs 
officials could not (or would not) enforce the law, the slave trade resumed and 
increased.78 By 1797, the Abolition Society of Rhode Island had brought several cases 
against suspected slavers to the District Court.
Jay Coughtry, a historian of the Rhode Island slave trade, has researched several 
cases tried under the Act of 1794. Clearly, there were many backroom deals and loose 
interpretations of the law, as members of the Society aimed to prosecute, rather than fine, 
slave traders. Abolition members resolved to drop their cases if the slave traders 
promised not to organize any more slave voyages. What appears to be the first successful 
prosecution occurred in Rhode Island in 1797, when John Brown was convicted of 
illegally trading slaves. His brother, Moses Brown, had tried to convince him to stop the 
trade in exchange for dropping the case, but John Brown had refused and Moses, a 
Quaker and active member of the Abolition Society, continued to pursue the case against 
him.79 This victory would be short-lived.
77 Coughtry, Jay, The Notorious Triangle, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), 18. For 
the De W olf family legacy see, Thomas Norman DeWolf, Inheriting the Trade: A Northern 
Family Confronts its Legacy as the Largest Slave-Trading Dynasty in U.S. History, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2008).
78 Coughtry, Notorious Triangle, 34.
79 Ibid, 214-6.
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Slavers employed many methods of evasion. Slave traders tended to be wealthy, 
high-standing members of society, particularly in the eighteenth century, which worked 
in their favor. Their influential connections enabled many to take advantage of the many 
loopholes in the law. On United States soil, slave ships could be detected and confiscated 
by customs officials, yet slave traders found many ways to circumvent prosecution. In 
Rhode Island, Coughtry has discovered that the influence of the slave traders in the court 
system led to sham auctions in which captains could easily reclaim their forfeited vessels. 
In 1799, the U.S. Customs agent ordered local customs officials to “obtain a fair estimate 
of [a slave ship’s] value and send someone to the auction to bid for the government.”80 
The Rhode Island surveyor was twice threatened by three prominent Rhode Island slave 
traders, and then was abducted before he arrived at the auction of a captured slave ship. 
While the government official was unhurt, the auction was carried out without his 
interference.
In another Rhode Island case, the brigantine Orange, was searched at sea and 
discovered to be carrying slaves. The Navy ship that searched her, however, could not 
confiscate the ship because the ship was at sea and had not yet landed slaves illegally. 
The Orange was released and, by the time the message was received by the Rhode Island 
customs officials, the owners of the Orange had initiated their own lawsuit (between the 
crew and owners for wages), which took precedent over the customs officials’ claim. 
The Judge, whose sons-in-law were involved in the slave trade, ruled in favor of the
80 Ibid, 217.
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owners, who were then able to repurchase their ship at low cost, successfully evading 
legal action.81
In addition to the existence of corrupt, bribed, or generally intimidated officials on 
land, there were problems at sea as well. A main problem with enforcement right up to 
the Civil War was that the U.S. Navy did not have the manpower to search every 
suspected ship. While the interior of a slave ship was radically different from that of 
other merchant ships because of its need to transport human cargo, from the exterior, a 
slave ship was “indistinguishable from the vessels that lay nearby.”82 The Navy could 
only search ships suspected of being slavers and, if the ship was in international waters, 
sometimes not even then. Even five years after the Act of 1794 had been passed, few 
ships had been confiscated, and even fewer had been taken to court.83 Slave traders were 
crafty, and often could circumvent the law through many loopholes: third-party 
ownership, use of foreign flags, bribery, and by peddling legal wares within the 
boundaries of the United States.
Clearly the suppression of the slave trade was not a national priority, except when 
considered a national security issue in the wake of European conflict. In terms of the 
slave trade, Americans were most concerned about restricting the importation of West 
Indian slaves into the U.S. In response, more measures were put in place to halt the West 
Indian slave traffic to the United States. A circular letter from Secretary of the Navy 
Thomas Pickering reminded captains of the specifics of the law and that “infractions of
81 Ibid, 218.
82 Coughtry, Notorious Triangle, 70.
83 Six suspected slave ships were captured by American vessels. Ericson, Slavery in the 
American Republic, 33.
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the act...have of late been frequently committed.”84 Several months later, Pickering 
warned John Morton, Consul of the United States in Havana, about the selling of ships to 
France or Spain. Additionally, Pickering wrote to Morton that “the vigilance of the 
Treasury Department and officers of the Customs has been insufficient to put a stop to 
the exercise of the slave trade by our citizens. Your situation will doubtless put it in your 
power to discover many vessels contravening the law.”85 This “vigilance” in Havana did 
have the effect of confiscating a Newport schooner that had just unloaded sixty-four 
African slaves in Cuba. While the schooner Betsey was sold, the death of the owner 
closed the case without prosecution.86
There were other convictions under the slave trade act of 1794, but because the 
Atlantic slave trade was growing, the effect on the trade was negligible. Newspapers 
occasionally printed the news of the capture of slave ships, as in the Lady Walterstorf 
Lindamin, and Mac, but these were short pieces conveying very little information, 
although these notices were reprinted widely.87 Some cases against slave ships did reach 
the Supreme Court, but only after the abolition of the slave trade in 1808.88 Even then,
84 Navy Circular, Benjamin Stoddert, Secretary o f  the Navy, addressed to Captain Lever, Sept. 5, 
1799. (Gilder Lehrman Collection), http://www.gilderlehrman.org/collections, accessed  
November 12, 2012.
85 letter from Timothy Pickering, Secretary o f  State, to John Morton, U.S. Consul in Havana, 
Cuba, November 16,1799. (Gilder Lehrman Collection, GLC 7221), 
http://www.gilderlehrman.org/collections, accessed November 12, 2012.
86 Coughtry, Notorious Triangle, 217.
87 Philadelphia Gazette, 2/23/1797; Gazette o f  the United States, 3/9/1797; Salem Gazette, 
9/20/1799.
88 Supreme Court Cases include: M ary Ann (8 Wheat 380) 5 Cond. Rep. 471; The Merino, 9 
Wheat 391, 6 Cond. Rep 623; Emily and Caroline, 9 Wheat 381; 6 Cond. Rep 623; The Antelope, 
10 Wheat 66; 6 Cond. Rep. 30; Margaret, 9 Wheat 421, 5 Cond. Rep 638; Tryphemea, 1 Wash 
CCR 522
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compromises still won out, and abolition on a national level was sacrificed for the sake of 
national unity and commercial prosperity.
The Act of 1794 and the strengthening of federal laws were effective at improving 
the regulation of commercial activity in ports but not in suppressing the slave trade. As 
the 1790s progressed, foreign nations continued to test U.S. sovereignty and the U.S. 
increasingly asserted itself as a nation able to compete on the global stage.89 Even after 
Jay’s Treaty, Britain failed to acknowledge American neutrality and commercial law, 
pressed sailors into the Royal navy, and refused to abandon western land claimed by the 
United States. As European chaos continued, the United States sought to increase its 
control over foreign trade and maintain economic and political stability. The Act of 1794 
created positive law that expressly focused on American trade and commercial voyages 
originating from U.S. ports. With this, the U.S. government attempted to claim a space on 
the international stage and increase its diplomatic clout.
The U.S. regulation of the slave trade in the 1790s reflects other concerns of that 
time period, namely that of the position of the U.S. between the warring nations of France 
and Britain. Regulating the slave trade was a low priority except when laws against it 
could aid the U.S. in foreign negotiations and protect other aspects of American foreign 
trade. With the Act of 1794, the federal government claimed its power to regulate the 
slave trade, which in turn expanded and further defined federal power. The Act made 
many promises, appeasing abolitionists and slaveholders alike. It seemed to abolitionists
89 Eliga Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, 3-4. Gould focuses on the making o f  a “treaty­
worthy” nation- that U.S. independence had much to do with international recognition. The U.S. 
had to prove itself in order to be considered “among the powers o f  the earth.”
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that the regulation of the slave trade might end slavery altogether, while slave owners 
ensured that slavery would be protected while minimizing the threat o f insurrection. 
While the Act demonstrated a stronger federal government on paper and on an 
international level, particularly in the regulation of trade, slave traders saw to it that the 
slave trade aspect of the law was unenforced and ineffective. Based on the fact that 
previous abolitionist petitions had been ignored, it is clear that the political “crises of 
1794” had primed the pump for increased trade regulations. The Act of 1794 was passed 
because it coincided with events that tested national sovereignty at home and abroad. 
Nevertheless, as the new century dawned, slave traders grew craftier in answering the 
increased, demand for slaves particularly in U.S. territories, the West Indies, and Brazil, 
despite the hopes of the abolitionist societies for the complete eradication of slavery.
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CHAPTER II
“A HORDE OF FOREIGN FREEBOOTERS": THE UNITED STATES, THE SLAVE
TRADE, AND BORDER CONTROL.
W E S T  I N D I E S
Figure 1 The G ulf o f  Mexico in 1817, indicating Galveston, New Orleans, and Amelia Island, 
Map o f  the United States... Charles Varle, Baltimore, 1817, D avid Rumsey Online Collection.
On January 10, 1818, a special Congressional committee submitted a report 
justifying the United States’ recent invasion of Spanish-owned Eastern Florida at a place 
called Amelia Island. The Spanish minister to the United States, Luis Onls, was furious 
that the United States seemed to be supporting the revolutionary governments in South 
America, whose privateers preyed on Spanish shipping. He was also incensed that the 
United States had the audacity to invade a foreign territory while at peace, even though 
Eastern Florida had, until the U.S. intervened, been occupied by men claiming to be
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“liberating” the territory from Spain. The Congressional committee sought to justify
their actions by arguing:
It does not appear that among these itinerant establishes of republics and 
distributers of Florida lands there is a single individual inhabitant of the 
country where the republic was to be constituted;... where the venerable 
forms by which a free people constituted a frame of government for 
themselves are prostituted by a horde of foreign freebooters, for purposes 
of plunder.1
From the United States’ perspective, these pirates, otherwise known as freebooters, were 
threatening the “security, tranquility, and commerce of this Union,” and had to be 
stopped. Since the Spanish government had shown itself to be incapable of controlling 
its territories, the Committee asserted that a U.S. invasion of the unruly territory was 
completely justified.
The U.S. invasion of Spanish-held Amelia Island in December 1817 occurred 
amid a prolonged period of expansion for the United States. After purchasing Louisiana 
territory in 1803, Congress turned to the disorderly, Spanish-held peninsula of Florida, 
actively courting Spain for its annexation. Through treaty, doctrine, threats, or brute 
force, the federal government would assert its powers and seek justification of one kind 
or another for its actions. By 1821, the United States could claim territory stretching 
from “sea to shining sea,” continuing the expansionist precedent set by Thomas Jefferson 
and the Louisiana Purchase.
In the case of the Amelia Island invasion in 1817, the federal government’s main 
claim that it had been acting legitimately was based on a secret act of Congress passed in 
1811, which authorized U.S. invasion of Spanish Florida if U.S border security was
1 House Document, 15th Cong., 1st Session, No. 290. “Suppression o f  Piratical Establishments.” 
January 10, 1818. 133.
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threatened, as well as the Anti-Slave Trade Act of 1807. Congress argued that the federal 
government had indeed acted appropriately in 1817 against unlawful and violent pirates 
and smugglers. In rationalizing its invasion of Spanish Florida, the U.S. government 
argued, among other points, that pirates on Amelia Island had caused the illegal 
importation of thousands of West Indian and African slaves into U.S. territories through 
Spanish Florida. While this was true, and many residents in Georgia were alarmed by the 
unauthorized immigration, the anti-slave trade law also was conveniently used by the 
federal government to justify the invasion for the protection of commerce and the control 
of its borders against these pirates. The incident offered the U.S. government another 
opportunity to extend its reach.
In the wake of the Amelia Island crisis of 1817, the United States Congress 
passed several new acts strengthening federal power, which included several slave trade 
acts. Some historians have argued that these Acts are evidence that the U.S. government 
did seek to end the slave trade for moral reasons. This chapter argues, however, that 
these Supplemental Slave Trade Acts were primarily aimed at protecting U.S. residents 
from uncontrolled slave populations and insurrections; improving border control; and 
protecting U.S. commerce by supporting African re-colonization efforts, expanding U.S. 
Navy patrols, and expanding the definition of piracy to include slave trading. Dominated 
by Southern slave owners, who capitalized on a thriving domestic slave trade and who 
competed with illicit slave smugglers, and Northern merchants whose livelihood 
depended on safe shipping, the federal government was more than willing to enact these
2 See for example, Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2001); Paul Finkelman, “Regulating the African Slave Trade,” Civil War History, Vol. LIV 
No. 4, 2008.
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stronger Supplemental Slave Trade Acts. While there was a moral component to slave 
trade suppression, the priorities continued to be to protect merchants and secure the 
United States’ expanding borders.
In analyzing the invasion of Amelia Island’s effect on federal slave trade laws, it 
is important to make the distinction between the slave trade to the United States and the 
participation in the foreign slave trade by Americans. By 1817, the institution of slavery 
in the United States was flourishing even with the slave importation ban. It was mainly 
the border regions that did not have ready access to legally acquired slaves that resisted 
government regulation and supported smuggling operations. As these pages will show, 
the U.S. was willing to regulate more strictly the slave trade to the U.S. because of 
concern about unchecked smuggling and piracy into U.S. territory. Stronger regulations 
against foreign pirates also secured U.S. shipping along the coast.3
The thriving domestic slave trade also provided support for the United States’ 
strengthening of anti-slave trade laws. The population of slaves in the relatively healthy 
environments in Virginia and Maryland fostered a profitable trade with the less 
developed Western states and territories. These eastern states leveraged their strong 
representation in the federal government to protect slavery and the domestic slave trade, 
while supporting laws that prohibited foreign slave imports. These slave states generally 
supported the banning of the slave trade, in part to capitalize on the growing interstate 
slave trade. Without an influx of slaves from Africa, they argued, their “surplus” slaves
3 Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 143-147; Ericson, 
5-7.
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would increase in value at the auction house.4 These states were eager to reap the profits 
of an internal slave trade and supported the abolition of the African slave trade, which 
competed with them as a source for slaves. Until the Civil War, the areas most notorious 
for breaking anti-slave trade laws by importing slaves were in newer U.S. territories such 
as Louisiana and Florida, where large plantation societies had not been established in the 
previous century. It was in these border regions where the federal government and 
smugglers sparred; the result was support by the general population for increased federal 
control and stronger laws against those who would compete with or threaten U.S. trade, 
including the domestic slave trade.
The U.S. Supplementary Slave Trade Acts of 1818-1820 created the strongest 
anti-slave trade laws in the world. It is no coincidence that they were enacted in 
conjunction with other laws aimed at increasing the federal regulation of imports in the 
wake of several threats to U.S. commercial interests, namely at the piratical strongholds 
of Galveston, in the Gulf of Mexico, and Amelia Island in Eastern Florida. While the 
territories in question were not on U.S. soil, the activities of their inhabitants threatened 
U.S. shipping and caused the illegal smuggling of thousands of dollars of goods and 
slaves into the United States. The threat to commerce by bands of smugglers who would 
strike at any ship, regardless of its nationality, prompted the federal government to crack 
down on illegal imports and smuggler strongholds and increase legal commerce in these 
areas. Unchecked slave smuggling, in particular, alarmed many border inhabitants and 
motivated the U.S. government to act. Even though many Americans were involved in
4 For the status o f  freed blacks in nineteenth, see Watson Jennison, Cultivating Race (Lexington: 
University Press o f  Kentucky, 2012), 290-1, and Introduction for changing status from colonial 
era to Civil War.
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illegal smuggling, the presence of foreign freebooters “offered a convenient rationale for 
a U.S. invasion and occupation that happened to coincide with diplomatic efforts” to 
annex Florida.5 Complications arose on a diplomatic level, however, when these pirates 
claimed their legitimacy as wartime privateers through South American republics—new 
nations the United States tacitly supported.
Background and Context
The link between the slave trade and U.S. border control stemmed from the 1808 
prohibition of the trade and the rise of an illegal market for slaves along the poorly 
controlled southern U.S. border. In the twenty years since the Constitutional Convention, 
slavery within the United States had become more entrenched in the South and continued 
to develop as U.S. borders spread westward. The worldwide demand for cotton and 
sugar increased, particularly as modes of transportation and industry improved, 
populations increased, and new trading markets opened. Technological innovations, such 
as the power loom and cotton gin, all were intimately connected to agricultural slave 
labor. The swelling demand for slave-produced goods like cotton and sugar, in turn, 
drove up the demand for slaves.6
The United States’ rapid territorial expansion also contributed to increased 
demand for slave labor. This demand fostered a strong interstate slave trade from Eastern 
slave states and contributed to the growing illicit trade in borderland communities like 
New Orleans and parts of Spanish Florida. Jefferson’s purchase of Louisiana from the
5 Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation, 147.
6 Herbert Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 204.
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French in 1803 opened vast tracts of agricultural land for white settlers, many of whom 
brought their slaves with them. As the new territory extended U.S. land claims in North 
America, it also promoted the growth of slavery and increased dependence on slave 
labor, particularly as new settlers planted cotton, which was then purchased by New 
England and European mill owners.7
The Louisiana Purchase had another direct effect on the growing slave trade and 
the expansion of slavery into U.S. territory. By 1798 all states had outlawed the slave 
trade primarily because of a fear of slave insurrection. Yet, three weeks after the 
announcement that Louisiana territory had been purchased by the United States, the 
South Carolina legislature voted to reopen the trade. Since the trade had been prohibited 
in that state for fourteen years, this cannot have been coincidental. Historian Jed 
Shugarman argues that the reopening of the trade at this time did not have immediate 
benefits for coastal South Carolinians but it did aim to prevent the smuggling of 
“dangerous” slaves from the West Indies and to ensure that the southern territories would 
become slave states. Ensuring the expansion of slavery, Southern slave owners could 
protect their interests when these future slave states sent legislators to Congress. 
Nevertheless, South Carolina’s reopening of the slave trade did alarm most Americans,
7 While Fehrenbacher disagrees with the idea that Southerners engineered the expansion o f  
slavery into the territories, it is certainly a fact that territorial expansionism led to the expansion 
o f slavery and increased number o f  slave states. See Fehrehbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 119. 
For a discussion on the expanding domestic trade see Deyle, Steven. “An ‘Abominable’ New  
Trade: The Closing o f  the African Slave Trade and the Changing Patterns o f  U.S. Political Power, 
1808-60.” William and M ary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 66, No. 4, Abolishing the Slave 
Trades: Ironies and Reverberations (Oct. 2009), 839-43. See also James Lewis, The American 
Union and the Problem o f  Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse o f  the Spanish 
Empire, 1783-1829, 1998.
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and President Jefferson encouraged Congress to pass an act to prohibit the “odious 
commerce.”8
As the year 1808 approached and the twenty-year moratorium on federal action 
prohibiting the slave trade reached its expiration date, lawmakers once again turned their 
attention to the slave trade. The 1807 debates over the proposed slave trade prohibition 
rekindled questions about the status of free blacks in America, the supremacy of the 
federal government over states, and the best method by which to “relocate” captured 
Africans under the proposed ban. According to the Constitution, slave status depended 
on individual states and the federal government did not have the authority to regulate 
slavery. This meant that if captured illegal slaves were forfeited to the federal 
government, then the federal government, as owner of these slaves, would be subject to 
the laws of the state in which the enslaved Africans were captured. The Government 
“could not free the Negroes contrary to such laws.”9 Most Southerners, and many 
Northerners, argued that if slaves were returned to Africa at great federal expense, they 
would most likely be re-enslaved anyway. As a result, with some exceptions, many 
Americans had come to believe that slaves would be better off living enslaved in the 
United States than re-enslaved or killed in Africa.10 Although the Act eventually passed, 
it “came very near being a dead letter.”11
8 Jed Handelsman Shugarman, “The Louisiana Purchase and South Carolina’s Reopening o f the 
Slave Trade in 1803 ."Journal o f  the Early Republic, Vol, 22, No. 2 (Summer 2002), 277, 289; 
and David Bryon Davis, Inhuman Bondage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 160.
9 Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 95 ,101.
10 Ibid, 102.
11 Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 110; for more on the slave trade debates see Matthew 
Mason, “Slavery Overshadowed: Congress Debates Prohibiting the Atlantic Slave Trade to the 
United States, 1806-1807.” Journal o f  Early Republic, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 2000), 59-81; also
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The Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves (the Act of 1807) passed in March
of 1807 and went into effect on January 1, 1808.12 The 1807 Act stipulated that no one of
African descent could be imported by anyone into the United States with the intent to sell
or enslave that person. The penalties could run as high as $20,000 for outfitting a ship 
11for the trade. The Act increased federal power, especially over imports, and increased 
the role of Customs Agents in the regulation of commerce. The Act also stated that all 
ships had to be registered at U.S. customs houses and any captured slaves would be put 
under the protection of the U.S. Marshal or Governor of that particular state. The intent 
of the bill was to free illegal slaves or send them to Africa, but in the Constitution, the 
regulation of slavery was left up to the states. Therefore, in slave states, these captured 
Africans were often sold to the highest bidder and endured a life o f slavery under the Act 
of 1807. While the most important aspect of this slave trade law was its contribution to 
the expansion of federal powers—no small feat during Jefferson’s administration- the 
law nevertheless illustrates the limits to federal authority.14 As the Constitution 
outlined, the federal government could regulate the slave trade, but slavery and Africans 
captured on confiscated slave ships would fell under the jurisdiction of the states. While
Robinson, Slavery in the Structure o f  American Politics, 329-332; and Fehrenbacher,
Slaveholding Republic, 144-147.
12 See “An Act to Prohibit the Importation o f  Slaves,” ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807); Goldfarb,
Stephen J., “An Inquiry into the Politics o f  the Prohibition o f  the International Slave Trade,” 
Agricultural History, Vol. 68, No. 2. Eli Whitney’s Cotton Gin, 1793-1993: A Symposium 
(Spring, 1994), 31. In this dissertation it is referred to as the Act o f  1807, although some 
historians call it the Act o f  1808.
13 This penalty resulted from a compromise made when the death penalty was struck from the 
punishment. Du Bois, The Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 103.
14 Paul Finkelman, “The American Suppression o f  the African Slave Trade,” Akron Law Review, 
p. 461; and Mason, “Slavery Overshadowed,” 59-72.
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the federal government did claim the power to suppress the slave trade, the actual effect 
of these laws on the suppression of the slave trade was fairly weak. With no clear-cut 
method to regulate traffic, no specific enforcement authority, and few federal resources 
devoted to suppressing the slave trade, the federal government could not effectively end 
the traffic even if it had been a priority.15
From a Constitutional perspective, although the U.S. government was able to 
prohibit the slave trade after 1808, it was not granted the power to outlaw slavery, which 
would have eliminated the demand that kept the slave trade active. Lawmakers were 
already divided on the issue of slavery and unwilling to push the law further. When war 
broke out with Britain in 1812, regulating the slave trade took a back seat to more 
pressing security measures in the United States.16 At the same time, American privateers 
took advantage of wartime prizes, capturing British merchant ships, including those 
carrying slaves.
Because the demand for slaves in the new U.S. territories remained high while the 
slave trade had been made illegal, “respectable” slave traders before 1808 were replaced 
by illicit smugglers, particularly in New Orleans and parts of Florida. These smugglers 
took advantage of the lax federal regulation in these outer regions. While the federal 
government was generally unresponsive towards the suppression of American
15 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 152. David Eltis and W.E.B. Du Bois were 
underwhelmed in their analysis o f  the Act o f  1807. See David Eltis, “The U.S. Transatlantic 
Slave Trade,” Civil War History Vol. LIV, No. 4, 2008, 722; W.E.B. Du Bois called U.S. efforts 
as “a few unsystematic and spasmodic attempts” to halt the trade see 115. When compiling data 
from the Du Bois Slave Trade database, Eltis found that, from an international perspective, the 
years 1830 and 1860 had a much more significant impact on the abolition o f  the slave trade than 
1808 for reasons to be explored later in this dissertation.
16 See Donald Hickey, “American Trade Restrictions during the War o f  1812,” Journal o f  
American History, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Dec. 1981), 517-538.
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participation in the foreign slave trade, during the 1810s and 1820s it made efforts to 
control the rampant smuggling of enslaved Africans into the United States, primarily 
along the Gulf of Mexico and Florida. If legislators and the general public could not 
agree among themselves about slavery, most could support government measures taken 
to control those participating in illegal smuggling, which avoided customs agents and 
import fees.
The Gulf coast was particularly vulnerable to smuggling because it was poorly 
patrolled. A longtime contested area between the Spanish, French, British, Americans, 
and Native American tribes, the clashing of cultures gave rise to thriving underground 
commercial and political networks. U.S. government measures taken during this period 
against smugglers and “patriot invaders” claiming independence from the Spanish empire 
exposed problems in the federal suppression of the slave trade under the Act of 1807. 
Smugglers and pirates, like the infamous Lafitte brothers and fellow Frenchman, Luis- 
Michel Aury, drew the attention of the federal government because of their aggressive 
antics, avoidance of customs duties, and questionable ties to revolutionary governments. 
While the local residents may have supported their smuggling operations, the federal 
government did not.17
American Pirates and the Profitability of Slave Smug?lin#;
The nature of the slave trade was changing in significant ways, and not solely 
because of the 1807 laws. The institution of slavery was protected by the U.S.
17 Although Fehrenbacher argued that the 1821 annexation o f  Florida largely ended slave imports 
into the United States, there were still thousands o f  slaves who were smuggled into the U.S. either 
directly from Africa or via Texas and Cuba.
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government and, with the slave population increasing naturally, there was no need for 
additional foreign slave imports to sustain it. Southern states that had protested the 
federal government’s control over slave imports now capitalized on the expansion of 
slavery into western territories. While illegal importations did exist, lack of demand for 
new slaves drove legal compliance perhaps more than the actual federal enforcement of 
its prohibition.
Demand for smuggled slaves was strong along the Gulf Coast, however, where 
the U.S. domestic slave trade could not reach. The Gulf of Mexico was a breeding 
ground for pirates, smugglers, and revolutionary patriots, and it was often difficult to 
distinguish between the three. The U.S. had little regard for any of these types because 
they were seen as a direct threat to national security and legal American commerce 
through their ties to renegade armies and their notoriety for seizing merchant vessels.
The Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812 produced huge incentives for 
privateering. When peace returned after 1812, many privateers were reticent to give up 
their lucrative trade and registered themselves as South American ships to prey on 
Spanish merchants. These vessels captured thousands of slaves in the process and sold 
them in or near American ports, as local custom agents turned a blind eye. The Spanish- 
American governments that commissioned these privateers benefitted through sharing the 
profits and by crippling enemy trade. Often, however, legal prizes bled into illegal 
pirating if the legitimacy of the government supporting the privateers was questioned, or 
if the privateers began seizing neutral merchant ships. The Gulf of Mexico and the 
Caribbean were notorious breeding grounds for these patriot-pirates. The Slave Trade 
Act of 1807 merely “added one more incentive for smuggling” by making desirable
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African slaves an illegal commodity.18 The U.S. government mostly ignored these 
privateers and smuggling operations until these ships began to interfere with U.S. trade. 
In 1818, the United States asserted its national power to protect its commercial interests 
by invading Spanish Florida. This action led directly to a near war with Spain, a clearer 
definition of piracy, and a stronger effort to suppress the slave trade to the United 
States.19
Three men who conducted business in the borderland regions of the Gulf and 
Caribbean exemplify the ambiguities between legal trader and pirate: Luis-Michel Aury, 
Jean Lafitte, and Gregor McGregor. All three claimed their legitimacy through the South 
American republics, all three directly or indirectly participated in the smuggling of slaves 
into the United States, and all three were brought to the attention of U.S. officials, leading 
to better protection of U.S. commerce and a broader definition of piracy. Their stories
18 William C. Davis, The Pirates Lafitte, (Orlando: Harcourt Press, 2005).
19 Again, it is important to separate the slave trade to the United States and the U.S. participation 
in the foreign trade. The slave trade acts o f  1807 and 1818-1820 address the former and, in 
conjunction with protecting commerce and U.S. borders, were supported by most Americans.
The latter was poorly regulated, and, as following chapters will show, and would increase 
dramatically during the nineteenth century. For the historiography o f  the Spanish-American War 
o f  Independence see: Kenneth Andrien and Lyman Johnson, The Political Economy o f  Spanish 
America in the Age o f  Revolution, 1750-1850  (Albuquerque: University o f  New Mexico Press, 
1994); Timothy Anna, Spain and the Loss o f  Empire, (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 
1983); Christon Archer, ed. The Wars o f  Independence in Spanish America (Wilmington: SR 
Books, 2000); Matthew Brown, Adventuring through Spanish Colonies: Simon Bolivar, Foreign 
Mercenaries and the Birth o f  New Nations (Liverpool University Press, 2006); John Charles 
Chasteen, Americanos: Latin America's Struggle fo r  Independence (Oxford University Press, 
2008); Michael Costeloe, Response to Revolution: Imperial Spain and the Spanish American 
Revolutions, 1810-1840  (Cambridge University Press, 1986); John Lynch, The Spanish American 
Revolutions, 1808-1826  (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986); Jaime Rodriguez, The Independence 
o f  Spanish America (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States 
and the Independence o f  Latin America, 1800-1830, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1941).
68
demonstrate the interconnectedness of the Spanish/Anglo Atlantic world, where people 
and regions claimed multiple nationalities and cultural identities.20
Of the three, Commodore Luis-Michel Aury ran the most widespread smuggling 
operations in the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and Florida. A handsome young 
adventurer, Aury crossed and re-crossed national boundaries and identity. He walked a 
fine line between a sanctioned patriot and lawless pirate. Bom in France in 1788, as a 
young adult he caught the Revolutionary spirit of the age and joined Mexico in the South 
American Wars of Independence. During the course of his short life, his fortunes rose 
and fell, particularly as he increasingly became involved in privateering operations under 
the flag of Mexico.21 In 1816, Aury was appointed by Manuel Herrera, a Mexican 
revolutionary, to form a government loyal to Mexico on the island of Galveston. 
Galveston was considered a prime location for smuggling operations during the early 
nineteenth century as it was located near the U.S. border and had an excellent harbor. As 
governor of the new republic, Aury commissioned privateers to raid Spanish ships in an
20 Eliga Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds,” American H istorical Review  112.3 
(June 2007): 765-6, 786. For more on borderland history see William Cronon, George Miles and 
Jay Gitlin. Eds., Under an Open Sky: Rethinking A m erica’s Western Past (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., 1992); Jack Forbes, “Frontiers in American History and the Role o f  the Frontier 
Historian,” Ethnohistory, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring, 1968), 203-235; Gerald Poyo and Gilberto M. 
Hinojosa, “Spanish Texas and Borderlands Historiography in Transition: Implications for United 
States History,” Journal o f  American History 75:2 (1988), 393-416; Cynthia Radding, “Conquest, 
Chronicles, and Cultural Encounters: The Spanish Borderlands o f  North America,” in 
Ethnohistory, Vol. 47, No. 3-4 (2000), 767-775; Benjamin Johnson and Andrew Graybill Eds. 
Bridging National Borders in North America: Transnational and Comparative Histories, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
21 letters documenting Aury’s life can be found in Container One, Luis Aury Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library o f  Congress, Washington, D.C. and in Lancaster Dabney’s article “Luis Aury: 
The First Governor o f  Texas under the Mexican Republic” in Southwestern H istorical Quarterly, 
Vol. 42, No. 2 (Oct., 1938), 108-116.
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attempt to weaken the foundering Spanish empire, and to line their own pockets as well.22 
Through his efforts, Galveston became a supply line for the importation of slaves into 
Louisiana. Aury benefited from a local demand for smuggled goods and illegal slave 
trading, but support for his operations did not extend to the federal government, which 
was receiving more and more demands from merchants for the protection of commercial 
vessels from the likes of Aury.23
Smuggling networks like Aury’s did not go unnoticed by U.S. officials. In 1817, 
a newly appointed customs agent, Beverly Chew, took on the vast network of corruption 
and targeted Aury’s operations directly. Chew wrote that he was unable to stop the 
“shameful violations of the slave act, as well as our revenue laws,... by a motley mixture 
of freebooters and smugglers, at Galveston, under the Mexican flag,” where many of 
Aury’s collaborators were U.S. citizens.24 But Beverly Chew was also a businessman. 
As a customs agent he benefitted from the fees collected at customs, but he also 
participated in his own smuggling operations, and he was not above turning a blind eye to 
slave importations when he could profit.25
22 Eugene C. Barker, “African Slave Trade in Texas,” The Quarterly o f  the Texas State Historical 
Association, Vol. 6, No. 2 (October, 1902), 146.
There are many petitions to the Customs Agents and the federal government by merchants 
during this time. See PresMsg 1817.
24 Beverly Chew, quoted in Barker, 146; see also Ernest Obadele-Starks, Freebooters and 
Smugglers (Fayetteville: University o f  Arkansas Press, 2007).
25 Chew was an interesting character in New Orleans and his conduct is a perfect example o f  the 
grey legal area so prevalent in the border regions during this period. When he could profit from 
suppressing the slave trade, he would. When he could profit from smuggling, he would. In an 
interesting side note, Chew would also assist slaves and free people o f  color, when it served his 
purpose. See Obadele-Starks, Freebooters, 42-45.
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If Aury had maintained his trade outside of U.S. territory, or preyed solely on 
Spanish ships, his movements likely would not have been considered threatening to the 
U.S. That Aury’s smuggled slaves may have been West Indian slaves, considered 
dangerous by many Americans, made Aury’s activities more suspicious to Chew and his 
agents. From early in 1817, Aury’s movements were tracked by customs agents and, 
when Aury moved his operations eighty miles south from Galveston to Matagorda in the 
spring of 1817, President Monroe was quickly informed.26
Attacks on the private property of U.S. citizens in the region mounted, 
presumably under Aury’s command. Chew, the officious customs agent, submitted to 
Congress letters of protest from American merchants who had been attacked by Aury’s 
corsairs. Their accounts depict Aury’s band as ruthless criminals without regard for 
personal belongings or laws of nations.27 Unable to protect U.S. merchants at sea, Chew 
also could not stop the smuggling of goods into Louisiana. Because he had no real proof 
of Aury’s activities and Aury was not officially recognized as a pirate, Chew could only 
take note of the dozen Mexican and Venezuelan ships floating at the New Orleans 
wharves; he could not arrest them.28 Merchants requested convoy protection from these 
pirates, as the British Navy had done in the Caribbean, but the United States did not have 
the naval power to comply.
26 Chew to Crawford, August 30, 1817, in Message from the President... Communicating 
Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817), 
13.
27 Chew to Crawford in ibid, 12,16-17.
28 Chew to Crawford, in ibid, 13; for an account o f  attacks on ships Pomona, Freelove and 
Firebrand, all US vessels; also o f  brig Charles see ibid, 25; and Aury’s authorization o f  attacks 
see ibid, 30. Chew was also a business partner o f  Jean Lafitte, so he may not have wanted to 
suppress all “piratical” activity. See Obadele-Starks, Freebooters, 44.
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More and more accounts labeling Aury and his followers as ruthless pirates came 
to the attention of the federal government. One source claimed that Aury was not even 
legitimately authorized by the Mexican government or any former Spanish colony.29 
American citizens were also implicated in Aury’s criminal networks. When rumors 
started circulating that patriots under General Mifia were to attack Pensacola after 
resupplying in U.S. ports, residents reacted with alarm. Although this rumor proved 
false, it was one more strike against the South American patriot cause, although Aury’s 
abandonment of Matagorda in July 1817 raised eyebrows.30 The U.S. could not afford to 
turn a blind eye to the operations of organizations that posed even a rumored threat to 
U.S. territory. By the time Aury and his fleet resurfaced in Eastern Florida in September 
1817, the United States was convinced he was nothing but a lawless pirate.
Aury was not the only patriot/pirate operating in the Gulf of Mexico. Also from 
France, Jean Lafitte and his brother Pierre resided in New Orleans and environs, 
capturing prizes and selling goods and slaves on the black market. At times deeply in 
debt and always watched by U.S. customs officials, the Lafittes nevertheless ran some 
legal businesses and assisted the American forces during the battle of New Orleans in 
1815, earning them full pardons from their smuggling convictions.31 Jean’s national 
alliances shifted with the prevailing winds, spying for both the Spanish and Mexican
29 15th Congress, 1st Session, No. 290, “Suppression o f  Piratical Establishments, Reported on 
January 10, 1818), 137. and Chew to Crawford in M essage from  the P resid en t... Communicating 
Information ...o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817), 
10 .
30 Morris to Secretary o f  Navy, March 14,1817, in ibid, 22.
31 See Davis, Pirates Lafitte, 225.
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governments at various points. Like Aury, Lafitte saw the benefits o f the border regions 
for his smuggling operations.
Many of Jean Lafitte’s prizes were ships captured in the West Indies, mostly 
Spanish slavers heading to or from Cuba, one of the last legal slave trade ports in the 
Caribbean. Lafitte’s knowledge of the Gulf Coast and Mississippi River tributaries, and 
his vast network of connections in Louisiana, made it relatively easy for his captured 
human cargo to be sold to American planters.32 Jean Lafitte was quick to capitalize on 
Aury’s departure, immediately seizing Galveston Island. Under Lafitte, a provisional 
government was set up in order to display some sort of authenticity. Jean Lafitte’s 
government at Galveston used the flags of the South American republics to hide their 
smuggling and piratical operations. His claims to legitimacy, however, fooled no one.
Both Lafitte and Aury capitalized on the poorly patrolled U.S. coast, benefitting 
from weak national alliances of the residents and high demand for smuggled goods. The 
nature of these borderlands in which these men worked, such as in New Orleans, was that 
of a twisted mixing of loyalties, nationalities, and cultures. In the corsairs’ world, profit 
came before flag allegiance. In one decade alone, Jean Lafitte aided the governments of 
Mexico, Spain, France and the United States. These shifting allegiances created a 
complicated web of interaction. Even the U.S. Navy was not free from these backroom 
deals.
The networks and alliances along the Gulf of Mexico made it particularly difficult 
to separate patriot action from piratical activity. Captain Daniel Patterson, a veteran of
32 Barker, 148; also Message from  the P residen t... Communicating Information ...ofAm elia  
Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817), 18, and Chew to 
Crawford, August 30, 1817, in 15th Congress, 1st Session, No. 290, “Suppression o f  Piratical 
Establishments, January 10, 1818,” 135.
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the War of 1812 and the Barbary Wars, commanded the U.S. S. Firebrand, off the coast of 
New Orleans. In 1811, he had orchestrated a raid of Barataria, near New Orleans to 
crack down on Lafitte’s smuggling and the outfitting of Mexican privateers.33 At the 
same time, Patterson was a long-time member of the New Orleans Alliance, an 
organization that supported Mexican independence. Under the guise of cruising for 
pirates, Patterson’s Firebrand escorted Mexican ships on several supply voyages in 1815 
and 1816, providing protection against Spanish raiders.34 A “cargo of arms” that Beverly 
Chew reported lost, was very likely part of one of these escorted trips.35 As with the 
claiming of the Barataria prizes, Patterson was compensated for his efforts. While 
technically acting illegally, the United States’ tacit support of South American 
independence did not, in Patterson’s reasoning, contradict his mission as a captain in the 
Navy. Even when the Spanish minister, Luis de Onis, reported Patterson’s actions to the 
U.S. State Department, Patterson remained at his post, although in 1816 the customs 
collector in New Orleans was replaced by Beverly Chew.36 In 1818, Patterson wrote to 
the Secretary of the Navy concerning the abandonment of Galveston, and the capture of 
several Mexican privateers. He also submitted a memorial on behalf of New Orleans 
merchants against several privateers of the United Provinces of South America. Clearly, 
Patterson considered the violations of laws against piracy much more heinous than the
33 Davis, Pirates Lafitte, 79.
34 Davis, Pirates Lafitte, 261.
35 See Davis, Pirates Lafitte, 262; and Chew to Crawford, in Message from the President... 
Communicating Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E.
De Krafft, 1817), 13.
36 Davis, Pirates Lafitte, 280.
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violation of neutrality laws, especially when the piracy claims were against American 
citizens and their capture earned him prize money.37
Patterson’s stance towards the Mexican government echoes that of the United 
States. U.S. expansionists like President James Monroe hoped that South American 
independence would rid European occupation of North America, which would grant the 
United States control of land from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans.38 Privateers and 
freebooters would be tolerated—unless they threatened U.S. territorial or commercial 
interests. Increasing threats to U.S. shipping in the wake of the wars of independence 
forced the United States to act. The problem lay in the fact that the new American 
republic did not have the federal strength to effectively protect merchants even after the 
Navy improvements made on the eve of the War of 1812. The U.S. government’s first 
goals became to create specific definitions for piracy and smuggling and to enact laws to 
punish violators. On a diplomatic level, this meant that the U.S. had to make distinctions 
between the patriot-privateer and freebooter pirate.
Despite what appears to be a real attempt to curb illegal smuggling (or at least 
operations in which he was not financially involved), Beverly Chew was fighting a losing 
battle. With thousands of miles of coastline and only a small squadron patrolling, the
37 Patterson to Secretary o f  the Navy Aug 4, 1817, in Message from  the P resid en t... 
Communicating Information ...o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, D ec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. 
De Krafft, 1817), 12-13; it is no wonder that in his July 28 ,1817  letter to the Secretary o f  the 
Navy he wrote that he had no information on the “conduct o f foreign armed vessels” and other 
transactions, although he must have been well aware o f  their movements. He focused on the 
attacks on American ships by several South American privateers, which “have been robbed o f  
specie to a considerable amount,” in Message from  the P resid en t... Communicating Information 
. ..o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817), 36.
38 This is the basis o f  the Monroe Doctrine from President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message to 
Congress, December 2, 1823, while the “Manifest Destiny” interpretation o f  the Doctrine did not 
occur until later, Monroe’s Doctrine nevertheless cautioned European nations to stay out o f  
American affairs, see Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, Epilogue.
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U.S. government could not properly monitor its borders. These ships were also at a 
disadvantage because they could not maneuver into the shallow inlets like the smaller 
smuggling ships could. In a letter to the Secretary of the Treasuiy, Beverly Chew wrote 
of the “necessity of either granting a certain number of revenue cutters,... or that the 
naval force on this station be enjoined strictly to prevent these privateers from hovering 
in our waters and violating our laws.”39 Chew seems to have been frustrated with the 
smugglers’ abilities to thwart his customs agents, and this frustration motivated him to 
improve the effectiveness of the U.S. government. While he ordered that all ships 
arriving from the “patriot” town of Galveston be searched, it was not because they were 
importing goods into New Orleans, but because he suspected that they were not 
authorized by the Mexican government.40 Public backlash against the increased 
government regulations of privateers in New Orleans compelled Chew to justify his 
actions for capturing privateers in August 1817 after he was accused of “being an enemy 
to personal liberty.”41 Whether or not he knew Patterson was involved in the New 
Orleans Alliance, Chew complained about the role of United States citizens in these 
piratical exploits. Among his biggest complaints was the smuggling of slaves into the 
region.
39 Chew to Crawford, Aug 1, 1817, in Message from  the P resid en t... Communicating 
Information ...o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, D ec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817), 
p. 11, and Chew to Crawford, October 17,1817, in 15th Congress, l sl Session, No. 290, 
“Suppression o f  Piratical Establishments, Reported on Januaiy 10, 1818), 136
40 Chew to Crawford, August 1 ,1817, in Message from the President... Communicating 




By 1817, only Spain and Portugal permitted the slave trade. As a result, their 
slave ships were targeted by South American privateers and pirates because their human 
cargo could be worth a great deal of money. It did not escape Beverly Chew’s notice that 
in New Orleans slaves were being smuggled into the region and purchased by the area 
planters. But simply knowing about clandestine slave importations did not mean these 
smugglers could be caught. The U.S.S. Boxer, patrolling off the coast of New Orleans, 
seized slaves that had been purchased by American planters, but the captures appeared 
more by accident than because of the Navy’s effectiveness. Beverly Chew wrote to the 
Secretary of the Treasury of a planned smuggling trip he had learned about through 
informants but the U.S. Navy was unable to catch the freebooters.42 Because of 
inaccurate maps, or perhaps an unwillingness to pursue these smugglers, the commander 
of the Boxer, John Porter, wrote it “will not be in my power to approach nearer the shore 
than within ten miles off the Sabine, and not nearer than thirty off the Atchafalya 
[River].”43 Porter reported that he would utilize smaller boats to attempt to halt 
smuggling from Galveston to Louisiana. But, the waters were dangerous, and the Boxer 
was lost in October 1817, leaving the coast virtually unpatrolled.
Even if slave ships were captured, there were other obstacles in the way. While 
the 1807 Act outlined proper legal procedure for the prosecution of slave traders, Chew 
wrote, “owing to the unfortunate absence of the judge, no decision can be had thereon.”44 
Chew was unraveling a complex web of illicit trading, complete with absent judge.
42 Chew to Crawford, in ibid, 12.
43 Porter to Crowninshield, June 28,1817, in ibid, 35.
44 Chew to Crawford, August 1,1817, in ibid, 10.
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Smugglers had other means for evading the state and territorial laws against slave 
importations. One method, utilized by the Lafittes, employed the technique of bribing 
corrupt officials to capture illegal slaves and sell them at public market, where the 
original importers would purchase them at reduced prices. The slaves thus became legal 
and could be sold to planters without risk of capture. This “laundering” of slaves could 
only be accomplished in states whose laws stipulated that captured slaves be sold for the 
benefit of the state, such as in Georgia and Louisiana, but it proved to be highly effective. 
Demand was so high for slaves from Africa that the extra expenses paid in bribes did not 
deter planters.45 Slave-owners were too willing to “render [smugglers] every possible 
assistance.”46
When customs agents were able to sniff out illegal traders, they would pry open 
the hold and find the ships empty of their human cargo even while the stench of their 
horrific journey lingered. While customs agents condemned these abandoned ships, very 
rarely could their owners be tracked down. Captains could also avoid regular procedure 
by coming into the harbors under supposed “duress.” False papers would show that the 
ship never intended to land there, so the customs agents could not perform a search. 
Then, as the ship made its so-called repairs, the cargo could be secretly unloaded and 
sold.47
45 Davis, The Pirates Lafitte, 63.
46 Morris to Crowninshield, June 10, 1817, in Message from the President... Communicating 
Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817), 
35.
47 Chew to Crawford, October 17, 1817, in ibid, 15; and Davis, Pirates Lafitte, 26.
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Customs agents did seem to be informed of the movements of smugglers but they 
consistently seemed to arrive a day late and a dollar short. While at Galveston, 
Commodore Aury sold over three hundred slaves to local planters and took more with 
him on his way to Florida in July 1817.48 Other reports of slave gangs came too late for 
officials to organize a capture. Once the smugglers had avoided being caught while 
unloading slaves, customs agents had no evidence with which to arrest them. The 
recently imported Africans disappeared in plain view on the plantations. Once there, 
there was little agents could do to recover the slaves.49
Chew was connected to enough informers to know that Commodore Aury had 
abandoned Galveston in late July 1817. He then received a letter directly from Aury 
stating that he had taken his government with him, therefore absolving himself of 
anything that might happen after his departure. Although Galveston was considered to be 
under United States jurisdiction, it was poorly patrolled, and, by August, the Lafitte 
brothers had set up shop there, continuing their privateering missions.50 With Barataria 
still not well patrolled by the United States, Chew argued, “nothing is easier... [than for a] 
privateer... to commit hostilities against the persons and property of a nation with whom 
the United States are at peace.”5’ To Chew, the businessman, the violations to U.S.
48 Porter to Crowninshield, June 28 ,1817, Message from the President... Communicating 
Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817),
35.
49 Chew to Crawford, October 17, 1817, in ibid, 14.
50 Chew to Crawford, August 30, 1817, in ibid, 12.
51 Chew to Crawford, October 17, 1817, in ibid, 15.
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merchants were the crux of the problem, not specifically the introduction of slaves into 
the territory.
Figure 2: Luis-Michel Aury (probably se lf portrait, 1816), Jean LaFitte (Rosenberg Library,
Galveston, Texas), and Gregor McGregor (General Gregor M acGregor, by Martin Tovar y 
Tovar, 1874)
McGregor, Aury and the Seizure of Amelia Island:
The slave trade and piratical activity was not restricted to Louisiana and Texas. 
Tiny Amelia Island, on the border between Georgia and Eastern Spanish Florida, became 
the center of international crisis during the early nineteenth century, nearly causing a war 
between the United States and Spain. The island was a hornet’s nest of smugglers, 
patriots, slaves, freemen, and privateers, not necessarily exclusive of each other. Well- 
known as a primary location for the smuggling of goods and slaves into the United States 
after Jefferson’s Embargo Act of 1807 (which halted virtually all legal imports) and the 
Slave Trade Act of 1807, the 1817 Amelia Island conflict embodies the complex 
relationship between national and diplomatic policy, and reflects the extent to which the 
United States employed the Slave Trade Acts to prevent border smuggling. The
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Supplementary Slave Trade Acts of 1818-1820, were a direct result of the threats to 
border security by these so-called privateers.52
Amelia Island was not the only prime smuggling point in Florida during the 
nineteenth century but it was particularly notorious both with the general public and 
federal government. The United States’ attempts to control this point of entry were 
inconsistent at best. In fact, one of the last successful slaving voyages, the infamous 
Wanderer, landed its slaves in 1859 within twenty miles of Amelia Island’s harbor. Fifty 
years after the first reports of slave smuggling appeared in newspapers, the area still 
could not (or would not) be brought under federal legal control.
Like with Galveston, the geography of Amelia Island was the main reason slave 
traders targeted the area. Swampy, sparsely populated, and at the mouth of several rivers, 
this sea island made it a perfect location for clandestine operations. The harbor of 
Femandina, the only town on the island, was “one of the best natural harbors along the 
South Atlantic Coast.”53 It also lay along the often-disputed boundary of Georgia and 
Spanish Florida. The United States had its eye on the later o f which for annexation. 
Additionally, while originally founded as a buffer from Spain as well as a colony that 
outlawed slavery, by the early nineteenth century, Georgia had become an expanding 
plantation society with a voracious appetite for slaves. Demand was met partially
52 See T. Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invasion o f  Florida,” The Florida H istorical Society 
Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jul., 1928), 9; Rufus Kay Wyllys, “Filibusters o f  Amelia Island,” The 
Georgia H istorical Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec. 1928), 300. Amelia Island had no fewer than 
eight national flags flying from its garrison during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This 
does not include Native American territorial claims.
53 T. Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invasion o f  Florida,” 11.
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through the legal interstate trade with South Carolina and Virginia as well as through the 
illicit trade from Florida.
Smuggling around Amelia Island was not new. In 1811, the Navy Department 
reported on many slave violations near St. Marys, Georgia.54 In this same year, a group 
of men claiming to be South American patriots invaded Florida and offered to cede the 
territory to the United States. When the affair was over and Florida had been restored to 
Spain, Congress passed a secret act authorizing the President to invade Spanish Florida if 
patriots staked their claim again. Evidently these patriots were enough of a commercial 
and political threat that Congress was willing to grant these powers to the Executive at 
the risk of breaking neutrality laws. This secret act would come into play before the end 
of the decade.55
Even though Amelia Island was already a known smuggling location, the capture 
of that island by Scotsman Gregor McGregor in June 1817 set events in motion that 
would bring to the attention of President Monroe and Congress the extent of the slave 
smuggling operations. While not a notorious slave trader like Lafitte and Aury, 
McGregor’s actions led directly to an increase in illegal slave trading along the 
Florida/Georgia border. It was his capture of Amelia Island that eventually led the U.S. 
to take a firmer stance on U.S. slave trading in particular, and piracy in general.
Gregor McGregor is first mentioned in the Niles ’ Weekly Register, incorrectly, 
under the name Charles McGregor, as a “patriot chief’ in 1816, responsible for numerous
54 “Letter from Secretary o f  N avy... subject o f Importation o f  Slaves, Jan 12,1819,” (Washington: 
EDeKrafft, 1819).
55 T. Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invasion o f  Florida,” 5; Act o f  Congress, Jan. 15, 1811 (3 
Stat 471).
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South American victories.56 The South American revolutions had attracted adventurers, 
revolutionaries, and mercenaries alike, many, like Scottish-born McGregor, with no 
previous ties to Spain. In general, the United States took a cautiously favorable stance 
towards these so-called patriots, but delayed recognizing the sovereignty of their nations, 
mostly due to the federal government’s desire to maintain good relations with Spain.57 
Owing to his foreign status and a wave of South American nationalism, which excluded 
foreigners from the patriot cause, McGregor quit the Venezuelan army in 1816, sailing 
north to Philadelphia with plans to gather funds to support an invasion of Spanish 
Florida. At the same time, the United States and Spain began talks to cede Florida to 
the United States.58 These negotiations would be called off because of actions put in 
motion by the Scotsman patriot, leaving Spanish Minister Orn's incensed at the U.S. 
invasion.
Gregor McGregor would not have considered himself an accomplice to slave 
traders. Nor would he have called himself a pirate. His decision to invade Amelia Island 
does raise questions. While some historians have argued that McGregor aimed to claim 
Florida for the United States, this could not have been a high priority for McGregor since 
his claim for legitimacy rested on his so-called commissions from the various 
governments of Spanish America.59 If the United States claimed Florida, Amelia Island
56 T. Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invaion o f Florida,” 4.
57 Niles ’ Weekly Register, Vol. 11, 10/5/1816, 96.
58 for correspondence between Adams and Onis see Spain-Illegal armaments, and occupation o f  
Amelia Island, 15th Congress, 1st Session, No. 300, March 26, 1818.
59 See T. Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invasion o f  Florida,” 6. This claim comes from 
information provided by Postmaster J. Skinner from Baltimore who had met with McGregor 
many times during his stay in Message from  the President...Relating to the Occupation o f  Amelia 
Island, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818) 7.
would not legally be a resource for the patriots as it would cause the U.S. to violate 
neutrality laws. McGregor must have seen Amelia Island for what it was: a privateer and 
smuggler’s haven. Florida’s Treasure Coast is where McGregor could raise money and 
resources to support the patriot cause, and, eventually, where he would begin his 
conquest of Florida.60
On June 29, 1817, McGregor and his fifty-five troops quickly gained possession 
of the garrison at Femandina, claiming the island on behalf of the South American 
governments. The Spanish at the fort surrendered without a shot being fired. McGregor 
immediately issued a proclamation (which he was fond of doing), and began to organize 
a new government based at Femandina, which included an admiralty court for prize 
ships.61 At that point, while the Charleston newspapers claimed that McGregor was 
planning an imminent attack on St. Augustine with “hundreds of recruits,” McGregor 
seemed to have stalled in his plans, hosting expensive dinner parties as his funds slowly 
drained away.
60 McGregor’s commission came from Lino de Clemente, Pedro Gaul, and Martin Thompson, 
residents in Philadelphia on March 31, 1817 on behalf o f  Venezuela, Mexico, and Rio de la Plata 
respectively. In T. Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invasion o f  Florida,” 5, and “Memorial o f  Don 
Vincente Pazos,” in M essage from  the President ...Relating to the Occupation o f  Amelia Island, 
(De Krafft: Washington, 1818) 33. McGregor used Postmaster Skinner to relay messages on to 
the U.S. government in an attempt to show his legitimacy and that McGregor wanted Florida to 
be a part o f  the United States. Since the U.S. accession o f  Florida would have legally closed the 
area o ff  for the patriots, this contact must have been mainly to protect him self from U.S. 
retaliation.
51 T. Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invasion o f  Florida,” 16-18.
62 Charleston City Gazette, 07/09/1817, T. Frederick Davis, 19. For a comment on the St. Mary’s 
trade, see Charleston City Gazette, 07/12/1817, see also Charleston City Gazette, 08/01/1817, 
08/05/1817 and 08/19/1817; “Letter o f  Marque, No. 8”, September 1,1817, in M essage from  the 
President...Relating to the Occupation o f  Amelia Island, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818), 13.
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Attempts at privateering did not at first bring in the profits McGregor had hoped. 
One of his own privateer ships was captured by the Spanish and most of its crew put to 
death.63 McGregor’s privateering attempts were not all failures, however. By the end of 
September there were reports of several prizes in the Femandina harbor waiting to be 
processed through the admiralty courts, before the captured goods filtered through 
Femandina’s growing markets.64 If McGregor originally had wanted to make friends 
with the local residents, he failed at the attempt by seizing slaves found on the island and 
selling them for his own benefit. Order in the town soon fell apart, and McGregor’s 
privateers turned to looting the countryside. Many residents appealed to U.S. 
government officials across the river at St. Marys to intervene.65
Low on money, McGregor still seemed to believe that he would receive 
reinforcements from South American patriots residing in the United States. On August 
19, 1817, it was reported in the Charleston Gazette that troops were amassing in 
Femandina and “the brig Morgiana was also hourly expected from New York with 400 
men.”66 In reality, the Morgiana brought Ruggles Hubbard, a former sheriff of New 
York, but no supplies, troops, or money for the patriots.67 By the beginning of 
September, Hubbard and McGregor were at odds, and several of McGregor’s officers had
63 Wyllys, “Fillibusters o f  Amelia Island,” 305; Charleston City Gazette, 08/05/1817.
64 Charleston City Gazette, 09/22/1817.
65 T Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invasion o f  Florida,” 20.
66 Charleston City Gazette, 08/19/1817.
67 Wyllys, “Fillibusters o f  Amelia Island,” 306.
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resigned. On September 6, 1817, McGregor abandoned the island, sailing for Nassau.68 
A source from Baltimore wrote that McGregor had left no one in charge when he 
departed, which seemed to be another strategy to avoid responsibility for what was to 
come. Ruggles Hubbard and Jared Irwin, a former Representative from Pennsylvania, 
claimed control of the island, although it is not clear what flag they flew.69 Except for a 
few letters written to absolve himself from wrongdoing against the United States, 
McGregor disappeared from historical record concerning Amelia Island.70
The United States tolerated Gregor McGregor because he appeared to have 
legitimate ties to the independence movement and did not have direct connections to 
pirates known for targeting American shipping. McGregor’s troops were primarily 
American, and the local residents enjoyed the brisk trade of Spanish goods sold at 
Femandina. The next leader of Amelia Island would compel the United States to act, 
with stronger anti-slave trade laws being a direct result.
As McGregor sailed out of the harbor, none other than Commodore Aury sailed in 
with his fleet of privateers. It was then that the United States finally mobilized for action, 
perhaps because Aury was more associated with smuggling than McGregor, or perhaps 
because Aury’s claim to Amelia Island on behalf of Mexico made it seem less likely the 
island could be turned over to the United States. One cause of concern for the U.S. with
68 Wyllys, 307; letter from Wayne, purser aboard Saranac, in Message from the President... 
Communicating Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15,1817, (Washington: E. 
De Krafft, 1817), 42.
69 “Extract o f  letter to Secretary o f  State,” in Message from  the President... Relating to the 
Occupation o f  Amelia Island, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818), 11.
70 McGregor to Gentleman in Baltimore, in Message from  the President... Relating to the 
Occupation o f  Amelia Island, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818), 8.
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the arrival of Commodore Aury is that while McGregor barely had fifty-five men (mostly 
Americans) fighting with him, Aury brought with him a much stronger force, mostly 
consisting of what one witness described as “one hundred and thirty brigand negroes—a 
set of desperate bloody dogs.”71 Whether these soldiers were the captured Africans he 
brought with him from Galveston or other hired soldiers is unclear. The presence of so 
many armed blacks alarmed the white population, however. Aury’s stronger force, 
increased privateering, and his use of black soldiers was unsettling.72
Aury’s arrival also brought into question the legitimacy of his ties to Mexico. 
While it is true that Aury had a longer and more legitimate connection to the patriot cause 
than McGregor, Aury’s behavior at Galveston led the United States government to label 
him as a pirate. Public opinion in the newspapers towards the patriots at Amelia Island 
quickly soured when Aury and his black soldiers arrived. One witness wrote, “the 
patriotism of Amelia Island appears to be confined to privateering and plundering.”73 
Indeed, as reports came in about privateers commissioned by Aury and the creation of an 
admiralty court, officials sat up and took note of the activities on the island. Aury’s 
strength, organization, and notoriety led U.S. officials to question his motives. His 
larger, and seemingly more dangerous, force threatened U.S. border security, especially
71 Mr. McIntosh to Mr. Crawford (Secretary o f  the Treasury) from his plantation near St Marys, 
Oct 30, 1817, in Message from  the P resid en t... Communicating Information ...ofA m elia Island 
and Galvezton, D ec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817), 20.
72 Frank Owsley and Gene Smith, Filibusters and Expansionists, (Mobile: University o f  Alabama 
Press, 1997), 121, 138.
73 Elton to Crowninshield, Sept 26, 1817, in Message from the President... Communicating 
Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15,1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817),
36.
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since McGregor’s Americans were now dominated by the new “French” force under 
Aury.
If McGregor had been a luckless patriot presiding over a lawless region, 
Commodore Luis Aury had no qualms against smuggling operations. He was the 
epitome of the Caribbean adventurer: part pirate, part legitimate privateer, and wholly 
seeking profit. Like many other so-called patriots, Aury sought to keep up appearances 
of legitimacy, organizing a legislative body to create laws and utilizing a printing press to 
publish a newspaper. While using his black soldiers to maintain control, Aury 
nevertheless made some attempts to integrate the so-called “American” party in with his 
own “French” party.74 Despite these attempts, chaos reigned. In November 1817, Aury
7*5declared martial law.
Aury’s extensive connections to South American privateers increased slave 
smuggling operations at Amelia Island during the fall of 1817. Several contemporary 
accounts estimated that in two months, nearly one thousand slaves had been smuggled 
into Georgia from Florida, and a half million dollars’ worth of goods had been sold in 
Femandina.76 The United States government could no longer overlook this blatant 
disregard for the law.
The federal government had been aware of slave importations into the United 
States through Florida for many decades. Very little had been done to control this,
74 Newspapers referred to the remnants o f  McGregor’s group, who were led by Jared Irwin, as the 
“American” party, while Aury’s troops were called the “French” party.
75 Richard G. Lowe, “American Seizure o f  Amelia Island,” The Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 
45. No. 1. (Jul., 1966), 22
76 Ibid.
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especially while Florida remained a territory of which Spain could exercise very little 
control. When McGregor took control of Amelia Island at the end of June, George 
Graham, interim Secretary of the Navy, immediately gave orders to the U.S.S. Saranac in 
New York to sail to St. Marys, Georgia, charging Captain John Elton to search every 
suspicious vessel on the voyage.77 The United States’ interest in Florida and Amelia 
Island’s proximity to the United States caused Graham to take immediate defensive 
action. Graham wrote about the need to “defend against disturbed tranquility” from the 
Spanish Wars and to “prevent the illicit introduction of slaves into the United States.”78 
Since the United States remained neutral with Spain and could not, therefore, legally 
invade Amelia Island, one of the only laws the U.S. government could cite to justify 
increased surveillance of Amelia Island was the 1807 Slave Trade Act.
Once the U.S.S. Saranac arrived at St. Mary’s, Captain John Elton began 
patrolling American waters for suspicious activity. Not only did Elton soon discover that 
American citizens were fitting out vessels to prey on neutral ships, but he also realized he 
lacked the authority to put a stop to the illegal operations. Unlike in the seizure of 
Amelia Island in 1811, McGregor and Aury were not American citizens, although most 
of McGregor’s men had been. Aury claimed the island for Mexico, but Elton was fairly 
certain Aury had not been officially authorized to do so. The United States remained a 
neutral country, and Amelia Island was clearly in Spanish territory. “Until I get 
directions on how to consider the island of Amelia, and the people bound to that place,” 
Elton complained, “it will be impossible to prevent either slaves or goods being
77 Graham to Elton dated July 1, 1817, in M essage from  the President ...Communicating 
Information o f  the Troops, January 13, 1818, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818), 15.
78 Graham to Crowninshield, in ibid, 11.
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smuggled.”79 Because the island was considered foreign territory and his brig could not 
negotiate the smaller inlets where slaves were smuggled, Elton could only board ships at 
sea—a task that proved difficult with only one ship.
Even if Elton were able to capture an illegal privateer, as he did on October 17, he 
could not prevent blatant smuggling. As he brought the captain of the captured slaver in 
for questioning, the illegal prize was accidentally left unguarded and the slaves were 
secreted off the ship and disappeared.80 While this was clearly a mistake on the Navy’s 
part, it nevertheless shows how active the smuggling networks were.
Slave smugglers also took advantage of the loopholes in customs collecting. 
Because boats under five tons were not required to have clearance papers, smugglers
ft 1utilized small boats to transport slaves and prize goods into Georgia. Once they were 
across the border, it was impossible for government officials to track down the smuggled 
slaves. Despite Elton’s best efforts, additional slaves were brought into Femandina and, 
ostensibly, into Georgia, although that particular slave ship was eventually delivered to 
St. Marys.
Elton found the border region between Florida and Georgia particularly difficult 
to control due to the delicate diplomatic situation among Spain, the U.S., and Spanish- 
American patriots. The vague orders from the Secretary of Navy compounded the
79 Elton to Crowninshield Oct 10, 1817, Message from the President... Communicating 
Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. De Krafft, 1817. 
28.
80 Elton to Crowninshield, Oct 19, 1817, in ibid, 38.
81 Elton to Crowninshield, November 15,1817, in Message from the President...
Communicating Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. 
De Krafft, 1817), 38.
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problem and Elton was often unsure how to carry out his duties. On November 9th, 
tensions escalated between the U.S. Navy and Aury’s command. Elton’s orders were to 
“prohibit all vessels freighted with slaves from entering the river St. Mary’s,” but Elton 
soon found that even this became impossible.82 Just as they were doing in the Gulf of 
Mexico, the brazen privateers showed no qualms about firing upon U.S. ships. Without 
firm orders about how to proceed with this turn of events, Elton was once again forced to 
act as he saw fit.
The Spanish slave ship Tentativa, captured by the Mexican privateer Brutus, 
sailed into the Femandina harbor with Elton already apprised of the contents of the cargo. 
Demanding that the ship be examined by U.S. Navy boats, one of Elton’s officers tried to 
board the ship. The ship fired upon the American cutter, which returned fire, but was 
unable to stop the Tentativa from reaching the safety of Femandina harbor. Elton then 
sent a message to Aury, demanding that the ship be surrendered to the United States, but, 
with Femandina being in Spanish territory, Elton had very little authority in this matter. 
The Tentativa was technically a legitimate prize, if Aury’s authority was recognized and, 
unless it could be proved that the ship was owned or sailed by Americans, the Navy could 
not legally claim her. Aury argued that the U.S. had fired upon his ship in Amelia Island 
waters, while Elton’s officer claimed that the scuffle began in neutral waters. Elton 
clearly had very little respect for Aury’s power as a representative of Mexico, writing “I 
have never been instructed... but I really think they hold the island by too precarious a
82 Graham to Crowninshield, July 17, 1817, in M essage from  the President ...Communicating 
Information o f  the Troops, January 13, 1818, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818), 11.
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tenor, to be yet so very tenacious of their rights.”83 When Aury did send over the 
Tentativa, its slaves had been removed and “she appeared in a very filthy state.”84 The 
incident did not prevent Aury from commissioning more privateers from Amelia Island.
American Seizure of Amelia Island:
In late 1817, President Monroe met with an advisory committee concerning his 
desire to invade Amelia Island to rid it of Aury and his followers. The relationship 
between the illegal slave trade and the prevalence of pirates in the Gulf and Caribbean 
made it such that federal action to protect U.S. commerce included efforts to suppress the 
slave trade. The Amelia Island incident was the federal government’s breaking point. 
One of Monroe’s justifications for his proposed invasion was that if Spain could not 
control its territories, the United States was compelled to do it instead.85 Still, the United 
States had no desire to create an international incident by violating neutrality laws with 
Spain.86
After receiving more reports about Aury’s disregard for American sovereignty, 
the United States Congress decided to act. Aury’s crew had fired on an armed U.S. 
vessel, which translated as a direct assault on the U.S. government. President Monroe, 
decided to invoke the Secret Act of 1811, passed by Congress authorizing the invasion of
83 Elton to Crowninshield, November 15, 1817, in Message from the President...
Communicating Information . . .o f  Amelia Island and Galvezton, Dec 15, 1817, (Washington: E. 
De Kraffi, 1817), 38.
84 Ibid; see also Lowe, “American Seizure,” 22.
85 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic,152, and Message from the President...Communicating 
Information o f  the Troops, January 13, 1818, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818).
86 T. Frederick Davis, “McGregor’s Invasion,” 5; the Secret Act o f  1811 was published in 1818, 
see U.S. Statutes at Large, III, 471.
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Florida in the case of a security threat, and called for the occupation of Amelia Island. 
The Secretary of the Navy, B.W. Crowninshield, sent orders to Commodore J. D. Henley 
aboard the John Adams to sail immediately to St. Marys. In addition to his sailors, three 
other ships would accompany Henley. President Monroe authorized Henley to “remove 
from Amelia island, the persons who have lately taken possession thereof... without 
authority from the colonies, or any organized government whatever.”87 This latter part 
was crucial, since the invasion of Amelia Island was an invasion of Spanish territory, a 
nation with which the U.S. claimed to be at peace. In order to proceed, Monroe knew 
that invasion of the island could not be seen as an aggression against Spain.
Citing the inability of Spain to regulate this territory and rampant slave smuggling 
in violation of the Act of 1807, Monroe argued that he was authorized by Congress to 
invade Amelia Island.88 Monroe hoped that by merely displaying force, Aury’s 
government would surrender, especially since the discord among the Femandina leaders 
was well known. In addition, the Navy ordered its ships to “detain all prizes, or other 
vessels having slaves on board, as the presumption is strong, that they are intended to be 
smuggled into the United States.”89 This would be easier said than done.
On December 22, 1817 several U.S. ships entered the Femandina harbor and 
demanded that Aury surrender. In response, Aury sent a letter in which he claimed to be 
“at a loss to ascertain ...[Bankhead and Henley’s] authority to interfere with our internal
87 Crowninshield to Henley, November 14,1817, in Message from  the
President ...Communicating Information o f  the Troops, January 13, 1818, (De Krafft; Washington, 
1818), 17.
88 U.S. Statutes at Large, III, 471.
89 Crowninshield to Henley, Nov 14, 1817, in Message from  the President... Communicating 
Information o f  the Troops, January 13, 1818, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818), p. 17.
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concerns.” Knowing full well that the United States could not legally invade a nation 
with which it was at peace, Aury hid behind these laws, arguing smugly that the only law 
the United States could “adduce... is that of force, which is always repugnant to 
republican governments, and to the principles of a just and impartial nation.”90
Aury felt he was legally justified in his claims and grossly underestimated U.S. 
interest in the Island, but he was unaware that Congress had specifically authorized the 
President to allow for the U.S. invasion of Florida in the event insurgents claimed it as 
their own. From the U.S. perspective, Aury’s invasion compromised U.S. negotiations 
with Spain over the acquisition of Florida. Monroe’s administration used the argument 
that the U.S. had invaded Florida in order to prohibit illegal slave importations as an 
attempt to defend government action. Aury’s “surprise” at the U.S. invasion was 
grounded in his belief that the United States had no authority to control territory outside 
its jurisdiction and that the federal government would not willingly antagonize Spain. In 
his response to Aury’s letter, Henley refused to capitulate, and Aury admitted surrender 
on December 23. Still protesting U.S. action, Aury allowed the troops to enter 
Femandina and Bankhead and Henley began their attempts to control the island.91
Aury took his time to abandon the island, remaining in Femandina for over a 
month. Henley and Bankhead experienced difficulty in maintaining order and, because 
of the poor condition of Aury’s ships, were delayed in removing Aury’s black troops 
from the island. Meanwhile, the sailors from the privateer vessels, Bankhead reported,
90 Aury to Bankhead and Henley, Dec 22, 1817, in ibid, 8.
91 Graham to Crowninshield, July 17, 1817, in ibid, 11.
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“whom it is difficult to restrain from violence and excess, are still here.”92 The arrival 
(and quick departure) of General Gaines did nothing to restore order.93 Henley 
complained that he was given no instructions on how to act, considering he had just, in 
fact, invaded a foreign territory.94 Communication between Amelia Island and the Navy 
was sporadic at best and the uncertain position of the United States as an invading nation 
left large holes in Henley’s authority. At the same time in Washington, government 
leaders greatly underestimated the extent of the conflict, submitting orders to Henley to 
proceed to the Gulf of Mexico even before he arrived at Amelia Island. Henley would 
still be at Amelia Island as late as March, four months later, where he wrote the Secretary 
of Navy asking “how far the commissions granted by Aury or McGregor, to vessels... are 
to be recognized.”95 Still unclear if their connections to South America were legitimate, 
Henley lacked the proper authority to detain the privateers that still kept sailing into 
Amelia Island waters.
Nearly a month after Aury officially turned over Femandina to the United States, 
Aury and his officers evacuated the island. Despite Aury’s reputation for piracy, despite 
his being suspected of attacking U.S. ships, and despite being a suspected smuggler, the 
United States had no authority to prosecute him in Femandina. By the time a
92 Bankhead to Crowninshield, December 27 ,1817, in ibid, 14. Also Bankhead to Crowninshield, 
December 27, 1817, in ibid, 14; Henley, Dec 24 ,1817, in ibid, 18.
93 Henley to Crowninshield, December 30, 1817, in ibid, 19. Also: Henley, Dec 24, 1817, in ibid, 
18;
94 Henley to Crowninshield, December 30, 1817, in ibid, 19.
95 Extract o f  a letter to a gentleman in DC dated Baltimore, July 30, 1817, in M essage from  the 
President ...Relating to the Occupation o f  Amelia Island, (De Krafft: Washington, 1818), 6.
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Congressional inquiry was made into the affair, Aury was long gone.96 Within months, 
he had set up a new base at New Providence, off the coast of Honduras, while the United 
States maintained a larger Gulf Coast squadron in order to protect merchant ships from 
the South American pirates.
The repercussions from Aury’s invasion had not ceased, however. Reports of 
illegal slave trafficking continued after the U.S. seizure of Amelia Island and its 
increased surveillance in the Gulf. By April, naval ships sent to Florida finally sailed to 
the Gulf with the orders to patrol a territory so vast that even the addition of four ships 
had little effect on the rampant smuggling. These smugglers, claiming commissions from 
Aury or Jean Lafitte, had no qualms about firing on U.S. merchant and naval ships, and 
their ability to shift trading locations confounded officials.97 In one instance, a 
collections cutter succeeded in capturing an illegal slave smuggling operation, only to 
have the pirates attack and reclaim their prize.98 The slaves were taken to plantations to 
the west of Galveston and out of U.S. jurisdiction. Customs agents not only lacked the 
power to enforce U.S. laws but also, as in the case of the customs agents in New Iberia, 
Louisiana, sometimes had not received pay for several months. Even after the passing of 
more stringent slave trade and commercial laws, the government’s ability to capture 
illegal slave traders did not improve significantly.
96 See both Charles H. Bowman Jr., “Vicente Pazos and the Amelia Island Affair, 1817,” The 
Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jan., 1975), 273-295 and “Vicente Pazos, Agent for 
the Amelia Island Filibusters, 1818” in ibid, 428-442; see also and 15th Congress, 2nd session, No. 
309, “Independent Governments o f  South America, Foreign Relations.” Aury died a few years 
later in New Providence after being thrown from a horse.
97 Chew to Crawford, April 17,1818, in House... Extracts from Documents in the Departments o f  
State, o f  the Treasury, and o f  the Navy, in Relation to the Illicit Introduction o f  Slaves, January 
19,1819. (Washington, De Krafft, 1819), 7.
98 Misc letters in ibid, 8-11.
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Perhaps the most compelling evidence explaining why U.S. leaders suddenly were 
willing to expend resources on stopping the slave trade into American territory comes 
from accounts referring to the importation of slaves from the West Indies. Convinced 
these slaves were more violent and willing to foment insurrections, many states enacted 
anti-slave trade laws." William McIntosh, a customs collector in Georgia, argued in 
March 1818 that “African and West India negroes are almost daily illicitly introduced 
into Georgia.”100 It was reported that slave importers (including one from New York) 
were creating a “Botany Bay” of the southern United States, by allowing black criminals 
to be imported.101 Desire for slave labor competed with the fear of insurrection.
The fact that laws were in place to determine what to do with captured Africans 
did not mean the federal government was acting for the slaves’ benefits. In many states it 
was quite the contrary. In Georgia, illegally imported Africans were to be put in the care 
of the Marshal or Governor, who would then sell them, with the profits going to the state. 
Sometimes, the officials receiving the slaves were as corrupt as the slave traders 
themselves. It is nearly impossible to document all transgressions concerning officials 
and violations of anti-slave trade laws, particularly of those who “merely” turned a blind 
eye to slaving operations. Some of these routes passed through Indian territories, where
99 W.E.B. Du Bois was particularly convinced that the Haitian Revolution sparked anti-slave 
trade legislation.
100 Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 114. McIntosh was a Creek ch ief from Scots-Irish 
and Creek heritage. He is believed to have used his influential status to circumvent U.S. 
importation laws. He had led a group o f  “Friendly Creeks” to assist General Andrew Jackson in 
the taking o f  Fort Gadsden (Negro Fort) in 1817. See Watson Jennison, Cultivating Race, 179- 
180.
101 Du Bois; also Henley in Letter from  Secretary o f  Navy...relating information... slaves into the 
United States, Jan 7 ,1820 . (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1820), 5 concerning British ship 
Neptune.
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agents, like General David Mitchell, were all too willing to assist in smuggling 
operations. His case was brought to the attention of the federal government and 
illustrates the complex network of smuggling operations into the United States.
American Complicity:
On the other side of the St. Marys river, David Mitchell had created a well 
connected network of slave smugglers, using his authority as a Creek agent to bring the 
Amelia Island slaves into Alabama territory. Mitchell, once the Governor of Georgia, was 
an Indian agent in southwestern Georgia in 1817 when McGregor and Aury captured 
Amelia Island. A slave owner himself, Mitchell was willing to help other slave owners 
purchase slaves. Mitchell allowed the Indian agency to be used by slave dealers in their 
transport of newly imported slaves into the Alabama territory. His cooperation with slave 
traders illustrates the level of complicity of some government officials. In October 1817, 
a prize ship carrying one hundred and ten slaves sailed into Femandina, where they were 
purchased by William Bowen, an agent for a Georgian businessman. These slaves were 
then taken in two groups across the Florida border into Georgia where they were held at 
the Creek nation agency, supposedly free from the hand of U.S. law. Eventually an 
investigation into the smuggling of the Femandina slaves was made, and Mitchell was 
implicated, but no formal prosecution took place.
Mitchell’s role in the illegal importations is convoluted and it is difficult to 
determine exactly what he did or did not sanction. Clearly he was turning a blind eye 
to the importations, while he benefitted from the slave labor, and sought to hide several
102 Royce Gordon Shingleton, “David Brydie Mitchell and the African Importation Case o f  1820,” 
The Journal o f  Negro History, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Jul., 1973), 328. For the official documentation o f  
this investigation, see Message from  the President o f  the United States... Relative to the 
Introduction o f  Slaves into the United States, M ay 6, 1822, (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1822).
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slaves (presumably ones he had purchased) when they were seized. By the time an 
investigation was launched and Mitchell was taken to court, the statute of limitations had 
expired. The jury in the circuit court located in Milledgeville, where Mitchell had 
considerable influence, refused to indict him, although the judge scolded him for his 
actions. Mitchell was removed from his position as Indian agent by the Governor of 
Georgia. He later served as an inferior court judge, and, in 1836, he was elected to the 
state Senate. Although one historian argues that this was a “test case for the non­
importation laws”103 and thus an important step forward, the lack of federal jurisdiction 
over the fate of the Africans ultimately resulted in the enslavement of more Africans in 
America. Despite the “tarnishing” of Mitchell’s reputation by this investigation, the 
smuggling of slaves from Florida continued through the Civil War.
David Mitchell’s case shows the reluctance of state and federal officials to act 
unless infractions against the existing slave laws were blatant. It would take over four 
years for the federal government to make a full investigation into Mitchell’s role in the 
smuggling in Georgia, although he had been reported in early 1818. Georgia was the last 
state to prohibit the slave trade, excepting the four years before 1808 when South 
Carolina reopened the trade. Georgia’s rapid agricultural expansion fueled the demand 
for slaves. At the same time, Georgia’s officials could not ignore the fact that confiscated 
slaves could be sold by the state for profit. This was enough incentive for the state to halt 
Mitchell’s operations, although for the slaves captured, hundreds more were no doubt 
successfully imported. Mitchell’s actions however, together with those of the
103 Shingleton, “David Brydie Mitchell,” 339. The case involving Mitchell is listed under the 
name “African Case Proceedings:” A d Hoc Collection - Georgia's Virtual Vault, File II, RG 4-2- 
46, Georgia Archives. Digital Collection.
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patriot/pirates at Galveston and Amelia Island, brought increased attention to the problem 
of illegal slave smuggling. This would lead directly to the passing of stricter anti-slave 
trade and anti-piracy laws.
The Supplementary Slave Trade Acts of 1818-1820:
The Amelia Island affair revealed to the U.S government how powerless it was to 
control smuggling and piratical operations along its southern borders. Most of the 
government’s inaptitude was derived from its inability to legally arrest South American 
affiliated freebooters. It was clear that the U.S. needed to strengthen its anti-piracy laws. 
If these laws were to include additional slave trade laws, the federal government could 
control more commercial activities and justify a stronger border patrol. After 1818, the 
federal government did try to improve the effectiveness of the suppression of the slave 
trade to the United States, as a direct result of what they saw as a threat to the security of 
U.S. commerce.104 Between 1818 and 1820, three new regulations were enacted to 
support the Act of 1808 and, as Congress deliberated on how best to improve the non­
importation act, information was collected to determine the effectiveness of the 1808 law. 
Reports from the Secretaries of the Navy and the Treasury demonstrated that there was 
much left to be desired.
104 The United States was less concerned about the slave trade to foreign ports. It is interesting to 
compare the U.S. attitudes towards the foreign slave trade (when the interstate slave trade was 
growing) to the Act o f  1794, which concerned itself entirely on the foreign slave trade and not on 
the domestic trade as it was prohibited by the Constitution. The Act o f  1794 was enacted during 
a period o f debt, struggling commerce, and amid a strong demand for African slaves. Just as with 
the Act o f  1794, the Supplemental Acts were an expansion o f  federal authority, particularly in the 
protection o f  commerce, even though these Acts focused on different aspects o f  the trade and 
even though the federal government appeared more ambivalent towards the slave trade to foreign 
ports in 1820 than it did twenty-five years before. The issue o f  what appears to be a shifting 
outlook towards the trade is understood when one reflects that U.S. policy against the slave trade 
primarily was governed by the protection o f commerce and assertion o f  federal power.
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Because there was no federal record of captured slaves, local customs agents were 
responsible for their own accounting. This made the inquiry into the actual numbers 
difficult, and still frustrates many historians. The Secretary of the Treasury, William H. 
Crawford, a Georgian and member of the American Colonization Society, wrote to the 
Speaker of the House, reporting that most slaves were sold to benefit the state, although 
he did mention that the slaves were supposed to be turned over to the colonization society 
in Georgia.105 In a letter written to Crawford, Joseph Nourse, from the Register’s Office, 
claimed that, according to the records kept in the office, not one ship had been 
condemned under the Act of 1808.106
In Alabama, regulation was even more disorganized. The U.S. Marshal in 
Alabama, John Hanes, claimed that while illegal slaves were supposed to be put in his 
custody, to limit expense, these slaves would be farmed out to nearby plantations. Aware 
of the extent of the corruption, the marshal declared that it was friends of the judge who 
housed the slaves—men who also had connections to Cuba. Without hope of a 
successful verdict, Alabama Marshal Hanes believed the slave smugglers would maintain 
control of their cargo.107 Meanwhile, the one revenue boat in use in Mobile, although it 
had just had repairs, was in danger of sinking, and the collector did not have the funds to
105 Crawford to House Speaker, January 20 ,1819, in Letter from  Secretary o f  the Treasury 
Transmitting... Ships Engaged in the Slave Trade, (Washington: De Krafft, 1819), 3.
106 Nourse to Crawford, Jan. 7 ,1819 , in ibid, 5.
107 Hanes to Anderson, July 22, 1818, in ibid, 6. This was the case o f  the Merino, Luisa, and 
Constitution, o f  July 1818.
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purchase another. The harbor of Mobile was at risk of not having a customs vessel at 
all.108
The events of the previous year did resonate in Congress. The destruction of U.S. 
property and the threat to commerce caused by the freebooters and pirates convinced 
legislators, that tougher federal laws needed to be enacted. Legislative acts passed in the 
three years after the Amelia Island affair reflected Congress’s goals to strengthen federal 
law, particularly as it became clear the extent of illegal slave smuggling.109 This 
increased attention led to the passing of stricter anti-slave trade laws—the last to be 
passed until the Civil War. In the 1818 Act, the maximum fines and jail sentences for 
complicity in the slave trade were reduced, however the burden of proof was shifted to 
the defendant, who would have to prove the slaves were not illegally imported. 
Additionally, the Slave Trade Act of 1819 “changed the regulation of the trade”110 by 
rewarding any informer who brought about the capture of illegally imported slaves.
The Act also called for the imported slaves to be “re-colonized” in Africa rather 
than be sold in the United States. Previously, the conflict between state and federal laws 
had led many states to regulate slave captures as they saw fit. Even with these new laws, 
officials still often remained hesitant to allow the federal government to return valuable 
slaves to Africa. In 1822, for example, the Guerrero wrecked off the coast of Florida, 
and, eventually, the U.S. government recovered 121 slaves. These slaves were hired out
108 Lewis to Crawford, November 15, 1818, in ibid, 8.
109 Du Bois quotes extensively the remarks o f  legislators, judges, and other officials who were 
concerned about the number o f  slaves imported and the participation o f  Americans in the trade, 
see 123-125.
110 Finkelman, “The American Suppression o f  the African Slave Trade,” 464, see also, Du Bois, 
Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 249-50.
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to plantation owners while their case was pending and, as Florida was still a territory, the 
federal government could not agree on a proper course of action, although according to 
territorial law the slaves were “entitled to their freedom.”111 The colony of Liberia, in 
Africa, eventually received recaptured slaves, but unhealthy conditions and poor 
regulation kept the colony from thriving.
The most radical Anti-Slave Trade Act, on paper, was the Act of 1820, which 
declared that participation in the slave trade was equal to an act of piracy. This applied 
both to U.S. citizens participating in the trade and foreigners aboard a U.S.-owned ship. 
The original statute was aimed at expanding the definition of piracy—a direct 
consequence of the Spanish Wars for Independence and the incidents at Galveston and 
Amelia Island. The goal of the 1820 Act was to strengthen federal protection of 
commercial interests, allowing anyone suspected of piracy to be brought to the United 
States and tried in U.S. courts, the “conviction thereof... be punished by death.”112 
During the next session of Congress, the Act was amended to include participation in the 
slave trade as an act of piracy, although it only extended to the captain and crew of a 
slave vessel, which would have included all of Aury and Lafitte’s privateers.113 Now, 
these slavers could be put to death for their crimes, although no one was until the onset of 
the Civil War. The most significant aspect of this act is that the federal government used 
the prohibition of the slave trade to strengthen U.S. federal power in negotiations with
111 Frances J. Stafford, “Illegal Importations: Enforcement o f  the Slave Trade Laws along the 
Florida Coast,” The Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Oct. 1967), 132-133.
112 Pub.L. 15-77, 3 Stat. 510, enacted March 3, 1819; this Act originated with President Monroe’s 
call for a Congressional committee to define piracy at the height o f  the Amelia Island affair on 
December 15, 1817, see motion in Senate Journal. 15th Cong., 1st sess., 15 December 1817, 33.
113 Pub.L. 16-13, 3 Stat. 600, enacted May 15, 1820.
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other nations, as in its justification for invading Spanish-Florida. This assertion of 
national sovereignty was supported by Northern merchants and Southern slave owners 
alike. Even though the demand for slaves in the expanding southwest was high, most 
slave owners believed that the growing interstate slave trade could both meet the demand 
and protect them from the importation of “undesirable” slaves from the West Indies. For 
these reasons, both the anti-slave trade and pro-slavery factions within the U.S. 
government could support stronger federal laws, all for the sake of protecting American 
interests.114
These Anti-Piracy Acts increased federal appropriations for naval surveillance in 
the Gulf of Mexico, creating both a federal alliance with the American Colonization 
Society to “repatriate” captured slaves and a squadron to patrol American ships off the 
coast of Africa. Most significantly for the suppression of the slave trade, the Slave Act 
stipulated that informers could reap huge rewards for aiding in the capture of illegal 
slaves.115 While the law had great potential to be effective, enforcing it proved, 
particularly as the slave trade itself moved south of the Equator. After 1820, Brazil 
received more slaves than any other region. Americans continued to participate in the 
trade, slipping through loopholes in the law and the many blind spots in the slave patrols.
Events at Amelia Island and Galveston during the summer and fall of 1817 do 
show an effort on the federal government’s part to crack down on slave importations, as
114 This coincided with John Quincy Adams’s policy o f  rejecting British demands to allow for the 
mutual right-of-search o f  all British or American vessels. This will be discussed in greater detail 
in the following chapter.
115 Paul Finkelman, “The American Suppression o f  the African Slave Trade,” 467.
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an extension of the federal government’s protection of legal commerce from freebooters 
and pirates. Newspaper accounts covering the Amelia Island occupation revealed to the 
general public how ineffective the Act of 1807 actually was and how complicit American 
citizens were in the extent of the smuggling from Spanish Florida. The Madison and 
Monroe administrations knew long before McGregor and Aury’s occupation both that 
Spanish Florida was a haven for slave smugglers and that the law was ineffective, but 
there was little they were willing or able to do. Because few Americans at this time 
supported the slave trade into the United States, primarily because they feared the influx 
of West Indian slaves and already had a ready supply of American-born slaves, the 
federal government was able to enact legislation to control the slave trade into the United 
States. Enforcement of these laws would be a different beast altogether. Only when 
slave smuggling became tangled up in violations of U.S. revenue laws and increased 
attacks against U.S. merchant ships, did the federal government move towards better 
suppression of the slave trade.
It would take another year before Spain finally agreed to cede Florida to the 
United States, and another two years after that before the U.S. took full possession of it. 
The United States Navy proved to be effective at reducing the number of pirate attacks in 
the Gulf, thus protecting U.S. commerce and preventing slave importations into the U.S., 
but its efforts stopped short of suppressing American participation in the slave trade. 
Although more ships were sent to patrol the southern coasts for slave ships, the squadron 
was too small to be effective, and even once slave ships were boarded, these smugglers 
found ways to circumvent the laws, both while at sea, and, if captured, on land. At the 
same time, new markets opened in Brazil, and the bulk of the slave trade moved south,
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away from primarily British attempts to abolish the trade north of the Equator. While 
demand for slaves continued, the illicit slave trade would continue to strengthen.116 Once 
piracy in the Gulf seemed controlled, interest in preventing the slave trade waned. The 
United States soon called back its slave trade patrols and, at the same time, continued to 
fight British pressure to sign right-of-search treaties, a subject which will be discussed in 
depth in the following chapter.
1,6 For additional cases involving the landing o f  slaves in Florida see Jeune Eugenie, Caroline, 
Emperor, Wanderer, see also Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, 173-177.
CHAPTER III
“MAKING SLA VES OF O U R S E L V E S THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN,
AND THE RIGHT-OF-SEARCH
The United States emerged as a self-confident, sovereign nation during the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century. No longer as dependent on other nations to assert its 
independence, the nation nevertheless continued to spar with Great Britain over 
sovereignty on the high seas. Maintaining its maritime independence trumped all other 
considerations, including abolition of the slave trade. Problems between Great Britain 
and the United States had existed since the Revolution, but the main cause for crisis that 
caused an escalating diplomatic crisis in the 1830s and 1840s centered on the U.S. refusal 
of a mutual right-of-search of vessels on the high seas.
The United States refused to cooperate with foreign nations in suppressing the 
slave trade because maintaining the nations’ maritime independence took precedence. 
Illegal smuggling from Florida and the Gulf Coast motivated the United States to 
increase its naval patrols along the coast and implement the Supplementary Acts, which 
reduced the introduction of slaves into the United States. In the case of the 
Supplementary Slave Trade Acts, regulations against the slave trade reinforced the U.S. 
government’s goals to secure its borders and prevent foreigners from circumventing
1 John Quincy Adams, quoted in Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic (London:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 159.
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customs regulations. Halting the foreign slave trade, however, remained a low priority 
especially when its suppression involved surrendering the U.S.’s hard-won maritime 
rights. Utilizing legal and constitutional justifications to deny Britain, the federal 
government refused to agree to a mutual right-of-search policy. This refusal led to the 
increased use of the American flag by slave traders, contributing to a vast expansion of 
the foreign slave trade and a rise in the number of Americans affiliated with the slave 
trade, and causing the failure of British or American efforts to stop the slave trade. By 
the 1840s, most slave ships had some sort of American involvement, either in their ports 
of origin, in the seamen who worked them, to those who financed the trip, in the flag the 
ships flew. Such would be the consequences of American nation building.2
The right-of-search policy on the high seas has been a source of contention for 
hundreds, if not, thousands of years. Among European nations, it was generally 
understood since the fourteenth century that individual states should enjoy sovereignty 
over their own vessels on the high seas and thus be exempt from foreign search and 
seizure, except during times of war. Britain often contested this idea during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because of its stronger naval force.3 In the early 
national period, the U.S. took issue with the right-of-search because it clashed with 
international law- a tacit, mostly unwritten code of conduct among European nations that 
also sanctioned the slave trade. In essence, international law stipulated that, in 
peacetime, sovereign nations had the right to enforce their own laws on the high seas
2 W .E.B. Du B ois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade (N ew  York: Schocken Books, 1969), 143; 
Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 157; see also David Ericson, Slavery in the American  
Republic (Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas, 2011), 1.
3 See Oxford Dictionary o f  Maritime History, http://www.oxford- 
maritimehistorv.com/entry7entrv =t232.e0458-s001.. accessed April 30, 2012.
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without the fear of foreign intervention. Henry Wheaton, a lawyer and diplomat from 
Rhode Island, compiled a digest of maritime laws in 1815 that became instrumental in 
supporting the United States’s stance towards Britain’s policies. Arguing that “the right 
of visitation and search is a right of belligerent powers,” Wheaton brought legal support 
to the U.S.’s protests against peacetime right-of-search.4 The issue remains contentious 
to this day. The current U.S. policy under the U.N. Freedom of Navigation agreement, 
which the U.S. has signed but not ratified, remains virtually identical to the policy of the 
early republic aside from new provisions on conservation and scientific research. Now, 
just as in the nineteenth century, the U.S. accepted the international law of the seas, while 
aiming “to enhance national and homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime 
interests,” namely, ensuring the freedom of the seas.5
Problems between the U.S. and Britain over the right-of-search policy began 
before the ink on the U.S. Constitution was dry, but the conflict intensified in the early 
nineteenth century. Emerging victorious from the Napoleonic Wars, and having proved 
its prowess at sea, Britain favored the right-of-search policy, especially because the Royal 
Navy had become the strongest naval power on the Atlantic Ocean. Britain benefitted 
from enforcing a right-of-search policy and regulating neutrality laws, contraband, and
4 Henry Wheaton, D igest o f  the Lew o f  Maritime Captures, (1815), 94. Wheaton argued that the 
case o f  the Amedie showed that the consular tribunals would uphold the laws o f  the violator’s 
own country (in this case, the Act o f  1807), but it also showed that slave ownership was legal 
only through positive law and therefore one could not assume that slavery was part o f  natural law, 
227.
5 Department o f  State website, accessed April 12, 2012,
http://www.state.gOv/e/oes/ocns/opa/maritimesecurity, for more on the connection between 
nineteenth century right-of-search policies and today’s political climate see Michael Byers, 
“Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative,” The American Journal o f  
International Lew, Vol. 98, No. 3 (Jul., 2004), 526-545.
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the trading missions of other nations. No other nation bordering the Atlantic Ocean 
possessed a maritime force that matched the Royal Navy.6
Britain could only enforce the right-of-search policy during peacetime through 
individual treaty negotiation. Turning its sights to eliminating the slave trade, “at critical 
moments, Britain was forced to deploy its ‘hard’ powers, as well as its domestic law and 
courts, to bring reluctant treaty partners back into the legal fold.”7 British foreign 
ministers were successful in negotiating several international treaties, the result of which 
“in practice, more often than not, was British inspection of non-British vessels,” because 
of Britain’s superior naval power.8 This “inspection” was, ultimately, unacceptable to 
Americans.
The United States also quibbled with Britain’s acknowledgment of a distinction 
between the right-of-search as a right determined through treaty and the right of visitation 
as a natural right for identification purposes.9 The British Navy was accustomed to 
boarding ships of any nation to inspect their papers and determine nationality. For the 
United States after the War of 1812, British visitation and seizure were essentially
6 Matthew Mason, “Keeping up Appearances: The International Politics o f  Slave Trade Abolition 
in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World,” William and M ary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 66, 
No. 4, Abolishing the Slave Trades: Ironies and Reverberations (Oct., 2009), 811. The 1815 
Treaty o f  Ghent also included within it a section admonishing the slave trade— a provision which 
Britain took upon itself to regulate, see Betty Fladeland, Men and Brothers, (Chicago: University 
o f  Illinois Press, 1972), 116.
7 Jenny Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins o f  International Human Rights Law  (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 14. See also Charleston City Gazette, 08-07-1821. Search 
and seizure was a belligerent right during wartime, therefore it was only during peacetime that a 
treaty was necessary.
8 Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 157.
9 Denis Creagh Moylan, The Right o f  Search, as Between France, America, and Great Britain, 
(London: James & Luke Hansard, 1843), 6.
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synonymous.10 The U.S. consistently refused to allow British vessels to board any 
American vessel and regarded any visitation as a violation of national sovereignty. In 
reality, British and American vessels likely visited each other regularly, but any time an 
American captain protested a British visitation, an in-depth inquiry was always 
undertaken by the U.S. Navy Department.11
The heart of British abolitionist goals involved the right-of-search policy. 
Considered only a belligerent right under international law, Britain would eventually sign 
dozens of treaties with other nations allowing for a peacetime mutual right-of-search for 
suspected slave ships under the auspices of ending the slave trade.12 The United States 
would be one of the last to sign such a treaty and then only in 1862 during the Civil War. 
The root cause of America’s adamancy against the mutual right-of-search stemmed from 
the Royal Navy’s seizures of American ships and sailors during the Napoleonic wars and 
the belief that Great Britain was overstepping her boundaries. During the brief period of 
1808 to 1812, the U.S. tacitly allowed British ships to seize American slave vessels, but 
this would change when the two nations went to war. After the War of 1812, American 
mistrust of the British remained. While Britain increased its efforts to suppress the slave
10 Again, while the United States did tacitly uphold rulings in the British Admiralty courts that the 
British could seize illegal U.S. slave ships as a belligerent right such as in the case o f  the Amedie, 
after the War o f  1812, the United States would explicitly bar all British vessels from searching 
any American ship. See H.E.D. 7, 36:2, Blythe to Appleton, May 8, 1858.
11 David Canney discusses the frequent visitations between the British and American ships o ff  the 
coast o f  Africa in his book, Africa Squadron (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006). The 
next chapter discusses this more thoroughly. This chapter discusses several British visitations 
before 1842.
12 Matthew Mason, “Keeping up Appearances,” 813. Belligerent right refers to rights claimed by 
one nation when engaged in war with another nation. These rights justify attacks on shipping, for 
example, and offer a relaxed interpretation o f  search and seizure policies that would be 
considered unacceptable if  the two nations were at peace. See Sir Travers Triss, Belligerent Right 
o f  Search on the High Seas, (London: Butterworths, 1884).
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trade after the Napoleonic wars, the United States refused to allow British ships to search 
American vessels during peacetime.
Historians have long debated Great Britain’s motives in its crusade against the 
slave trade. Some scholars assert that Britain approached abolition with entirely 
humanitarian principles, while others hold that abolition was pushed forward to protect 
British commercial interests in the face of a declining slave system in the West Indies and
|  -5
increasing industrialization. In wartime, the seizure of slaves and the capture of slave 
ships had long been a measure to hinder enemy productivity and Great Britain used this 
to its advantage against its former colonies both during the American Revolution and the 
War of 1812. As the abolition movement in the United Kingdom gained strength, some 
plantation owners turned to the so-called apprentice system whereby Africans captured 
aboard slave ships were enrolled in an “apprenticeship” in the West Indies. Working for 
room, board, and for the cost of their middle passage, many of these indentured servants 
did not live long enough to enjoy their freedom.14 One 1808 pamphlet encouraged the 
use of Chinese immigrants on West Indian plantations, declaring that the Chinese were 
suited to the environmental conditions and would enjoy a better standard of living on a
13 There has been much discussion by historians on this topic see for example Chaim Kaufman 
and Robert Pape, “Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign 
against the Atlantic Slave Trade,” International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 1999), 
631-668; Ronald Bailey, “The Slaverfy) Trade and the Development o f  Capitalism in the United 
States: The Textile Industry in New England,” Social Science History, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn, 
1990), 373-414; see also the general works o f  W.E.B. Du Bois, David Bryon Davis, Robert 
Anstey, Seymour Drescher, Kenneth Morgan, and Herbert Klein among others.
14 David Bryon Davis, Inhuman Bondage, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 177.
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plantation than in China.15 U.S. newspapers were quick to criticize Britain for its 
apprenticeship practice.
On two occasions, the United States almost negotiated a limited right-of-search 
treaty with Great Britain: 1806 and again in 1824. Both of these negotiations ultimately 
failed. After the Slave Trade Act of 1808 went into effect, the U.S. government 
begrudgingly submitted to the British seizure of American slave ships, but this was due to 
British claims of belligerent right-of-search, not solely because of the existence of U.S. 
laws. Once again neutrality issues would plague Anglo-American relations and directly 
affect U.S. policy and U.S. efforts to stop the slave trade.16
The Failed Mission of James Monroe and William Pinkney 
The first treaty negotiation directly involving the regulation of the slave trade 
occurred two years before the federal slave trade moratorium expired in 1808. Because 
of neutrality crises erupting during the Napoleonic wars, relations between the United 
States and Great Britain were strained, at best. American demands for compensation for 
the slaves carried away by the British during the Revolution had gone unheeded. Jay’s 
Treaty, signed in 1794, granted American ship owners compensation for lost vessels.
15 Robert T. Farquhar, Suggestions Arising from the Abolition o f  the Slave Trade (London: John 
Stockdale, 1807). See also: Moon-Ho Jung, “Outlawing ‘Coolies’: Race, Nation, and Empire in 
the Age o f Emancipation,” American Quarterly. Sep2005, Vol. 57 Issue 3, p677-701 and Arnold 
J Meagher, The Coolie Trade: the Traffic in Chinese Laborers to Latin America, 1847-1874 
(Phildelphia: Xlibris Corporation, 2008).
16 The Amedie case in 1810 involved a ruling by the British admiralty courts that British ships 
could capture American slavers, which the U.S. government tacitly supported until the War o f  
1812. Hugh Soulsby, “The Right o f  Search and the Slave Trade in Anglo-American Relations,” 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933); Howard H. Wilson, “Some Principal Aspects o f  British 
Efforts to Crush the African Slave Trade, 1807-1929,” The American Journal o f  International 
Law , Vol. 44, No. 3 (Jul., 1950), 508; for the right o f  search o f  American slave ships see Gould, 
165-167, and court cases Amedie, Nancy, Anne, and Fortuna, see Catterall, Judicial Cases 
Concerning American Slavery and the Negro, vol. I, 26-9, and, for Amedie, Africa, and Tartar, 
see Donnan vol. IV, 550, 570, and 587, respectively.
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Still, the British Royal Navy continued to press American seamen into service, a practice 
that increasingly irked Americans as the United States matured as an independent nation. 
Even though Jay’s treaty resolved some important issues left over from the Revolution, 
Jefferson and his followers nevertheless were disappointed with the final negotiation. 
When the treaty expired in 1804, Jefferson, now President, was ready.
Jefferson sent James Monroe and William Pinkney to London to negotiate the 
terms of a new agreement. Monroe and Pinkney’s main goal was to create a broad 
definition of neutral maritime rights in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. Many 
Americans had felt that Jay’s treaty did not protect American interests and were 
interested in pressing for more stipulations to protect American citizens and commerce. 
Jefferson was “willing to sanction a limited treaty with England covering neutral rights— 
impressment, blockades, contraband, the re-export trade, and the right of search.”17 In 
other words, the United States was willing to surrender some maritime freedom on the 
high seas in exchange for continued goodwill from the British, the result of which would,
1 fiin turn, protect American commerce. Because of British maritime strength and the U.S. 
dependence on British imports, Jefferson had little choice in negotiating a treaty at that 
point.
17 Hickey, Donald R. "The Monroe-Pinkney Treaty o f  1806: A Reappraisal". William and Mary 
Quarterly 4 4 (1 ) , 1987, 73.
18 Bradford Perkins asserts that the British, in effect, controlled American commerce, because o f  
its strong naval power and various blockades during the Napoleonic wars. Both Jefferson and 
Madison were fairly miserable diplomats, using non-importation as a “mild threat” to Britain, and 
all but ignoring the problem o f  British impressment (also known as pressing men into the service 
o f  the Royal Navy). See Bradford Perkins. "Jefferson and Madison: The Diplomacy o f  Fear and 
Hope." The Creation o f  a Republican Empire, 1776-1865. Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Cambridge H istories Online. Cambridge University Press. 17 October 2012, 110, 118, and 122.
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From the British perspective, the Americans continued to profess neutrality while 
aiding French commerce. One of the problems the British had with the American 
maritime trade during this period stemmed from the U.S.’s lucrative export trade. 
Americans, claiming neutral rights during wartime, could transport goods from Europe, 
sail to an American port, then proceed to the West Indies to sell those goods, thus 
circumventing the British belligerent blockade. This trade earned American merchants 
upwards of $53,000,000 in 1805 alone. The British government felt that this was a 
violation of wartime commerce, benefitting the Americans who they regarded as their 
commercial rivals. In addition, the British, desperately in need of able seamen, argued 
that British subjects were disguising themselves as Americans aboard U.S. ships in order 
to avoid service to the crown. The British claimed the right to search all vessels in order 
to confiscate enemy contraband and to sniff out Royal Navy deserters.
Meanwhile, Monroe and Pinkney worked with British ministers to iron out the 
treaty, heedless of the downwardly spiraling U.S. public opinion of the British. In 
December 1807, the British-signed Monroe-Pinkney treaty was rushed back to 
Washington for President Jefferson’s review. The treaty did protect U.S. commercial 
interests in that it narrowed the wartime contraband list, lowered duties for American 
vessels arriving in British ports, and extended American territorial waters from three 
miles to five. The treaty stipulated that the United States would offer up British seamen 
to the Royal Navy, and, importantly, allow British naval ships to board U.S. vessels to 
determine nationality. This right-of-search provision was actually quite limited in 
practice and would have in actuality decreased the prevalence of the British seizure of 
American vessels. The treaty also stipulated that both countries would agree to cooperate
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in the slave trade’s suppression since both the United States and British governments 
aimed to prohibit the illicit trade after 1808.19
In Congress, a non-importation bill was being debated which was intended to 
prevent Great Britain and France from selling their goods in American markets. 
Jefferson supported this bill, but postponed its passage, waiting on the outcome of the 
treaty negotiations with Britain.20 While the non-importation bill was being debated, the 
crisis of impressment reached new heights. On June 22, 1807 the H.M.S. Leopard 
attacked, then boarded, the American frigate Chesapeake, seizing four seamen—three of 
whom were later proven to be American citizens. One sailor was killed and eighteen 
wounded in the attack. Although the British government made an inquiry into the
incident, Parliament failed to apologize. The American public was now in an uproar
*) 1against Britain’s “atrocious act of aggression.” The Chesapeake incident made any 
negotiations with Britain over the right-of-search policy an impossibility. The New York 
Evening Post wrote that the incident was “worse than Whitby” who was the captain on 
trial in the Essex case.
19 Hickey, “Monroe-Pinkney Treaty,” 72, 78, 84. See also Reginald Horsman, The Causes o f  the 
War o f  1812 (New York: Octagon Books, 1975) 38-9, 56-8 and 85; Bradford Perkins, Prologue 
to War (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1963) 79-82, and Burton Spivak, Jefferson's 
English Crisis (Charlottesville: University Press o f  Virginia, 1979) 28-34.
20 Hickey, “Monroe-Pinkney Treaty,” 82; Spivak, Jefferson’s English Crisis, 139-44.
21 American State Papers, Foreign Relations Vol. 3, 10th Congress, 1st Session, Pub. No. 205, 6. 
Two o f  the captured sailors were African-American. See W. Jeffrey Bolster, “African-American 
Seamen,” in James Horton, ed., A History o f  the African-American People  (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1997) 34; see also Spivak, Jefferson’s English Crisis, 93 and 111-114.
22 See American State Papers, For Rel Vol 3, Pub. No. 205, pp. 6-23; there were hundreds o f  
articles printed in the months after the Chesapeake expressing public outrage. See for example: 
New York Evening Post, J6/291807.
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Figure 3: U.S.S. Chesapeake, 1807: Courtesy o f  the U.S. Navy Art Collection, Washington, D.C.
Because of escalating tensions between the U.S. and Britain, when Jefferson 
received the Monroe-Pinkney treaty, which provided for a limited mutual right-of-search, 
the President could not sign it as written. Worse than allowing a limited right-of-search, 
the proposed treaty did nothing to prevent the impressment of American seamen. 
According to the opposition, allowing Britain the right to search American vessels 
impinged upon the sovereignty of the American flag on the high seas, as had clearly been 
demonstrated with the Chesapeake. Jefferson rejected the Monroe-Pinkney treaty, 
submitted revisions which were promptly dismissed by the now Tory-led Parliament, and 
signed the much more radical Embargo Act of 1807, shutting down all trade with Britain 
and France. The British practice of searching American vessels would be a sticking point 
for decades to come and, more immediately, one of the causes of the War of 1812.24
23 Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, 166. For a thorough discussion o f  impressment and the 
Monroe-Pinkney treaty see Dumas Malone, Jefferson the President, (Boston: Little, Brown,
1974), 399-402, 409; and Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War, 123-139.
24 Hickey, “Monroe-Pinkney Treaty,” 88, see also Spivak, Jefferson’s English Crisis for more on 
the Treaty and the Embargo. The U.S. begrudgingly allowed the British Navy to seize American 
slave ships until the outbreak o f  the War o f  1812. Madison conceded this right only as it 
pertained to the slave trade. After 1812, American opposition to the right o f  search would include 
that o f  slave ships. See Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, 169-70.
As an infant nation, the United States had continually seen the strength of the
British navy as a threat to its own national sovereignty. In 1795, George Washington
wrote of his concerns about British power on the high seas, condemning the
“domineering spirit of Great Britain.”25 By Madison’s presidency, the United States
believed that Britain was grossly overstepping its boundaries. In his speech to Congress
recommending a declaration of war on June 1, 1812, James Madison stated:
British cruisers have been in the practice also of violating the 
rights and the peace of our coasts. They hover over and harass our 
entering and departing commerce...and have wantonly spilt 
American blood,...our commerce has been plundered in every sea, 
the great staples of our country have been cut off from their 
legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed at our 
agricultural and maritime interests....26
British violation of commercial agreements, neutral rights, and the protection of 
citizens under the American flag was just cause for a declaration of war, Madison argued. 
Congress agreed. American officials estimated that thousands of American citizens had 
been pressed into British service and hundreds of American vessels boarded by the Royal 
Navy. The United States had to be respected as an independent nation, pro-War 
Americans argued, and it was worth a “second revolution” to ensure these rights. 
Britain’s power had to be checked, lest the United States find herself once more under the 
ruling thumb of Parliament.
25 See Writings o f  Washington, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1931-44) vol 34, 293.
26 James Madison’s Message to Congress, June 1, 1812, Library o f  Congress,
http ://memory. 1 oc. gov/c gi-bin/ampage?col I Id—llac&fi leN ame=024/l lac024.db&recN um=221, 
Accessed February 23, 2012.
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Disagreements between the United States and England concerning British 
removal of slaves during both the American Revolution and the War of 1812 continued 
long after peace was declared in 1814. Correspondence between John Quincy Adams, 
then the U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and Viscount Castlereagh, Britain’s 
Foreign Minister, largely concerned compensation for American “private property” and 
the British denial of its violation of the law of nations concerning a flag of truce. After 
the War of 1812, United States continued to be convinced that, if  left unimpeded, 
England would control the seas, and, by default, maritime commerce. Because of this, 
American ministers, including those who were against the slave trade, were reticent to 
allow any sort of British commercial privilege on the high seas even at the expense of 
slave trade suppression.27
The Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812, confirmed in writing that 
both the United States and Great Britain condemned the traffic, but no cooperative 
agreements were put in place between the former foes.28 With the war over, the United 
States government turned its focus to domestic affairs and internal nation-building. The 
War of 1812 did prove to the world that the United States would endure, and, for 
Americans, the war proved to be a uniting force, aiding in the creation of national identity 
and patriotism, despite the fact that it was merely “sheer luck that the union was not
27 See for example: “From the Franklin Gazette,” City Gazette, 07-19-1823.
28 See American Foreign Relations papers No. 287, 118-126; see also Gould, Among the Powers 
o f  the Earth, 173-4.
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destroyed.” The United States thus emerged from the war with stronger negotiating 
powers on the international scene.29
Under James Monroe’s administration, the suppression of the slave trade was a 
much lower priority than that of making internal improvements to the American 
transportation system and manufacturing, although personally he supported ending the 
slave trade.30 According to Monroe, the expanding yet still immature United States 
needed to focus inwardly on its own affairs, while at the same time maintaining a 
watchful eye on nearby territories, namely South America and the new, independent 
nations forming there. Monroe’s policy would extend towards the regulation of the 
foreign slave trade and diplomatic relations with Britain. England’s continued searching 
of American vessels was, in Americans’ view, a point of outrage and a flagrant disregard 
for American independence and liberty.31 The American conviction that England was 
aiming to control the seas, coupled with the inability of the United States and Great 
Britain to compromise and the increasingly divergent opinions concerning slavery, led to 
considerable discord over the policing of the slave trade.32
After the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, the United Kingdom focused 
much of its foreign diplomacy on negotiating treaties with European powers. These
29 Quotation from Perkins, Cambridge Histories Online, 110; for building a “treaty-worthy nation” 
after European peace see Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, 144, and Epilogue.
30 Monroe’s Inaugural Address, in Foreign Relations Annals, no 288, 128. See also Stanislaus M. 
Hamilton, The Writings o f  James Monroe, vol. 5. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1901), 
especially 25 and 33 on how the aftermath o f  the Monroe-Pinkney treaty affected Monroe’s 
policy.
31 Foreign Relation Annals, no. 288, 355
32 Soulsby, Right ofSearch\22. While Britain worked to abolish slavery, slavery in America 
became more entrenched and the pro-slavery bloc increased.
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treaties aimed to prevent war, protect commerce, and make the anti-slave-trade laws more 
effective. Both the United States and France refused to sign right-of-search agreements 
with Britain. In 1820, Portugal was the only European nation that allowed its ships to 
participate in the slave trade, yet British reports claimed the French and Spanish flags 
were often used to shelter slave ships.34 Throughout the 1820s, slave trade conferences 
took place, with Britain urging European cooperation. The consequence of Britain’s 
strong-arm tactics was that Great Britain’s anti-slave trade policies became equated with 
“threats to national sovereignty and thus handed a powerful argument to slaving 
factions,” particularly in Spain, Portugal, Cuba, and the United States.
Although Great Britain did succeed in securing right-of-search treaties with some 
nations, negotiations with the United States did not have the same results. In 1818, Lord 
Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary and Canning’s predecessor, accused the United 
States of being unable to enforce its own laws, citing the Amelia Island controversy of 
1817. Richard Rush, Ambassador to the United Kingdom from 1817 to 1825, retorted 
that the opposite was true. The Amelia Island affair, and the island’s subsequent capture 
by the United States actually displayed a successful assertion of U.S. control.
33 for more on British treaties see Sir Reginald Coupland, The British Anti-Slavery Movement, 
(London, F. Cass, 1933/1964), 166; Joseph Dorsey, Slave Traffic in the Age o f  Abolition, 
(Gainesville: University Press o f  Florida, 2003), 15, 38-40; David Murray, Odious Commerce, 
Britain, Spain, And The Abolition O f The Cuban Slave Trade. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980). 51; Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 132-135; Helfman, Tara, “The Court 
o f  Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone and the Abolition o f the West African Slave Trade,” The Yale 
Law Journal, Vol. 115, No. 5 (Mar., 2006). 1125, 1133; and Leslie Bethell, “The Mixed 
Commisions for the Suppression o f  the Transatlantic Slave trade in the Nineteenth Century,” 
Journal o f  African History, Vol. 7., No. 1 (1966), 79-80.
34 Howard H. Wilson, “Some Principal Aspects o f  British Efforts to Crush the African Slave 
Trade, 1807-1929,” The American Journal o f  International Law, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Jul., 1950), 506, 
509.
35 Mason, “Keeping up Appearances,” 814.
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Castlereagh could not agree and called for the reciprocal right-of-search during the 
Anglo-American Convention of 1818, refusing to back down on Britain’s impressment 
policy.36 The United States, in turn, flatly refused. At the same time, Robert Walsh Jr., a 
lawyer from Maryland, published “An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain,” 
which highlighted Britain’s hypocritical stance towards the slave trade and accused 
British writers of unjustly criticizing the United States. Blaming Great Britain for 
introducing slavery to American soil, Walsh’s nearly 600-page tome placed the United 
States at the forefront of abolitionist politics and underlined England’s duplicity as it 
patrolled the seas protecting its own commercial interests. Without citing his sources, 
Walsh argued that American ships were not being used for the slave trade, blaming
1 7Spain, Portugal, and France for the continued trade.
Monroe’s administration agreed with Walsh’s assertions that Americans were not 
participating in the slave trade since the passage of the Supplementary Slave Trade Acts. 
While it was true that the smuggling of slaves into the United States was decreasing, 
particularly after the Amelia Island crisis of 1817, the slave trade to Cuba and Brazil 
increased dramatically, and, in the years to come, United States citizens would play an 
integral role in those lucrative slave markets. By being labeled a pirate under the Piracy 
Act of 1820, slave vessels could be searched and seized by both the U.S. Navy and 
ordinary citizens, eliminating all protective laws against the ship, allowing the slaver to 
be claimed as a prize, and making foreign slave trading a capital crime.
36 House Document 48, 16:2, (Washington [D.C.]: Printed by Gales & Seaton, 1821), 9; Soulsby, 
Right o f  Search, 132.
37 Robert Walsh Jr., “An Appeal from the Judgments o f  Great Britain,” (Philadelphia: Mitchell, 
Mes and White, 1819), 307-310, 323, 358-362.
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Most Americans believed that American participation in the slave trade was 
minimal and more importantly, that there were no slaves smuggled into U.S. territories. 
Not everyone was convinced, however. Two southern Representatives informed 
Congress these anti-slave-trade laws were ineffective, estimating that since 1807, 28,000 
illegal slaves had been smuggled into South Carolina and Virginia alone. Just as they 
had in previous decades, eastern slave states allied with Northern free states to denounce 
the illicit traffic, maintaining an ideological separation between the “odious commerce” 
and the institution of slavery.39
Because of the growing domestic slave trade, eastern slave states generally 
supported the Supplementary Slave Trade Acts. Charles Mercer, of Virginia, was 
particularly vocal about ensuring that the laws were being carried out. He reported in 
January 1819 that at least twenty vessels had been “fitted out in the ports of the United 
States for the obvious purpose of carrying on the slave trade,”40 and British courts had 
tried several Americans for participating in the trade. With little debate, the House voted 
to make inquiries into the effectiveness of the anti-slave trade laws, which led directly to 
the declaration of the slave trade as piracy in 1820. At the last moment, Thomas Butler 
of Louisiana amended the piracy bill to stipulate that the captured slave ship be returned 
to its home port. This obvious (and effective) maneuver to ensure court favoritism
38 According to Jay’s Inquiry into American Colonization (1838), in Du Bois, Suppression o f  the 
Slave Trade, 124; I have not, however, been able to locate Jay’s original source. Instead his 
information seems to have come from the speeches o f  Henry Middleton o f  SC and Robert Wright 
o f  MD in the House in the House in February 1823, in Annals o f  Congress, House o f  
Representatives, 17:2, 1148-1154.
39 Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 125.
40 Annals o f  Congress, House o f  Representatives, 15:2, 442, see also Fladeland, Men and Brothers, 
114. Mercer was in favor o f  colonization, against the slave trade but not an abolitionist— a prime 
example o f  what modem society might see as conflicting ideas.
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towards the slavers received no opposition from any Representative, revealing that most 
policy makers believed that the regulation of the slave trade should remain a concern of 
the state rather than be subject to national, and especially international, regulation.
After the turmoil of the War of 1812 and the Missouri Crisis of 1820, most 
Americans wanted harmony to be restored to the nation. The debate in the Senate over 
the slave trade and right-of-search focused less on the resolution itself and more on the 
limits of Congress in instructing the Executive, and on the practice of recommending 
resolutions in the first place. While it appeared as though public opinion was united 
against the slave trade, Congress was unwilling to compromise national unity for the sake 
of suppressing the trade. As more punitive laws against the slave trade were enacted, 
more legal loopholes were opened through amendments and exceptions made to 
accommodate state and commercial activity. One major exception to the impotence of 
the slave trade acts was that these laws, particularly the piracy act, provided the federal 
government with strong leverage in its negotiations with Great Britain.
The Slave Trade Convention negotiations between British and American 
ministers illustrate the extent to which the U.S. was unwilling to compromise maritime 
sovereignty in order to more effectively suppress the foreign slave trade. In 1820, the 
Committee on the Slave Trade submitted a resolution to request the President “to consult 
and negotiate with all the Governments... on the means of effecting an entire and 
immediate abolition of the African slave trade.”41 At the same time that the Committee 
later recommended that a limited right-of-search treaty be agreed to with Britain, John 
Quincy Adams wrote to Canning of the constitutional impossibility of allowing the U.S.
41 Annals o f  Congress, Senate 16:1, 697, also reported in “Right o f  Search,” Columbian Centinel, 
04-24-1822 and “Abolition o f  the Slave Trade,” Columbian Centinel, 12-14-1822.
124
to participate in the right-of-search and mixed courts, and Richard Rush, the U.S. 
Attorney General, argued that maintaining maritime independence was far more 
important than suppressing the slave trade.42 Monroe himself argued, “the concession of 
the right of search in time of peace for an offense not piratical would be repugnant to the 
feelings of the nation and of dangerous tendency. The right of search is the right of war of 
the belligerent toward the neutral. To extend it in time of peace to any object whatever 
might establish a precedent which ...might be subject to great abuse.”43 Congress would 
eventually agree to a limited right-of-search with Great Britain, but it did so on terms that 
Parliament ultimately rejected. The feud between the two nations continued, each 
blaming the other for the continuation of the trade and congratulating itself on making 
efforts to stop it, both placing national policy over the abolition of the slave trade.44
Despite the continued recommendations from the Committee on the Slave Trade 
to cooperate with Britain, the Senate continued to vote against any proposal that included 
provisions for the mutual right-of-search 45 Even though there were limited efforts to 
suppress the slave trade, and repeated appeals by Congressional Committees to cooperate 
with Britain, the U.S. government refused to compromise on this matter, stymieing 
attempts to create an international cooperative effort against the slave trade. Many
42 quoted in Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 158. Here Rush discussed British impressment 
as “more afflicting to humanity” than the slave trade, see also Fladeland, M end and Brothers, 119.
43 James Monroe: "Special Message," May 21,1824. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=66411. 
accessed October 17,2012.
44 An excellent discussion o f  impressment and slavery can be found in Matthew Mason, “The 
Battle o f  the Slaveholding Liberators: Great Britain, the United States, and Slavery in the Early 
Nineteenth Century, ” The William and M ary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 59, No. 3, Slaveries in 
the Atlantic World (Jul., 2002), 665-696.
45 Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 137; Ericson, Slavery in the American Republic, 8, 23.
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legislators simply did not believe these negotiations were a proper extension of Executive 
powers, nor were they convinced that the foreign slave trade was enough of a problem to 
prompt a sacrifice of maritime sovereignty.46
Some legislators did recognize the need to abolish slavery in order to effectively 
end the trade. In 1821, Henry Meigs, a Democratic-Republican from New York, was 
concerned about the “growing controversy between the North and South,” and proposed 
that there be western land allotted to those willing to emancipate their slaves. The freed 
blacks would then be transported back to Africa.47 Seen by some in Congress as a 
potential solution to both the “problem” of freed blacks in the South and the nation’s 
divisions over slavery, the resolution was nevertheless tabled and never resolved.
The Seventeenth Congress began its first session in March 1822, with the slave 
trade resolutions still on the table. The annual report of the Committee on the Slave 
Trade praised the effectiveness of the Navy, although it proposed that there should 
always be a U.S. ship on the coast of Africa. The Committee went further to assert that 
the American flag “had wholly disappeared from the coasts of Africa,” although the trade 
was increasing “under the flags of other nations.” It was therefore necessary, the 
Committee argued, that a qualified right-of-search be agreed to.48
Some policymakers were so committed to ending the slave trade they were 
willing to add a specific amendment to alter federal powers to create the most effective 
means by which to stop it. Robert Wright, a Maryland legislator, urged the House to




consider amending the Constitution to allow the United States to cooperate with other 
nations, specifically in order to grant a mutual right-of-search.49 He was in a minority. 
After the chaos of the Missouri Compromise, few were willing to rock the boat and 
increase tension. Wright was adamant about adding a right-of-search provision, stating, 
“this is the only effective measure to secure that important purpose.”50 Once again, with 
Congress mired in a legislative stalemate, a Committee was appointed to investigate the 
slave trade.51
Congress discussed piracy and the slave trade again at length in December 1822. 
Congress approved appropriations to the Navy to help patrol the West Indies and the 
coast of Africa, and for the purchase of additional cruising ships. Concerned that 
“piracies are multiplied to an alarming degree,” Congress agreed that the federal 
government ought to have the power to act.52 Here, the uncertainties about the limits of 
the national power become apparent. No one objected to the federal government 
pursuing lawless pirates, but, as discussed in chapter two, the question of how and to 
what extent these pirates should be prosecuted was hotly debated. Now that the slave 
trade was added to the list of piratical crimes, American commerce itself became 
embroiled in this question. Throughout its short history, the United States had struggled 
with international legitimacy. After finally achieving full commercial and national
49 Ibid, 17:2, 332.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid, 333.
52 Ibid, 374 and 384.
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recognition by the powers of Europe, this independence continued to be tested.53 Could 
the United States now concede these hard-won liberties? For most Americans, including 
those, like John Quincy Adams, who opposed the slave trade, the answer was no. 
Despite arguments by Mercer and Wright on the necessity of allowing a qualified right- 
of-search, their amendments were rejected, and Adams was employed to negotiate a 
treaty with Britain over the slave trade, with instructions to reject all conventions that 
included a right-of-search clause.
The Anglo-American Convention of 1824
In a carefully worded letter written on April 8, 1823 to Secretary of State John 
Quincy Adams, Stratford Canning, British minister to the U.S., outlined in detail a 
proposition that Great Britain and the United States work together to end the slave trade. 
Canning was pleased to learn that the United States was “prepared to enter into a formal 
engagement with Great Britain.”54 This was no small accomplishment since Great 
Britain had been pushing for right-of-search privileges since before the War of 1812, 
stipulating that ships of consenting nations had the right to board participating countries’ 
merchant vessels. Now it finally seemed as though England’s goals would be realized. 
An ambitious diplomat, Canning, who John Adams described as a ““a proud, high- 
tempered, Englishman, of good but not extraordinary parts; stubborn and punctilious, 
with a disposition to be overbearing,” had worked tirelessly to negotiate a treaty against
53 See Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, introduction.
54 American State Papers, I: 328
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the slave trade with the United States.55 Adams himself was strongly opposed to both 
slavery and the slave trade and would later argue the famous Amistad case in the 
Supreme Court. Adams was also an ardent nationalist, advocating for a strong American 
government insulated from European affairs. Canning and Adams met often over a 
period of several months and left behind pages of correspondence that reveal how 
unwilling the U.S. was to compromise on freedom of the seas. In Canning’s long career 
as a British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Greece, his U.S. post would 
be his most unsuccessful. In 1824, he returned to London with a treaty so watered down 
by U.S. exceptions that Parliament refused to endorse it.
v
Figure 4: Stratford Canning56 and John Quincy Adams57
55 Allan Nevins, The D iary o f  John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (New York: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1929), 296. Lord Castlereagh, his predecessor and arch rival, had committed suicide in 1822. 
Canning and Castlereagh had dueled in 1809, an action that left Canning wounded, and forced 
both o f  them to remove themselves from politics for several years because o f  public scrutiny.
56 Stratford de Redcliffe, Stratford Canning, Viscount. Photograph. E ncyclopedia Britannica 
Online. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/media/14557/Stratford- 
Canning-Viscount-Stratford-painting-by-GF-Watts-1855-in>
57 George Peter Alexander Healy, John Quincy Adams, 1858, White House Collection.
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Constitutional issues concerning the right-of-search policy and the recent war 
with Britain plagued the Monroe administration. During the treaty negotiations in 1823, 
the United States used as leverage the fact that Britain had yet to declare the slave trade 
piracy. Believing in the future success of the Piracy Act despite evidence to the contrary, 
Adams and the Monroe administration professed that the most effective means by which 
to end the slave trade was to have the slave trade declared an act of piracy under the law 
of nations.58 Arguing that an international declaration of the slave trade as piracy would 
be “more effectual to its purpose and less liable to objections...than... of granting the 
right of search,” Adams “declare[d] the willingness of this Union to join with other 
nations.”59 This method, and this method only, they asserted, would end the trade. After 
an international declaration that the slave trade was an act of piracy, Adams argued, no 
slave ship could hide under the flag of another country, thus negating the need for a 
mutual right-of-search treaty. In this circumstance, no flag could protect a slaver, and 
therefore all suspected slave ships could be boarded by any nation. From the U.S. 
government’s perspective, this was the only means by which the slave trade could be 
stopped and while allowing the U.S. to maintain its freedom on the high seas. The 
problem of this proposal lay in the positive identification of slave ships and the high 
probability that the British navy would board legal traders, thus committing so-called 
“outrages” on the high seas.60
58 Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 124.
59 M essage o f  President to Congress... March 20, 1824, 18:2, doc 119, 10.
60 This, o f  course, is exactly was happened. See Message o f  the President... M ay 19, 1858, S.E.D 
59,35:1.
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The American proposal differed from the right-of-search in function only: if the 
slave trade became piracy under international law, Britain could not claim a right to 
search American vessels through treaty. Even though the piracy act would remove U.S. 
government protection for American slave ships, the wording circumnavigated the right- 
of-search sticking point that had been the cause of so much discord between the two 
nations, and which the U.S. government refused to concede.
If the American proposal were to be at all effective however, all nations would 
have to agree to this policy and consent to alter international laws governing sovereignty 
on the high seas. In the eyes of the British, this proposition would only be effective if 
slavers could be immediately identified. If a ship could not be immediately identified as 
a slaver under the proposition, its navy could not then board the suspect foreign vessel. 
Under the right-of-search policy, the navy of one nation could visit a ship of another 
nation without the threat of breaking sovereignty laws. According to British reasoning, 
the U.S.’s proposal left too much potential for slavers to pass undetected or for legal 
merchants to be boarded illegally. It would not solve the problem of the slave trade.
Reminding Adams of the U.S.’s “solemn obligations, to employ their utmost 
endeavors for the trade’s completed and universal extermination,” Canning once again 
underlined the necessity for a right-of-search policy between the two nations.61 He wrote 
to Adams that the United States was not effectively patrolling its ships off the coast of 
Africa, further justifying the need for international collaboration and making it clear to 
Adams that Great Britain was unwilling to concede this policy in its negotiations. 
Adams, in turn, reminded Canning of England’s past transgressions, leading to the War
61 M essage o f  President to Congress... March 20, 1824, 18:2, doc 119, Canning to Adams, April 
8, 1823, 13.
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of 1812, citing the practice as “an abusive and wrongful extension of the search for 
contraband,... and... a relict of the barbarous warfare of barbarous ages.”62 Under no 
circumstance would the United States stoop to such a practice, nor allow any nation 
(especially Britain) the right to board its vessels.
Despite Adams’s protests, Parliament was unwilling to abandon its demands for 
the right-of-search and the Mixed Admiralty court system it had implemented in its 
recent treaties with several European nations. These admiralty courts created an 
international judiciary system aimed at the suppression of the slave trade. All captured 
slavers were sent to these mixed courts where they were tried in a court represented by 
several nations. These courts allocated prize money and meted out punishments for those 
involved in the trade. Great Britain, perhaps because it had led the way in the creation of 
these courts, held them in high esteem. As Canning intimated in his response to Adams, 
Britain could not understand why the United States would have a problem with bringing 
the perpetrators to justice in this manner, particularly if the current U.S. laws against the 
slave trade “might be applied to [the courts] without difficulty or inconvenience.”63 
Adams countered that there were serious constitutional complications with the Mixed 
Admiralty courts. Even if the court had had one American judge on the bench, the 
Constitution cites that all U.S. citizens have a right to a trial of their peers, thus both 
judge and jury must be fellow American citizens. The American people would never
52 Message o f  President to Congress... March 20, 1824, 18:2, doc 119, 18.
63 M essage o f  President to Congress... March 20, 1824, 18:2, doc 119, Canning to Adams, April 
8, 1823,12-13.
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agree to being subject to a foreign court, Adams argued. Even the evils of the slave trade 
could not convince Adams to agree to these policies.64
The United States’ refusal to capitulate on a mixed court and a right-of-search 
policy also revealed the extent to which the federal government was unwilling to alter the 
status quo, even for a crime that the U.S. itself had deemed an act of piracy. The law of 
nations historically limited the searching of foreign vessels only during wartime. 
Because of the two nations’ past history, Congress would never agree to any proposal 
that compromised the U.S.’s independence from Britain. Some feared that the right-of- 
search policy would force the U.S. to become a mere “satellite” of Britain, and several 
newspapers denounced the right-of-search as “a right of war.”65
Pressure from the House Committee eventually convinced Adams to propose to 
Canning a limited right-of-search provision, provided that Great Britain declared the 
slave trade an act of piracy. This, proponents argued, would circumvent the 
constitutionality of right-of-search because international law treated pirates as 
belligerents and therefore subject to search. The House as a whole agreed to the wording 
of a new Convention in 1824, that if the slave trade was piracy under the law of nations, 
slave ships could then be considered belligerents and thus subject to search by any nation 
agreeing to the policy. The U.S. government had no love for pirates and could legally 
justify the inclusion of slave traders in this law. In March 1824, delegates from the U.S. 
and Britain drew up a formal convention with specific language concerning the slave
64 Annals o f  Congress, House o f  Representatives, 17:2, 1152.
65 John C. Calhoun referenced in Flageland, Men and Brothers, 128; later historian Marshall 
Smelser, quoted in Hickey, 69 and “Washington,” City Gazette, 05-19-1824, “Surrender o f  the 
Right o f  Search,” City Gazette, 06-11-1824.
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trade, piracy, and the right-of-search. In it there were “a variety of restrictions designed 
to allay American fears. Procedures for boarding were carefully spelled out, and 
boarding officers were to be held strictly accountable for abuses.”66 Meanwhile, 
Parliament quickly passed an act making the slave trade piracy. Soon it would be clear, 
however, that Canning’s negotiations would all be in vain. Once the signed treaty made 
its way to Congress, political divisions and the contentious election of 1824 set in motion 
a breakdown of the Convention that ensured that the slave trade could not be effectively 
halted.
Electoral politics contributed to the failure of the mutual right-of-search. With 
Adams in the race, friends of his opponent, William Crawford, campaigned against the 
Convention’s ratification in the Senate. These men succeeding in amending the treaty to 
preclude American waters from this search policy, allow either party to terminate the 
agreement at any time, and forbid Naval Officers from removing sailors from vessels.67 
Whether the reasons for this action were rooted in the desire to harm Adams’ reputation, 
stymie British attempts at maritime control, or thwart growing abolitionism, the effect 
was the same: twenty-three Senators voted against the treaty as amended, and ultimately 
Parliament also rejected the amended convention.68
66 Flageland, Men and Brothers, 129, 137.
67 Flageland, Men and Brothers, 139 and American State Papers, For. Rel. V, 360-2, no. 379.
68 See Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 160 and Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams 
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1964), 277, and Flageland, Men and Brothers, 140. 
William Crawford is an excellent example o f the complexity o f  the issue o f the right-of-search 
and the slave trade. Crawford was a Georgian and an active member o f  the American 
Colonization Society, yet his followers were unwilling to allow the Slave Trade treaty to pass. 
Some claimed he was involved in the Mitchell case o f  smuggling slaves into GA from Amelia 
Island, while others asserted that Crawford would seek to allow slavery in the former Northwest 
Territories, see Flageland, Men and Brothers, 126.
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In the end, the Slave Trade Treaty of 1824 was, in fact, ratified by the Senate. It 
stipulated a very limited right-of-search clause, which is definitely significant, but it was 
so narrow in scope and contained so many limiting provisions that Parliament refused to 
approve it. Newspapers wrote lengthy articles concerning the “surrender of the right of 
search,” and it was feared that despite the recent war with Britain, America would lose 
her maritime sovereignty.69 Another eighteen years would pass by before another anti­
slave trade treaty would be negotiated between the U.S. and Britain.
The diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain concerning 
the slave trade during the 1820s reveal two nations publicly willing to condemn the 
“nefarious traffic” while unwilling to compromise much in policy. The United States’ 
refusal to cooperate with Britain in the suppression of the slave trade, despite publicly 
shunning the middle passage depicts a federal government more concerned about 
maintaining its sovereignty than about its commitment to ending the trade.70 As Adams 
wrote, the right-of-search policy “would make slaves of ourselves.”71 The United States 
finally agreed to send Navy ships to Africa to monitor the trade, but these voyages would 
last only a few weeks each year, leaving the African coast void of U.S. surveillance for 
most of the year.
After the Slave Trade Convention of 1824 broke down, the United States and 
Britain developed their own methods for addressing issues connected to the slave trade. 
Britain increased its attention to the elimination of the international slave trade north of
69 See installments in City Gazette, 05-19-1824, 06-18,1824.
70 Mason, “Keeping up Appearances”, 824.
71 Adams, Memoirs, VI, 13.
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the equator through treaties with other nations. Parliament also began to put pressure on 
Portugal to eliminate the slave trade south of the equator although this proved to be a 
much more difficult task, leading to the British blockade of the harbor of Buenos Aires in 
1850. It would take until 1842 for the U.S. and Great Britain again to discuss a mutual 
right-of-search policy in earnest. By then the American flag was being used extensively 
by slave ships to escape British patrols. The U.S. government refused to acknowledge 
Britain’s charges that Americans were participating in the slave trade, arguing that these 
were foreign ships abusing the U.S. flag and not under U.S. jurisdiction, asserting that 
Americans no longer participated in the trade at all. Unfortunately, U.S. officials 
claimed, the U.S. had no authority in prosecuting foreign ships.
The Slave Trade Convention of 1824 between the United States and Great Britain 
was a failed moment in the abolition of the slave trade because the United States refused 
to allow foreign naval ships to board American merchant vessels. Having more potential 
importance than the 1808 U.S. and British slave trade acts, this treaty would have given 
both the U.S. and Great Britain the means with which to enforce their laws against the 
slave trade. The rejected treaty would have prevented slave ships from using neutral 
flags as cover for their illegal operations under international law. Once again, with the 
slave trade to the U.S. having been mostly eliminated and U.S. sovereignty upheld, no 
amount of “moral repugnance” towards the slave trade would encourage the U.S. to 
surrender any of its sovereignty on the seas.
72 for information on documented American ships see Slave Trade Database at slavevoyages.org. 
For letter from Forsyth to Fox about absence o f  U.S. participation in slave trade and inability o f  
the U.S. government to “control foreigners,” see House Doc, 26:2, no 115, p i67.
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British Search and Seizure
During the 1830s and 1840s, slave trading under the American flag increased 
significantly, primarily because the U.S. refused to cooperate with other nations and 
surrender any maritime power. At the same time, the expansion and protection of U.S. 
slavery in federal policy made it increasingly difficult for abolitionists to make any 
domestic policy change regarding slavery. In the two decades after the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820, the Presidential administrations of Jackson, Van Buren and Polk 
cemented the U.S. expansionist policies, particularly in the Southwest. The movement of 
U.S. slaveholders into Mexican territory, later the Republic of Texas, ensured a strong 
pro-slavery faction in the U.S. government and an increasingly unified pro-slavery south. 
Britain’s concerns about the U.S. annexation of Texas and the increase in the slave trade 
because of this expansion did not improve Anglo-American relations. Simultaneously, 
the increasing slave trade to Texas through Cuba as well as to Brazil, and the regular use 
of the American flag by slavers, decreased the effectiveness of Britain’s slave-trade 
patrol. The failed Anglo-American negotiations in 1824 illustrate America’s 
unwillingness to compromise over sovereignty and the U.S.’s continued protective stance 
towards the British Navy.
In the 1830s, the complicit role by Americans in the foreign slave trade, namely 
Cuba and Brazil, caused the issue to be revived. The British, well aware that the 
American flag was being used as protection for slavers, began stepping up their efforts to 
confiscate counterfeit papers. Inevitably, the Royal Navy did occasionally search
73 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 164, 166; Leslie Bethell, “The Mixed Commissions,” 90, 
this treaty broke down soon after with France “questioning Great Britain’s motives,” see Calvin 
Lane, The African Squadron: The U.S. Navy and the Slave Trade, 1820-1862” essay found on 
Mystic Seaport website, http://amistad.mysticseaport.org/.
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legitimate American traders, causing outrage among the American people who would not 
soon forget the British seizure of American ships during the Revolution and War of 1812. 
In 1841, a report from President Van Buren, per House request regarding British search 
and seizure of U.S. vessels was delivered to Congress totaling 766 pages.74 The bulk of 
the document concerned the U.S. consul in Havana and questionable bills of sale, yet 
hundreds of pages are devoted to the British visitation of U.S. vessels. United States 
policymakers, like Andrew Stevenson and John Forsyth who served as foreign ministers 
to Britain during the 1830s, equated visitation with belligerent search, vehemently 
protesting the Royal Navy’s practice of the former. Still insisting that visitation was 
illegal during peacetime, Stevenson and Forsyth claimed that because the “search for 
pirates was the only occasion for its exercise in time of peace, and as the slave trade had 
not been acknowledged as piracy in international law, there was no case whatever for the 
exercise of a right of visit or search against slave traders.”75 Hiding behind this 
stipulation, the United States continued to protest British search and refused to cooperate 
with Parliament.
Meanwhile, the British consulate in Cuba accused the American consul, Nicholas 
Trist, of providing slave ships with illegal papers, which granted them safe passage to 
Africa. While Trist denied these accusations, the evidence against him forced the Van 
Buren administration to make a formal inquiry and admit the increasing use of the 
American flag in the slave trade.76 At this time, the United States, particularly southern
74 House Doc, 26:2, no 115, extensive correspondence, March 3 ,1841.
75 Soulsby, Right o f  Search, 176.
76 Soulsby, Right o f  Search, 161. See also House Doc, 26:2, no 115, on Trist.
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politicians were eyeing Cuba for annexation. Britain’s desire to block U.S. expansion 
both in Cuba and Texas, as well as its dependence on Cuba’s sugar, impeded on 
American annexation efforts. Because of the United States’ refusal to allow British right- 
of-search, Spanish and Portuguese slave ships increasingly used the American flag for 
protection.77
The U.S. government’s admission of the use of the American flag in the slave 
trade did not signify admission of U.S. complicity in the trade. U.S. officials blamed 
Spanish and Portuguese slavers for illegally flying American colors, without admitting 
that these ships were actually American-built, sailed, or supplied (which they often were). 
The investigation, increased pressure by Britain, and an increasingly vocal abolitionist 
contingency in the United States led to the creation of a U.S. African Squadron. 
Nevertheless, although Stevenson finally admitted that the U.S. flag was being used by 
slavers, he refused to acknowledge the right-of-search policy as a feasible preventative
78measure.
Lord Palmerston, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had kept the 
American government apprised of the use of the U.S. flag in the slave trade throughout 
the 1830s.79 In 1836, he sent a letter to Secretary of State John Forsyth concerning
77 Herbert Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 194. 
for British accusations o f  American annexation plans see R.R. Madden, “Letter to W.E. Channing, 
DD on the subject o f  the Abuse o f  the Flag o f  the United States in the Island o f  Cuba and the 
Advantage taken o f  its protection o f  the Slave Trade,” (Boston, William Ticknor, 1839); Soulsby, 
Right o f  Search, 160-3.
78 Hugh Soulsby reported in detail o f  the use o f  the American flag by slavers in Right o f  Search, 
180-2; Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 165.
79 Lord Palmerston, supported a British foreign policy o f  expansion and control o f  the high seas. 
David Steele, “Temple, Henry John, third Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865),” Oxford Dictionary 
o f  National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edition, May 2009, accessed 
February 26, 2013.
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several American-built schooners sailing from Cuba for Africa. The Martha, a brig from 
Maine, sailed from Cuba with “a cargo which would equally have [been] confiscated as a 
slaver [by] any Spanish vessel”80 to the slave factories in Africa. The correspondence 
between the two governments remained cordial- until growing accounts of the unlawful 
seizure of American vessels by Britain compelled U.S. diplomats to utilize more forceful 
language.
The capture of the Susan in 1839 led to a U.S. investigation of British seizures 
and a renewal of negotiations between the U.S. and Britain over the right-of-search. On 
April 10, 1839, the Boston-built Susan departed Rio de Janeiro bound for Africa with a 
Brazilian captain and American passengers. Soon after she got underway, the Royal 
Navy Ship Grecian fired a shot at the Susan, boarded her “in a piratical manner,” and 
demanded that the captain be taken over to the Grecian for questioning.81 In a letter of 
complaint sent by the U.S. passengers on board to Andrew Stevenson, a Democrat and 
American Minister to the United Kingdom, the manner by which the Grecian boarding 
party behaved was befitting not of naval officers, but of pirates. British officers allegedly 
threatened the captain of the Susan, but when the officers realized it was an American 
ship, they returned to the Grecian and sailed off without explanation.82
This “outrage” committed by the British against an American vessel is perhaps 
not surprising considering the ship bore all the right markings for being a slaver, from its 
American-colors being flown as it sailed eastward, to its mix of American and foreign
80 House Doc, 26:2, no 115,6.
81 extract from the logbook o f  the ship “Susan” o f  Boston, in ibid, 9.
82 Ibid.
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citizens aboard, and, more obviously, its destination. This case does exemplify the 
difficulties the British faced in its suppression of the slave trade. While the Susan may 
not have been used to transport slaves at that moment in time, it is clear that her owners 
were trading in Brazilian and African goods directly linked to the slave trade. Slavers 
would often maintain one crew for eastward voyages and another one for western ones, 
listing the “off-duty” crew as passengers. For the U.S., whether or not the Susan was a 
slaver was not the issue.
The British government conducted their own investigation of the boarding of the 
Susan, and determined that “nothing was done by the officers of the ‘Grecian’ of which 
the United States Government can justly complain.”83 Furthermore, the conduct of James 
Brewer, an American passenger, who berated and threatened the British crew while the 
Susan was being boarded, was “rude and offensive.” The boarding officer, N.B. Pearse 
later wrote that the Susan had been making signals towards shore, and, as the area was 
already well known for its slave-landing, the Grecian had cause to stop the ship for 
search. According to his account, the Susan was slow to respond to the Grecian's call to 
heave-to, compelling the British captain to fire a blank shot. Upon hearing this account 
of the boarding, John Forsyth responded to Palmerston that “that answer cannot be 
considered as otherwise than unsatisfactory.”84
The increase of British searches compelled the United States to rethink its 
participation in the suppression of the slave trade, namely with respect to the protection 
of its commerce on the coast of Africa. Discussions focused on the creation of a
83 Ibid, 33.
84 House Doc, 26:2, no 115, 40; other reports o f  illegal British seizure came from the Edwin,
Mary, Douglas, Tigris, Hero, and logo.
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permanent U.S. African Squadron in order to appease the British demands for the U.S. 
participation in the suppression of the slave trade while circumventing a right-of-search 
treaty. Forsyth, while being sure to commend the British for its efforts against the slave 
trade, nevertheless saw British efforts as “exceeding their appropriate limits.” The 
United States could not “surrender to British cruisers certain rights and authority not 
recognized by maritime law...and... vessels legally sailing under [the U.S.] flag can in 
no case be called upon to submit.”85 The long list of British abuses against American 
shipping also exposed the extent to which the U.S. flag was being used by slavers. The 
U.S. was finally compelled to outfit its own squadron, at a minimum, to prevent the 
boarding of American ships by British vessels and to alleviate pressure by Parliament to 
concede the right-of-search policy.
A New Hope; The Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
In 1842, ministers from Great Britain and the United States succeeded in 
negotiating a treaty that both avoided another bloody conflict and solidified American 
borders. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty succeeded in easing Anglo-American relations in 
the wake of British seizures, but it did little to effectively suppress the slave trade. 
Principally focusing on boundary issues between British Canada and the United States, 
the diplomatic thorn in the United States’ side, the question of right-of-search was 
featured in the negotiations of this new treaty, led by Daniel Webster and Alexander 
Baring, also known as Baron Ashburton. During these debates, public outcry,
85 Ibid.
86 Lane, African Squadron. The commander o f  the Grampus signed an agreement with the 
commander o f  the British African Squadron allowing a mutual right-of-search, which was 
quickly renounced by the U.S. government. See Soulsby, Right o f  Search, 170.
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questioning the true British intent for pressing the right-of-search policy, resonated on 
Capitol Hill. Captain Charles Bell, commanding officer in the U.S. Navy reported, “the 
British Government is not sincere in its attempts to put down the slave-trade,” as British 
agents often were given precedent in the purchasing of captured slavers.87 According to 
this claim, Parliament benefitted by pulling the strings in the so-called suppression of the 
slave trade and the U.S. would be unwise to make any concessions.
The American minister in Berlin, Henry Wheaton, also adamantly opposed any 
right-of-search compromise.88 In a tract published in 1842, the diplomat wrote “we shall 
hereafter endeavour to show; it is the true nature of the pretension set up by Great Britain 
on this occasion.” Still blaming Great Britain for the institution of slavery in the United 
States, Wheaton argued that Parliament still controlled the slave trade and “sacrificed 
maritime rights to suppress the slave trade.” All sovereign nations should find this 
unacceptable, he claimed.89 He continued by echoing the words of John Quincy Adams a 
generation before, that “seizing and confiscating enemy’s property in the ships of a 
friend— [is a] relic of a barbarous age.”90 Search and seizure were crimes for which 
England still needed to be held accountable, Wheaton and many others claimed.
87 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 167.
88 Wheaton was the author o f  D igest o f  the Law o f  Maritime Captures (1815) and Elements o f  
International Law  (1836), among many others. He reported extensively on legal procedure and 
international affairs.
89 Henry Wheaton, Enquiry into the Validity o f  the British Claim to a Right o f  Visitation and  
Search o f  American Vessels Suspected to be Engaged in the African Slave Trade, (Philadelphia: 
Lea & Blanchard, 1842), 4.
90 Wheaton, Enquiry, 149; President Tyler also refused to compromise the freedom o f the seas, 
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Lewis Cass also opposed compromise on the issue of right-of-search. 
Instrumental in Jackson’s Indian Removal policy, he had served as Secretary of War from 
1831-1836 and was later appointed minister to France. He resigned his position in 1842 
amid his disapproval of the Webster-Ashburton treaty negotiations and the new Whig 
administration under Tyler. Like Wheaton, he published a tract against the British right- 
of-search policy. Cass did not personally support slavery, although he advocated popular 
sovereignty—that states and territories should decide on the issue rather than the federal 
government. Cass believed that a mutual right-of-search policy and national sovereignty 
could not be reconciled.
Cass actively campaigned against the Webster-Ashburton Treaty and published 
several tracts berating Great Britain for its duplicitous slave trade policy and for exerting 
pressure upon other nations to bend to its will. Cass and journalist Duff Green, “mixed 
economic determinism with a good deal of conspiracy theory, summoning up the specter 
of a British grand design aimed at maritime supremacy, commercial monopoly, and 
universal emancipation.”91 Only the United States was in a position strong enough to 
stand up to British demands, they argued.
In his published account, Cass railed against Britain’s dominating spirit, and, like 
Wheaton, blamed England for slavery in America. He argued “freedom of the seas... 
[and its] connexion with the African slave trade is but incidental, and the nature of this 
traffic, which no where finds advocates, cannot affect the nature o f this question.”92
91 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 168.
92 Lewis Cass, An Examination O f The Question, Now In Discussion, Between The American And  
British Governments, Concerning The Right O f  Search, Hume Tracts, 
http://www.istor.org/stable/60209115. accessed April 26, 2012. 7.
144
Once again, the horrors of the slave trade were not considered grave enough to sacrifice 
maritime rights, nor did many Americans believe that their fellow citizens were 
participating in the trade in any great numbers, if at all.
The general American public was convinced that the United States was doing 
more to stop the slave trade than most other nations and that “not a slave has been 
imported into the United-States for thirty years.”93 The number of those smuggled into 
territories later incorporated into the United States is unknown. The indirect American 
participation in the slave trade was nothing less than a “loosely knitted international 
conspiracy,” especially since the U.S. refused to take responsibility for slave voyages 
taking place under the American flag.94 It was not surprising that, with the duplicate 
documents, the re-export trade, hidden nationalities, and lax security, officials like Cass 
and Wheaton, could deny any U.S. involvement in the slave trade.
Regardless of the political battles between Britain and the United States, U.S. and 
British captains tended to be more willing to cooperate in day-to-day operations. During 
the Webster-Ashburton Treaty negotiations, Daniel Webster wrote letters to the 
commanders of the two ships sailing off the coast of Africa. Both commanders 
recommended no fewer than fifteen U.S. ships be assigned to the African Squadron, a
93 Cass, Examination o f  the Question, 12. Historians still debate the actual number o f  slaves 
carried into the U.S. I argue that the inability o f  the U.S. to regulate its borders and the overall 
conviction that slave smuggling was not politically important, is significant. Fehrenbacher 
claimed that there were very few slaves smuggled and argues that these numbers are not 
significant, see Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 149. W.E.B. Du Bois estimated that there 
were 250,000 slaves smuggled into the United States, while the Trans-Atlantic database 
documents 5,900 slaves and 28 voyages. This does not include slaves smuggled into the U.S. via 
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http://www.slavevoyages.org. accessed April 30, 2012.
94 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 156.
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number far greater than was ever achieved.95 More importantly, however, the two 
officers suggested that a mutual right of visit be allowed. On land, this idea was so 
abhorrent that Webster had the suggestion struck out before the letter was sent to the 
printers for distribution.96
Very likely the negotiations would have failed if the pro-slavery nationalists, 
Forsyth and Stevenson, had not been replaced with the New England anglophiles Daniel 
Webster and Edward Everett after the election of Whig William Henry Harrison. 
Although a slaveholder himself, Harrison and his party tended to be more pro-Great 
Britain than the administrations of Jackson and Van Buren had been. Meanwhile, on the 
British side, the uncompromising Palmerston was replaced by the more moderate Lord 
Aberdeen, creating a much more mutually supportive negotiation. With a pro-British, 
northern coalition on the Americans’ side and a pro-compromise party at the table from 
Britain, the timing seemed ripe for a united Anglo-American effort in the suppression of 
the slave trade.97
Unlike during the 1824 slave trade negotiations, the abuse of the American flag 
by slave traders had, by 1840 caused enough national embarrassment to encourage 
compromise by American diplomats. Treaty negotiations led to an agreement for a 
collaborative naval patrol off the African coast and an official statement by both the 
United States and Britain that they would cooperate in the eradication of the slave trade 
and in the destruction of slave markets in Africa. The Webster-Ashburton treaty was
95 Ibid, 169. The average number o f  U.S. ships on the African squadron from 1842-1860 was 
three.
96 Ibid.
97 Soulsby, Right o f  Search, 183.
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ratified by the U.S. in August 1842 and went into effect that November.98 The section of 
the Webster-Ashburton treaty that concerned the slave trade avoided the issue of search 
and visitation and, although it created a stronger naval patrol off the African coast, the 
fact that the U.S. and British ships did not have to cruise together ultimately negated all 
efforts to control the abuse of the American flag. At the time, however, both Webster 
and Ashburton seemed pleased with their negotiations and Anglo-American tensions 
eased.99
After the treaty was signed, the British continued to patrol the coast of Africa, 
mostly performing its tasks without international support. The Royal Navy continued to 
visit suspected slavers, even if they were flying American colors, but the permanent 
presence of an American fleet off the coast of Africa eased some of the right-of-search 
problems. The British practice of visitation would not reach a crisis again until 1858 
when the British put additional pressure on the United States to improve the efficiency of 
their African Squadron. The Webster-Ashburton treaty did not put an end to the British 
practice of visitation, nor did it placate anti-British protesters like Lewis Cass. The 
Treaty did ease Anglo-American diplomatic relations and required U.S. Naval 
participation in the African Squadron.
98 The Avalon Project, “Webster-Ashburton Treaty,” http://avalon.law.vale.edu/l9th century/br- 
1842.asp , accessed April 25, 2012. Also interesting to note, in 1836 John Forsyth wrote a letter 
to Congress arguing that the right-of-search policy would be ineffective, but that the destruction 
o f  slave markets (presumably he meant the ones in Africa) would be the most effective means for 
suppression. See PresMsgMar31841 NOTES, House Doc, 26:2, no 115, 167.
99 Soulsby, Right o f  Search, 200.
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The Failure of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty
International efforts were not enough to stop, or even decrease, the number of 
captured Africans sent to the Americas.100 Although emancipation efforts in the West 
Indies and increasing abolitionist sentiments decreased some of the trade, the extensive 
profits found in the slave trade to Brazil and Cuba lured many, including many 
Americans, into the trade. New slave markets opened as plantations Brazil and Cuba 
consumed thousands of slaves. Increasingly, with the United States’ conflicting and 
contentious debates over slavery and the trade, slave traders took advantage of the Navy’s 
lax patrols, sailing safely past them under the American flag. The most significant effect 
of the creation of the African Squadron was that it improved Anglo-American relations at 
a time when many felt that the two nations were on the brink of another war. The 
Squadron did not effectively suppress the American participation in the slave trade. By 
the 1850s, most slave voyages sailed at least part of the time under the U.S. flag.101 In 
what could have been a watershed moment in ending the slave trade, the United States’ 
refusal to compromise over the right-of-search allowed the slave trade to continue, and, 
in fact, flourish.
100 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 161; Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 141.
101 Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 178.
CHAPTER IV
“A DEAD F A IL U R E THE U.S. AFRICAN SQUADRON AND THE SLAVE TRADE
/
1
Figure 5: The U.S.S. Portsmouth , circa 1896, photograph by John S. Johnson.
The Portsmouth she was the pride of the Station 
She beat all the Steamers and also the Constellation.
She is a good Ship and never wavers.
And she is always there when there is [sic] empty slavers, 
Through the water she ploughs like a mad bull,
But she is never there when the slavers are full.1
When seaman Isaac Mullen penned these words in late 1859 aboard the U.S.S. 
Portsmouth, his frustration with the Navy’s inability to capture and effectively bring to 
justice American slave ships was apparent. Even though the Buchanan administration 
had increased expenditures and finally added steam ships to the skeletal African 
Squadron, the U.S. faced a daunting foe. Lightning-quick slave ships still passed by the 
British and American blockades using their sailing abilities, superior intelligence of the
1 Isaac Mullen, Journal o f  Isaac Mullen aboard the U.S.S. Portsmouth, Strawbery Banke Museum, 
October 9, 1859.
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whereabouts of navy vessels, and duplicate flags behind which to hide. To the sailors 
assigned to this unpopular post, the African patrol must have been maddening. Even 
when slave ships were searched and found to have storage holds filled with water casks, 
lumber, medicines, and huge coppers, convictions in American courts were nearly 
impossible without slaves on board.2 To make his job more difficult, a Navy captain also 
ran the risk of causing an international incident if he boarded and condemned a seemingly 
legal foreign trader.
During the season in which Isaac Mullen vented his frustrations into his private 
journal, Anglo-American cooperation along the African coast had improved immensely, 
with commanders from both countries sharing information and often cruising in tandem. 
U.S. policy towards the right-of-search, however, continued to hamstring any widespread 
effectiveness in suppressing the foreign slave trade. Even with a stronger African patrol, 
the United States was no better at suppressing the slave trade than it had been fifty years, 
earlier because the government was unwilling to sign a right-of-search treaty with 
Britain. The main focus of the African Squadron from 1842 to 1861 was to protect U.S. 
interests and merchant ships off the coast of Africa. Despite the complaints from sailors 
like Mullen and influential Squadron leaders like Andrew Foote, the inflexibility of U.S. 
policymakers directly contributed to the proliferation of the American-affiliated trade 
after the signing of the Webster-Ashburton treaty in 1842 and rendered the both the
2 Coppers are kettles for making large quantities o f  food, usually kept on the deck o f  slave ships. 
Merchant ships would not have the need for such large cooking vessels.
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American and British African Squadrons ineffectual, despite their immense financial 
cost.3
Continued British pressure on the U.S. government eventually persuaded the U.S. 
to improve its African Squadron patrols, but change would occur very slowly and the 
Squadron would only improve marginally in the few months before it was disbanded in 
1861. In the nineteen years of the Squadron’s deployment, the individual efforts of the 
few captains and seamen personally committed to the suppression of the trade were 
hindered by inefficiency, lack of financial support, poor supplies, and a general disregard 
by the federal government. For U.S. policymakers, the Squadron served two main goals: 
1) to patrol the African coast to protect American merchant ships from British vessels, 
and 2) to appease Parliament in order to avoid signing a right-of-search policy. 
Suppressing the foreign slave trade would remain a low priority. Until 1858, most 
American slave ships were captured by mere chance rather than by a real commitment to 
suppression by the U.S. government.4
The proliferation of the American-affiliated slave trade sowed its own seeds of 
destruction. As the trade under the American flag increased, its notoriety spread through 
American and British newspapers, drawing more attention to the major flaws in U.S. 
policy. The United States government held fast to maritime sovereignty, and its refusal
3 Andrew Foote recognized the connection between the lack o f  cruisers o ff  the coast o f  Africa and 
the increase in the American-led slave trade. In his influential work, Africa and the American 
Flag (New York: Appleton & Co, 1854), he wrote: “our legal commerce here exceeds that o f  
Great Britain or France,... [T]he slave-trade has been boldly carried on under the American flag,” 
354.
4 See Donald Canney, Africa Squadron (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), 136-7, for a 
list o f  vessels captured in port. The American vessels seized very few slavers at sea until 1858 
see also Appendix E.
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to cooperate with Britain or make slave trade suppression a national priority remained 
points of contention between the British and American governments long after the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty aimed to alleviate these tensions. Stars aligned for slave trade 
suppression when an increase in British seizures of American ships coincided with 
rumors that the illegal slave trade to the United States had been revived. These direct 
threats, the former to U.S. commerce and the latter to national security, combined to 
improve the efficacy of the African Squadron beginning in 1859. Nevertheless, the 
Squadron remained wholly inadequate to patrol the entire African coastline, and, without 
international cooperation, which the U.S. continue to refuse until 1862, improvements 
would remain slight.
Based on the entries in his journal, Isaac Mullen probably wrote his poem upon 
learning of the recapture of the slave ship Orion by the H.M.S. Pluto on November 29, 
1859. Owned and operated by Americans, the Orion had been captured by the U.S.S. 
Marion off the coast of Africa in April of that same year with a cargo of suspicious 
equipment and taken to New York for indictment. In a New York court, Judge Samuel 
Betts decreed that there was insufficient evidence with which to convict her as a slaver. 
The court released the bark on bond and Thomas Morgan, the former mate and current 
captain and owner of the ship, sailed immediately back to the coast of Africa. Between 
October 10 and November 22, the Orion was boarded no fewer than five times by the 
U.S. Navy but, because the judge had ruled that her cargo was not enough to convict her 
as a slaver, the Navy was compelled to send her on her way. Even though it was clear to 
everyone that the Orion was planning on taking on slaves near the mouth of the Congo 
River, the Navy had to wait until she was full of slaves in order to capture her. Finally,
152
on November 29th, she was captured with nearly 900 slaves on board but, despite all the 
evidence and all the searches by the U.S. Navy, it was a British ship, not an American, 
that claimed the prize. Within a few weeks, the Orion had been destroyed in St. Helena 
and three members of her crew, including Captain Morgan, were sent to Boston for trial. 
All three men spent less than two years in jail for their crime.5
The story of the Orion exemplifies the problems the U.S. Navy faced in 
suppressing the slave trade. Even if the Navy itself had been effective in capturing slave 
ships (which it was not), it faced a barrage of inefficiencies, apathy, and conflicting 
orders from the federal government and the Secretaries of the Navy. It also faced a court 
system unwilling to prosecute the alleged pirates to the fullest extent of the law and a 
public divided over slavery, yet decidedly anti-British and anti-standing Navy in its 
sentiments. These factors resulted in the overall ineffectiveness of the Squadron even 
after it received increased government and public support. Although the federal 
government was fairly effective at protecting its borders and preventing the illegal slave 
trade onto U.S. soil by the 1830s, it was mainly the success of the domestic slave trade 
that had minimized the demand for imported slaves. The case of the Orion is often 
considered a success story since the vessel was seized and its cargo of 900 Africans 
released but the Orion case resonates as an example of the failure of the Navy to suppress
5 Warren Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862 (Berkeley, 1963), 171-173; 
Morgan would still be in jail in 1863 after failing to pay the $2,000 fine, see Record Group 204, 
Office o f  the Pardon Attorney, National Archives. There was still tension between Britain and 
the United States over the right-of-search, but, because the Orion was so clearly a slave ship, the 
U.S. could not protest the British boarding o f  the slaver. Once the Flag Officer learned that the 
Orion had been taken to St. Helena, he sent the U.S.S. Vincennes to arrest the Orion's crew in St. 
Helena. See Record Group 45, Letters to the Secretary o f  the Navy, Captain's Letters, National 
Archives, Microfilm Roll 110.
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the slave trade, even after the force had been strengthened. After all, it was a British 
crew that ultimately received the prize.
During this so-called Age of Abolition, the slave trade under the American flag 
continued to increase. Between 1820 and 1866, 2.2 million enslaved Africans are 
recorded to have been forced across the Atlantic Ocean, with fifty-seven recorded 
voyages originating from North American ports. What can never be known is how many 
slavers were successful in landing their human cargoes on U.S. soil without detection, nor 
is it possible to determine exactly how many Americans participated in the 5,552 slaving 
voyages made after 1808.6 Despite the fact that we will never know the exact numbers of 
Americans who participated in the slave trade, based on extant data and eyewitness 
accounts, it is clear that Americans played a large role in the operation, ownership, 
construction, and fitting out of these slave ships.7
The British and the Formation of the U.S. African Squadron. 1842
As the slave trade shifted to the southern hemisphere and Britain negotiated with 
European nations and African chiefdoms to halt the slave trade, the expansion of slavery 
in Brazil and Cuba in turn increased the demand for slaves and the potential for profits 
for the slave traders.8 Even as more nations made commitments to suppressing the slave 
trade, the citizens of those same nations continued to involve themselves in the trade.
6 In this chapter, all statistics come from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade database at 
slavevoyages.org
7 See Anne Farrow, Joel Lang, Jenifer Frank, Complicity, (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005); 
and David Eltis, “The Abolition o f  the Slave Trade,” New York Public Library, 
http://abolition.nypl.org, accessed October 12, 2012.
8 David Eltis, “Was Abolition o f  the US and British Slave Trade Significant in the Broader 
Atlantic Context?” William and M ary Quarterly, 66 (2009), 724.
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Britain emerged from the Napoleonic Wars as the international police force, using its 
superior naval strength to bully weaker nations into mutual right-of-search and anti-slave 
trade treaties while stronger nations, like the United States and France, resisted giving 
one nation the authority to interfere with the affairs of another.9 As an alternative to 
mutual right-of-search, both France and the United States created their own African 
Squadrons to patrol the coastline, although the U.S. rarely sent a patrol ship to Africa 
before 1842.
The British, on the other hand, actively patrolled the coast of Africa. Emerging as 
the victor after the Napoleonic Wars, it formed the West African Squadron, or 
Preventative Squadron, capitalizing on its superior strength. While Britain did not patrol 
alone—France, the U.S. and Portugal also sent ships to the coast- the U.K. was certainly 
the most committed to the African patrol. Parliament offered incentives to the Navy’s 
captains and crews with promises of prize money for the capture of slavers and slaves. 
When captured, slave traders were sent to Mixed Commission courts to be tried, while 
the slave ship crews were generally freed. As Britain gained a footing in Africa, it also 
entered into anti-slave trade agreements and legal trading contracts with various African 
chiefdoms, establishing and protecting British commerce along the coast.10
Even though it was the most powerful navy in the world at the time, the British 
Navy had to obey international law, a topic addressed in the previous chapter. Other
9 Eltis, “The Abolition o f the Slave Trade,” New York Public Library.
10 For the British Squadron see, Eltis, “The Abolition o f  the Slave Trade;” Christopher Lloyd, The 
Navy and the Slave Trade; Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade; William Mathieson G reat Britain and 
the Slave trade (New York: Octagon Books, 1967), Roger Anstey, “A Re-lnterpretation o f  the 
Abolition o f  the British Slave Trade, 1806-1807,” The English Historical Review  , Vol. 87, No. 
343 (Apr., 1972), 304-332; Sian Rees, Sweet Water and Bitter (Durham: University o f  New  
Hampshire Press, 2011), among others.
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nations, especially France and the United States, were quick to point out infractions and
had a legal right to do so. The British Navy “frequently broke even the nascent dictates
of early-nineteenth century international law.” 11 As a safeguard against British
“outrages,” the United States government signed the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in 1842,
which created a U.S. squadron that would have no fewer than eighty guns patrolling off
1the coast of Africa at all times. From the start, under Secretary of the Navy Abel 
Upshur, the U.S. Africa Squadron was not given a high national priority. Under the 
terms of the Webster-Ashburton treaty, the United States agreed to “prepare, equip, and 
maintain in service on the coast of Africa, a sufficient and adequate squadron to enforce 
separately and respectively, the laws... for the suppression of the slave trade.”13 In 
reality, instructions given to the Squadron focused on the protection of U.S. commerce 
above all else. Secretary of the Navy Upshur wrote in 1843, “while the U States 
sincerely desire the suppression of the Slave Trade, ... they do not regard the success of 
their efforts as their paramount interest nor as their paramount duty.”14 Considering this, 
it is no wonder that the U.S. Navy captured only thirty-six slave ships; it is surprising that 
any were caught at all.
When Upshur finally organized efforts to create the African Squadron, it was over 
a year after the Webster-Ashburton Treaty was signed. Matthew C. Perry, a Commodore
11 Eltis, “The Abolition o f  the Slave Trade,” 4.
12 Andrew Foote, famous for his support o f  the squadron, questioned British anti-slave trade 
motives, while Henry Wise, a pro-slavery statist, argued against the inhumanity o f  the slave trade, 
working diligently in Brazil to stop the illegal traffic. See Howard, American Slavers and the 
Federal Law, 10-11.
13 Webster-Asburton Treaty, Section 8.
14 Upshur quoted in Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 173.
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of the U.S. Navy who would become more famous for his Japan Expedition in the 1850s, 
was appointed to command the first squadron. Four relatively new naval ships sailed to 
Africa in 1843, where Perry set up a depot in the Cape Verde Islands, concerned himself 
with the health of the sailors, and protected the small settlement of Monrovia, which was 
populated by missionaries and former U.S. slaves.
Perry’s orders to the Squadron focused on guarding American merchant vessels 
against British search. On August 1, 1843, upon arriving at Cape Verde, he issued the 
proclamation that the Squadron was to prevent the boarding of any U.S. vessel by any 
foreign navy under all circumstances.15 If captains had had any interest in patrolling in 
tandem with the Royal Navy, these orders expressly forbade it. Because the Navy was so 
concerned with maintaining maritime sovereignty for American vessels, very little time 
and effort was put into suppressing the slave trade.16 As relations improved between the 
U.S. and Great Britain in the early 1850s, calls came to eliminate the squadron.17
During his tenure, Perry used the African Squadron to protect American interests 
and to show American strength along major trading centers in Africa, such as Cape 
Verde, Sierra Leone, and, occasionally, Whydah, situated near modem day Accra. 
Though advised to cooperate with the British Squadron, Perry kept his squadron separate 
from the Royal Navy. With thousands of miles to patrol, Perry chose to keep his ships 
together, rather than dispersing them along the coast. He seemed most concerned about 
maintaining health on his ships, ordering that common areas be fumigated every day and
15 Squadron Letters, Perry, August 1,1843.
16 James Coleman Pfautz, The African Squadron o f  the United States Navy, 1843-1861, (Ph.D. 
diss., American University, 1968), 65.
17 Pfautz, The African Squadron, 62, 65. 89.
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distributing flannel drawers to all seamen.18 Rarely did he send his ships south where 
slave trading was most active, and only one slave ship was captured during his tenure. 
When Charles Skinner took command of the Squadron in 1845, the Navy captured a 
handful of slavers, with the total number of slavers captured by 1850 totaling seven “at an 
annual cost of $384,000.”19 The Secretaries of the Navy continued to employ large 
frigates, primarily as a sign of power and prestige, which could easily make up at least 
half of the eighty-gun requirement but proved to be unsuited for the navigation of shallow 
inlets, where slavers tended to hide. Throughout the history of the African Squadron, 
political leaders consistently ignored the appeals from Squadron captains and 
commodores to improve conditions and effectiveness, preferring to use the Squadron as a 
display of national force.
Problems with Support
Perhaps the biggest obstacle in suppressing the slave trade was the general belief 
that American participation in the slave trade was not a widespread problem. Most of the 
slave trade to the United States had ceased after 1820 and the scope of American 
complicity in the foreign slave trade was difficult to discern. Since the United States was 
more concerned with protecting its borders, few Americans concerned themselves over 
the slave trade to the Caribbean and South America, although many took part in its 
profits. President Monroe, whose administration was responsible for the Supplementary 
Slave Trade Acts, was convinced that the slave trade by American citizens had ended.20
18 See Squadron Letters, Perry 1843.
19 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 174.
20 Earl McNeilly, “The United States Navy and the Suppression o f  the Slave Trade,” (Ph.D. diss., 
Case Western Reserve University, 1973), 62.
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While the U.S. African Squadron was in existence, Secretaries of the Navy as 
well as many Squadron leaders refused to acknowledge involvement in the slave trade by 
American citizens until very late in the Squadron’s history. Even Commodore Perry 
declared that the slave trade was not being carried out by Americans.21 Throughout the 
history of the African Squadron, there seemed to be very little consensus about the extent 
of the traffic. African Squadron Flag Officer Crabbe wrote in April 1856 that the slave 
trade was “broken up,” but by the next February he admitted that Americans were 
participating in the trade and later stated that the slave trade was “carried on to an unusual 
extent.”22
Even after the African Squadron was formed, and even though the British 
continued to report on the vast American involvement in the trade, most political leaders 
denied the prevalence of American slavers. Despite the evidence of foreign ships sailing 
illegally under the Stars and Stripes, Lewis Cass wrote in 1860 that he “regrets if the U.S. 
flag is used more for the slave trade, although he doubts it in actuality.”23 Throughout the 
African Squadron’s history, policy makers refused to admit that the participation by 
Americans in the trade was carried on by more than just a few misguided troublemakers.
One explanation why African Squadron leaders and the Secretaries of the Navy 
tended to believe that the slave trade was waning, while in fact it was increasing, was that 
the African Squadron usually sailed solely between Madeira, Cape Verde, and Liberia,
21 Alan R. Booth, “The United States African Squadron, 1843-1861,” from Boston University 
Papers in African History, vol. 1 (Boston: Boston University Press, 1964), 112, see also letter to 
Secretary o f  Navy Sept 4 ,1843 , National Archives, M89, “Letters Received by the Secretaiy o f  
the Navy From Commanding Officers o f  Squadrons.” (“Squadron Letters”), 1841-1886. Roll 101.
22 H.E.D., No. 7, 36:2, 517, 520, and 522.
23 H.E.D., No. 7, 36:2,415.
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and avoided areas south of the Equator. While the coast around Liberia had been dotted 
with slave barracoons in the eighteenth century, the trade shifted further and further south 
as the nineteenth century progressed. By the 1850s, the African slave trade was focused 
around the Congo River in modem day Angola. While the British used their extensive 
spy networks to gain intelligence about the African trade, American naval ships rarely 
traveled south of Liberia until the late 1850s. Some captains, like McNair aboard the 
Dale, aggressively patrolled the coast while on a southern cruise, but many captains 
chose to focus on the protection of Monrovia, and most were unwilling to sail close to the 
coast. This was in part due to the deep draft of the U.S. ships-of-war and in part due to 
the fear of African fever. Most captains returned to Cape Verde or Madeira as soon as 
possible.24
There were those who did believe that the United States was playing a complicit 
role in the foreign slave trade. Reverend Charles Remond, a black abolitionist from 
Massachusetts, asked if anyone would deny that “the star spangled banner was now the 
greatest protector of the slave trade,” in a debate against Frederick Douglass on May 20, 
1857 in New York City.25 Douglass himself would chastise the U.S. government, saying 
“we were made the patrons of pirates... our Government virtually gave notice not merely 
to slave traders, but to all manner of sea pirates that the American flag is broad enough to 
cover them all, and that the American arm is strong enough to defend them all.”26
24 McNeilly, U.S. Navy, 145.
25 Speech by Rev. C.L. Remond, in The Frederick Douglass Papers, Series One, vol. Ill, ed. John. 
W. Blassingame (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 160.
26 Frederick Douglass, speech in Poughkeepsie, NY on Aug 2 ,1858 , in Blassingame, ed., 217- 
218.
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Abolitionist alarmists increasingly pressed the federal government to stop the slave trade, 
but their message was weakened by international politics between the U.S and Britain, as 
well as the United States’ own anti-slave trade stance. Words and deeds, however, were 
distinctly separate entities.
From the beginning, the African Squadron was an unpopular post. The patrol was 
isolating, it lacked public support and, above all, was considered the least healthy of the 
American Squadrons. In reality, seamen posted to the African Squadron were no more 
likely to die than those on other patrols but its reputation as a death squadron made most 
captains and crews long for transfers.27 And, despite the fact that few ships were posted 
to the Squadron for more than twenty-four months, the flag officers tended to keep the 
ships around Porto Praya, two thousand miles northwest of the Congo River and most of 
the slaving activity, in order to stay near the supply depot and to keep the crews healthy. 
Many Flag Officers spent significant time in Madeira, an island even further from the 
slaving coast. The long distances ships-of-war had to travel significantly reduced active 
patrol duty, slowed down communication between the ships and, based on the reports of 
African fever at Porto Praya, had little effect on the overall health of the crews.28
The African Squadron was also hindered by the lack of monetary support because 
few believed the U.S. slave trade was a problem. It was hugely expensive to maintain a 
fleet so far from American soil. The United States government did not have the power 
necessary to justify the allocation of such funds, especially since there was so little public 
support for the squadron. Even the Navy reported that conducting a patrol o f such a large
27 See Canney, Africa Squadron, 12, 35, 143; and Pfautz, African Squadron, 21.
28 Henry Eason reported a yellow fever outbreak in Porto Praya, see also Canney, Africa 
Squadron, 66.
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area was futile, an observation that did not help the squadron’s image, particularly with a 
public generally opposed to a standing navy.29 While Americans supported the squadron 
either for the protection of commerce or as a measure against British dominance, most 
believed that an expensive blockade was not the best method to suppress the traffic.
This lack of public support for the Squadron also manifested itself in the general 
dislike of the post by Squadron Commanders. Many flag officers did not complete their 
two-year commitment, preferring the perks of the Mediterranean or the Home 
Squadrons.30 The Secretaries of the Navy tended to neglect the Squadron, leaving the 
Flag Officers to command as they saw fit. For most, this meant long stays in Porto Praya 
and Madeira and little overall coordination and strategy within the small fleet. In general, 
the Squadron captains displayed a commitment to their duties, both in protecting U.S. 
commerce and in their search for American slave ships. Navy captains made attempts to 
acquire information from the British about slave ship locations, while the Secretaries of 
the Navy were more concerned about British right-of-search violations. In the long run, 
the fear of illness, poor supplies, insufficient fire-power, and the long distance between 
the supply depot and the slaving coast, rendered efforts to stop the slave trade futile.31
29 Canney, Africa Squadron, 68, and McNeilly, The U.S. Navy, 175
30 There are many letters from Commodores to the Secretaries o f  the Navy asking to be relieved 
o f  their position. Some had good reason. Bolton, for example, died a few months after being 
reassigned to the Mediterranean post, after a long illness which kept him and his flag ship in 
Madeira for most o f  the time he was Flag Officer. See Canney, Africa Squadron, and Letters to 
the Secretary o f  the Navy, housed in the National Archives.
31 See Canney, Africa Squadron, 221, 223, and 227; see also Booth, “The United States African 
Squadron,” 102; Pfautz discusses the “indifference o f captains” but Canney’s thorough analysis 
o f  squadron letters and decklogs does support the argument that the Captains were committed to 
their goals. The problem for the suppression o f  the slave trade was that the General Orders did 
not prioritize abolishing the slave trade.
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The Squadron and the Slave Trade Laws
The Squadron was also fraught with miscommunication and legal uncertainty. 
Even though the laws against the slave trade stipulated that vessels could be condemned 
for having slave trading equipment aboard, none of the laws specified what this 
equipment was. The Navy tended to assert that items such as chains, slave coppers, water 
casks, and medicines were evidence enough to confiscate a vessel. Justice Joseph Story 
in 1823 and Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in the 1840s also agreed. Juries, hesitant to 
convict fellow citizens of a capital crime, increasingly dismissed these cases because of 
lack of evidence, however. By 1859, seamen and officers were only able to receive prize 
money if human cargo was found aboard a slave vessel. In the Wanderer case, which 
will be analyzed in the next chapter, a judge declared the 1820 piracy law to be 
unconstitutional, and New York District court judge Samuel Betts declared that vessels 
could only be condemned if slaves were found aboard. This created huge obstacles for a 
Navy that otherwise was becoming better organized and more effective.33
Because the United States never resolved the issue of mutual right-of-search and 
was ineffective against the abuse of the American flag, even when these abuses were 
acknowledged, little could be done to mitigate them. By the 1850s, public officials 
finally admitted the problem of the abuse of the American flag as well as American 
participation in the trade, but they had made little progress in improving the squadron. 
Andrew Foote commented on this problem in 1855, arguing that the right-of-search 
policy effectively sheltered slavers under the flag because, “unless the vessel is boarded,
32 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 175, see also Blythe to Hatch in Cuba July 22, 1857, 
concerning Blythe’s difficulty in gaining evidence in H.E.D., No. 7, 36:2, 71.
33 Canney, Africa Squadron, 199.
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our colors may be made to cover the most atrocious acts of piracy.”34 The U.S. Squadron 
slowly began to cooperate with the British Squadron, particularly by trading information 
and sailing in tandem. By drawing the public’s attention to problems of the slave trade, 
men like Andrew Foote pressured Congress to make the squadron more effective. An 
avid abolitionist after serving on the U.S.S. Perry in the African Squadron, Foote 
declared, that while his ship sailed in tandem with the British, the slave trade 
“languished,” but afterwards, when the Marion and Boxer spent very little time sailing 
south, the “abuse of the American Flag became too notorious... to make it necessary for 
me to refer further to it.”35
Back in the United States, conflict over the expansion of slavery dominated 
politics. The federal government continued to sanction slavery and prioritize preserving 
the Union, while abolitionists began increasingly to attack the “peculiar institution.” The 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 cemented the government’s commitment to slavery, which 
made harboring a fugitive slave a criminal offense and employed federal marshals to 
carry out state slavery codes. After 1850, some claimed that the U.S. Navy, in capturing 
slave ships and separating slaves from their potential owners, was violating the Fugitive 
Slave Act, creating yet another contradiction in U.S. policy.36
Changes to the Squadron 
Understanding the disconnect between the vision of American leaders and the 
practice of the commanders on the coast of Africa reveals the difficulties in slave trade
34 Andrew Foote, The African Squadron, 3.
35 Quoting Sir George Jackson, in Foote, The African Squadron, 9.
36 This claim comes from Canney, Africa Squadron, 155
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suppression. Beginning with the agreed cooperation between the British Squadron and 
the U.S.S. Grampus in 1843 and the swift orders overriding this agreement from the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Squadron captains seemed much more willing than the U.S. 
policy makers to join forces with the British, probably because the captains understood 
the many problems at sea in suppressing the slave trade and that a single country could 
not act alone. Historian Donald Canney’s assessment of the Africa Squadron concludes 
that Navy captains, in general, took their positions seriously despite the obstacles, 
unpopularity of the post, and lack of support from above.37 Despite the overall efforts of 
squadron captains, effective patrolling could only be brought about from the political 
leaders holding the purse strings. Eventually the African Squadron would improve its 
efforts in stopping American slave ships, but, in the end, it was the U.S. efforts to stop 
British seizure of American ships that led to a stronger squadron.
Partially in response to the renewed British “attacks” on shipping, the United 
States increased its surveillance of the African Coast in 1858, adding several steamships 
and sloops-of-war to its Squadron. At the same time, plans for a supply depot closer to 
the slaving ports were finally accepted. The Navy seemed much more committed to the 
Squadron than it had ever been before. This commitment reflected the changes at home: 
the radicalization of Southern politics and the reaction in the North, and an admission by 
the government of American complicity in the slave trade and the abuse of the flag. The 
addition of steam ships was important because, unlike sailing vessels, they were much 
more effective in navigating the shallow inlets along the African coast and were not 
dependent on Africa’s unreliable breezes. Despite these important additions, many slaver
37 Canney, Africa Squadron, 224-227.
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traders would still escape capture, and many more would escape conviction in U.S. 
courts, as the example of the Orion showed. Its journey from the Baltimore dry docks to 
its destruction at St. Helena by the British highlights the many problems the U.S. and 
British squadrons had in successfully capturing slave ships.
By the time the owners of the Orion began fitting her out in New York for a 
slave-trading voyage in early 1859, the British and American squadrons off the coast of 
Africa had entered into an unwritten understanding and were increasingly sailing in 
tandem. But, as it became more and more apparent that the U.S. flag was acting as a 
cover for slavers, the British also increased their policing of suspicious vessels regardless 
of the flag flown. Because the U.S. Secretaries of the Navy continued to protest Great 
Britain’s search and seizure policy, the British began utilizing other methods of capturing 
slavers, and therefore claiming their prize money. When a suspicious ship raised the 
Stars and Stripes in the presence of a Royal Navy ship, often the British would then 
“detain” the ship until it came upon an American cruiser. As the ships waited for the 
U.S. squadron to arrive, British officers would try to convince the alleged slaver to 
abandon its American papers and surrender to the British or else be subject to capital 
punishment in the U.S. courts. Often, this tactic worked, since the British tended to 
release crew members while the U.S. Navy would send them to the U.S. for trial. Not 
surprisingly, the U.S. government protested this practice, accusing British officers of 
overreaching their authority.38
38 The President M essage Concerning the Slave Trade o f 1860 is full o f  examples o f  British 
“liberties” see for example: 80, 82, 83, 92, 97, 532. By 1858, the British had increased the 
pressure on the U.S. over the abuse o f  the American flag, by blatantly boarding vessels flying the 
American flag. Even the captain aboard the Orion protested this action. H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2.
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Orion: First Capture:
Clftur* O f Tk* 8 U**r
Figure 6: "Capture o f  the Slaver"39
The Orion first came under the suspicion in the spring of 1859 as it cruised near 
the mouth of the Congo River. The bark, under the control of Captain John Hanna, had 
left New York in January of that year and had spent nearly three months sailing off the 
African coast, arousing British suspicion. Finally, Lieutenant Commander R. H. Burton
thof the H.M.S. Triton boarded the Orion on the 11 of April and “never for the moment 
supposing] him legally entitled to fly the ‘American ensign’”40 seized the ship, placed 
her in tow, and got underway to find a U.S. Navy ship. After four days of sailing, the 
Triton returned to Shark’s Point, at the mouth of the Congo River, and waited for the 
U.S.S. Marion, which was scheduled to arrive in the area.
While the Orion was in tow, it seems from Lieutenant Burton’s testimony that the 
Captain and Chief Officer of the suspected slaver were in disagreement. According to 
Burton, Captain Hanna had discussed with him the possibility of forgoing the American
39 G.W. Blunt Library, Log 902; Eason Ship Journal, 1858. On the side o f  the image, Heniy 
Eason wrote: “A Dead Failure: She was honorably acquitted in Charleston, S.C. & no prize 
money.” It is unclear why Henry Eason sketched a bark rather than a brigantine, which is what 
the Orion was; it is most likely because the drawing was done by memory, not in person.
40 Burton to Commodore Charles Wise, July 18, 1859, in H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 350.
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flag and turning the ship over to the Triton. On April 13, Thomas Morgan, the Chief 
Officer of the Orion, submitted a protest to Burton, insisting that the bark be turned over 
to the closest American ship or consul immediately and that Hanna was “so unwell that 
he is unable to conduct or manage the vessel himself.”41 Unsure of who was in charge of 
the Orion, Burton must have been relieved when the U.S.S. Marion came into sight on 
the 19th.
Once the Marion arrived on the scene, the situation did not improve for Burton. 
Thomas Morgan clearly had been instructed on how to claim innocence while carrying a 
suspicious cargo. A formal protest dated April 18th by Hanna, Morgan, and the second 
mate, claimed that the British seizure of the ship was “calculated to injure the interest of 
my owners to a very serious extent, and, [that they would]... seek reparation for every 
damage sustained thereby.”42 Morgan’s detailed account of the ordeal indicates that he 
was well aware of the conflict between the U.S. and Britain over the right-of-search. He 
also claimed that Burton had made threats to Hanna and Morgan and also indicated that 
the Royal officer was open to bribery. According to Morgan, “these and many other 
things were used by the British commander, in order to intimidate and induce our captain 
to give up the ship.”43 When questioned about the cargo on board, both Hanna and 
Morgan claimed that they had no “knowledge of the nature of their cargo.”44
41 Morgan to Burton, April 13, 1859, H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 370.
42 Protest o f  John Hanna, April 18, 1859, H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 367, the O rion ’s  logbook refers to 
its seizure by the Triton.
43 Morgan, Excerpts from Orion’s logbook, April 14, 1859, H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 369.
44 Burton to Brent, April 32, 1859, H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 365.
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Denying knowledge of the cargo was one of many tactics slave traders used in 
order to escape conviction. The captain and crew need not have worried. The Anti-Slave 
Trade Acts failed to define what cargo was considered evidence despite all the U.S. laws 
against the slave trade and the severity of the punishments.45 At sea, the Marion quickly 
seized the Orion and made preparations to sail her to New York, believing her to have 
enough evidence for conviction.46
The officers and crew aboard the Marion would find many American merchant 
ships at the mouth of the Congo that spring. The day after the Orion was seized, the 
Emma Lincoln was boarded and was found to contain nearly identical cargo as the Orion 
and owned by the same group of New Yorkers. While Commander Brent of the Marion 
seems to have been suspicious of the Orion’s story, the papers of the Emma Lincoln were 
considered to be “correct [and] they could not find sufficient evidence to condemn her.”47 
In the case of the Orion, Brent must have been wary of the outbursts of Captain Hanna 
and claims of Thomas Morgan. Brent sent a letter on April 20 to Commander Burton of 
the H.M.S. Triton, arguing that the Orion’s papers were genuine and informing Burton 
that a formal investigation would take place. Remaining cordial but firm in his letter, 
Brent reminded Burton that, although Burton believed himself to be carrying out his 
orders, “as to [the Orion] being engaged in the slave trade, that is another question, and in
45 See Slave Trade Acts o f  1794, 1800, 1808, 1818, 1819, and 1820 in Appendices, and Judge 
Betts’s decision that required slaves be present on board in order for a slave ship to be convicted, 
see Canney, Africa Squadron, 94.
46 Henry Eason, Journal o f  Henry Eason aboard U.S. Marion, G.W.Blunt Library, 4/19/1859, 46.
47 Eason, Journal, 47.
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my jurisdiction.”48 Brent knew that keeping the British in check was the squadron’s main 
priority.
Brent’s tone in his correspondence with Burton was mild compared to that of the 
letters sent from the Secretaries of State and Navy and the U.S. Minister to the Court of 
St. James, George M. Dallas. Unlike the men who had witnessed the capture of the 
Orion, they focused on the illegal boarding of an American ship by the British, rather 
than the obvious nature of the bark’s voyage.49 Whereas Brent concluded that, without 
Burton’s “intervention it is highly probably I could not have effected the capture of that 
vessel,”50 Dallas wrote to the British Secretary of State that “the incidents, if ultimately 
established, are so calculated to create angry feeling, and to disturb the existing relations 
of the two countries.”51 He demanded that a full investigation be conducted.
Meanwhile, as the two nations fought over the alleged misconduct of Burton, the 
Orion sailed to New York with its original officers and crew in irons. En route to New 
York, Captain Hanna, apparently “under the menaces, humiliation, and responsibilities to 
which he was subjected, died of a broken heart.”52 When captured aboard the Orion, 
however, Morgan initially described Hanna’s ailments as an intestinal blockage. Hanna’s 
death was declared to have been caused by the cruelty of the British captain and there 
was widespread sympathy for the Orion’s crew among the American public. The case
48 Brent to Burton, April 20, 1859, H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 362.
49 The main objectives o f  the squadron were for “protecting the American flag and denying to the 
British a right o f  search.” See Pfautz, African Squadron, 62.
50 Brent to Burton (at Burton’s request), April 22 ,1859, H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 366.
51 Dallas to Russell, August 29, 1859, H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 360.
52 Ibid.
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became less about the illegal actions of the Orion and more about British aggression 
against American merchants. In court, the crew was immediately released, the owner, 
Harrison Vining, was not held liable, and a bond was posted in return for the ship. As a 
result, while the United States and British politicians sparred over the seizure of the ship, 
Thomas Morgan, the former mate and new captain of the vessel, readied the Orion for a 
return trip to Africa, carrying the same cargo from the first voyage.
The seizure of the ship and the subsequent dismissal of the case had effectively 
given Morgan a free pass to travel undisturbed. Even with a cargo of slave coppers, 
water casks, medicine, and lumber, the New York judge ruled that there was insufficient 
evidence by which to condemn the vessel. By dismissing the case, the judge made the 
cargo legal in the eyes of the U.S. courts, and subsequently, Thomas Morgan himself. 
Immediately before sailing the Orion back to Africa, Morgan boldly sent a letter to Lewis 
Cass, Secretary of State, protesting the “insulting” behavior of the British officers aboard 
the Triton, and informing him of the Orion’s  preparations to sail to Africa. In addition, 
Morgan asked Cass what a captain’s rights were in denying foreign navies permission to 
board his ship. It seems, though, despite Morgan’s request for a swift reply, that his goal 
was merely to have his inquiries put in writing, since he set sail with a new crew aboard 
the Orion shortly after posting his letter.53 After a journey of less than two months, the 
suspected slaver was back at the mouth of the Congo River. The ship’s arrival, however, 
did not go unnoticed.
53 Morgan to Cass, August 3 ,1859 , H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 353, an account o f  the first capture and 
trial can be found in Howard, American Slavers, 171-174.
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By the fall of 1859, the African Squadron had changed dramatically because of 
the Buchanan administration’s increased support of the Squadron. William Inman, a War 
of 1812 veteran and native of Utica, New York, had been appointed Flag Officer of the 
Squadron. Inman’s tenure as flag officer brought many important changes to the African 
Squadron. His attention to detail created a more connected, streamlined, patrol o f the 
African coast. Isaac Toucey, the Secretary of the Navy, finally answered the requests of 
previous Flag Officers; he allocated funds for steamships, negotiated a supply depot 
closer to the slaving coast, ordered U.S. ships to remain south of Liberia, and encouraged 
communication between British and U.S. ships. These improvements marked a great 
“sea change” in the U.S. African Squadron.54 This change stemmed from two main 
causes. First, the increased British aggression on American merchants ships encouraged 
Congress to allocate more funding for the Navy in order to protect merchants ships, 
which also had the consequence of improving U.S. patrols against illegal slavers. The 
second cause stemmed from rumors of the reopening of the slave trade to the U.S., 
including the successful voyage of the Wanderer to Georgia, which will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter. For these reasons, the U.S. government itself was more 
committed to suppressing the slave trade.55 Additionally, the capture of more American 
slavers brought international attention, and added U.S. embarrassment, to the 
participation of American citizens in the illegal slave trade. Finally, U.S. policy makers
54 Canney, Africa Squadron, 201
55 Buchanan, a Democrat, responded to demands to improve the African Squadron in part to 
prevent the Republican party from gaining anti-slave trade supporters and capitalize on the 
alarming (mostly inflated) reports that the slave trade to the U.S. was reviving. See Canney, 
Africa Squadron, 204-5.
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begrudgingly admitted that Americans were profiting from the trade, and they began to 
take responsibility for the abuse of the U.S. flag by foreign slave ships.
The extent of the success of the African Squadron under Inman and Toucey was 
limited, as Inman’s extreme micromanaging decreased the squadron’s flexibility and 
effectiveness.56 Aside from a few, albeit important, improvements made in the final two 
years of the Squadron, the United States’ policy would never alter or adapt to the ever- 
changing evasion tactics of the slavers, although the squadron made more captures 
between 1859-1861 than the previous fourteen years combined.57 In many ways, the 
increasingly hesitant court system cancelled out any progress the Navy made in capturing 
slave ships, because the policy for conviction was not keeping pace with improvements to 
the African Squadron.
56 Canney, Africa Squadron, 220, McNeilly, U.S. Navy, 226, see also the works o f  Booth, Pfautz, 
and Howard. Canney argues, rightfully, that the Squadron became more effective due to changes 
from the federal government, not necessarily in Inman’s officiousness. It must still be pointed 
out that although Inman’s tenure saw many changes in the Squadron (i.e. changing supply 
stations, use o f  steamers, better communication with the British, and increased funding) slave 
ships still escaped the African blockade and delivered their human cargo, and, the court system in 
the United States still balked at convicting slavers. The case o f  the Erie and Captain Gordon, 
who was hanged in 1862, stands as the one exception to the rule. Inman’s letters to officers and 
the Isaac Toucey, the Secretary o f  the Navy, begin in July 1859 when he was appointed Flag 
Officer. His correspondence then proceeds to fill three rolls o f  microfilm, compared to one to 
one-half roll from his predecessors. Although Inman’s tenure does boast the largest number o f  
slave ship captures, this seems in part due to sheer luck rather than his own desire to capture 
illegal traders.
57 Canney, Africa Squadron, 233.
58 Warren Howard has an impressive set o f  Appendices including lists o f  vessels and slavers 
captured and the outcomes o f  their trials. Most criminal prosecutions resulted in acquittal or less 
than 5 years sentencing, while cases involving alleged slave vessels were increasingly dismissed. 
See also Canney, Africa Squadron, 201-203, see also the infamous Wanderer case, in Tom 
Henderson W ells’s The Slave Ship Wanderer (Athens, University o f  Georgia Press, 1968).
Owner Charles Lamar bragged to his friends that he could land slaves on U.S. soil, transporting 
them aboard his yacht, which he did successfully, and with great publicity. The vessel was 
eventually forfeited, but over 300 enslaved Africans disappeared into Southern plantations and 
were never recovered.
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From an international viewpoint, the differing strategies of the United States and 
Britain placed huge obstacles in the way of successful cooperation. It does appear that 
captains from both navies communicated and collaborated on a regular basis, however. 
These U.S. Navy captains employed British spy networks and superior force to their 
advantage, learning more about the slave ships than they would have on their own, 
particularly in years where the American squadron was functioning at a minimum level. 
The right-of-search issue, of course, remained a sticking point until the Civil War. The 
U.S. policy of freedom of the seas in international law continued to obstruct most efforts 
to stop the trade. This is most apparent from the fact that despite appropriating funds for 
a stronger African force, the general orders for the African Squadron in 1858 were 
virtually identical to orders given to Perry in 1842. The main, and most significant, 
change to U.S. policy was the order from Isaac Toucey to collaborate with the British if it 
were deemed prudent.59
Inman took most General Orders seriously and in his typically officious manner. 
His orders to re-concentrate his force and alter the supply depot he carried out with 
methodical diligence. He had been ordered to transfer the supplies from Porto Praya to 
St. Paul de Loando, a Portuguese port near the mouth of the Congo River that was 
believed to be fairly healthy, and, more importantly, was much closer to the slaving coast 
than Cape Verde. The most important change Inman orchestrated was in ordering the 
Squadron captains “to cooperate with her Majesty’s ships whenever it may be mutually
59 Canney, Africa Squadron, 208; H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 584.
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desirable to do so.”60 Inman himself seems to have minimized his own contact with 
British Officers during his tenure.
Inman left New York in July 1859 aboard the Constellation, a five-year old sloop- 
of-war that would gain the distinction of being the last all-sail ship built for the U.S. 
Navy and the last Flag Ship of the African Squadron.61 But, before the Constellation 
could begin its cruise down the African coast, Inman kept the ship in Madeira for a 
month and, in Porto Praya, the supply depot in Cape Verde, for another five weeks, not 
reaching Liberia until the end of October. Flag Officers of the Squadron typically 
preferred to maintain their base of operations in either Madeira or Porto Praya, since they 
believed that these ports were healthier than any other found in Africa. Like his 
predecessors, Inman was in no hurry to sail south.
While Inman supervised these duties in Madeira and Porto Praya and awaited the 
arrival of the steamers and the return of the ships from patrol, only the U.S.S. Vincennes 
remained on duty to monitor the hundreds of miles of coastline and inlets. By 
September, that ship had sailed north to Porto Praya with the hope of returning to the 
United States, while the U.S.S. Portsmouth sailed south after receiving orders from the 
Constellation in Porto Praya. On her way south, the Portsmouth captured the slave ship 
Emily the day after having met with the captain of a British warship. Likely the British 
had informed Captain Colhoun of the suspicious vessel. When the Portsmouth arrived at
60 Inman to Rear Admiral Sir Fred. Grey, October 24 ,1859, in H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 584.
61 Walter Dean Myers, The U.S.S. Constellation, (New York: Holiday House Press, 2004), 20.
See also www.historicships.org/Cons/e//an‘o« for Baltimore’s Historic Ships website.
62 This information comes from Record Group 45, Letters to the Secretary o f  the Navy, National 
Archives, Microfilm Reel 110.
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the Congo River on October 9, crew member Isaac Mullen simply recorded, “English 
steamers Archer and Viper also barque Orion lying there.”63 The Orion was back on the 
coast and immune to both British and U.S. searches.
The fact that the Orion was in company with the two Royal Navy ships is telling. 
Clearly Thomas Morgan, the captain of the Orion, was not threatened by the presence of 
the British Navy. With the vast intelligence and communications networks of the British, 
the two British men-of-war would have known about the Orion’s previous capture, and, 
most likely, would have been in communication with the ship. Morgan’s court libel 
rendered him untouchable. Without slaves on board, the U.S.S. Portsmouth was also 
powerless to slow Morgan’s progress. What Morgan did not know was that the 
Portsmouth soon would not be alone. Three more U.S. Navy ships would sail to the 
Congo in the next six weeks, trapping Morgan on the coast.
Even if Calhoun and the rest of the Portsmouth crew did not initially suspect the 
Orion as a slaver, communication with the British would have informed them of the 
situation. Five days after Mullen recorded seeing the Orion, the First Lieutenant of the 
Portsmouth boarded the Orion and found Captain Morgan sailing with his bonded cargo- 
the same cargo with which the Portsmouth had seized the Emily. But because the Orion 
had been bonded by the district court, its cargo was immune to seizure. With that 
knowledge, Colhoun ordered the Portsmouth to release the Orion and set sail. No more 
mention of the Orion exists until four weeks later.
In the span of time before the Orion was again spotted off the coast of the Congo 
River, Thomas Morgan must have gone up river to negotiate the purchase of slaves, fill
63 Isaac Mullen, Journal o f  Isaac Mullen aboard the U.S.S. Portsmouth, Strawbery Banke 
Museum, October 9, 1859.
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up his water casks, and dispose of the slave coppers, which then he had trekked over land 
to a prearranged slave loading area north of the mouth of the Congo River. Slave trader 
intelligence networks must have informed Morgan that he was being watched by the 
British and American ships, and that more navy ships were congregating south of the 
Congo River, making it impossible to load the slaves from the river. Yet, his trip up the 
river also subjected himself and his crew to “African fever” and, by the time she was 
again sighted off the coast by American ships a month later, most of her crew, including 
Morgan, were sick.64
By the beginning of November, the U.S. African Squadron had begun 
concentrating its forces at the mouth of the Congo River, where the majority of slave 
trading voyages were reported to have embarked. The Portsmouth, the Mystic, the San 
Jacinto, and the Constellation all patrolled a three hundred mile stretch of coastline 
between Kabenda and St. Paul de Loanda.65 Inman had ordered all ships to make St. Paul 
de Loando their base, and he finally left Porto Praya, arriving at Shark’s Point on 
November 21. Never before had so many U.S. Navy vessels patrolled such a 
concentrated area of the African coast.
Before the Constellation’s arrival, the Portsmouth, the Mystic, the San Jacinto, 
together with the British ships Pluto and Archer, circled around the untouchable Orion. 
The Portsmouth boarded the Orion on November 10th after a six-hour chase. One hour 
later, Captain Colhoun released the suspicious vessel because, as a New York Herald 
correspondent aboard the Portsmouth lamented, “although her intention was perfectly
64 The Portsmouth chased the Orion for six hours before boarding her for an hour on November 
10th. The Mystic boarded her on the 12th, see Record Group 45 Deck Logs, National Archives.
65 Also spelled Kabinda or Cabinda.
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evident, we could do nothing but let her pass, not being able to procure the evidence our 
courts in New York require for condemnation.”66 Two days later the Mystic boarded the 
Orion and found the captain and crew sick with African fever. To assist the Orion back 
to Shark’s Point, “an officer and fourteen men [from the Mystic] were put on board at the 
request of her master”67 where they would remain at least a week.
While it was not unusual for Navy ships to assist merchant vessels in distress, one 
can only imagine what was going on aboard the Orion for those seven days. Later 
Morgan would be accused of feigning sickness, but this accusation only adds to the 
brazenness of Morgan’s behavior off the coast of Africa. Free to sail where he wanted, 
sick or not, he could make preparations for a slaving voyage right under the U.S. Navy’s 
nose.
One incident during the middle weeks in November that had a direct impact on 
the Orion’s story was the boarding of the ship by the U.S. Steamship San Jacinto, 
recently arrived from the United States. Steamships would prove invaluable in the 
policing of coastal inlets, but they were expensive to fuel and often broke down. During 
the voyage across the Atlantic, the steamer’s propellers and pumping system failed. 
Despite Flag Officer Inman’s orders to continue on patrol, Captain William Armstrong 
wrote many letters describing the extent of the damage and had engineers submit damage 
reports recommending immediate overhaul. Inman overrode all these protests, ordering 
Armstrong to “anchor the San Jacinto off Shark’s Point in such a position that, with your 
gun boats and by chase under steam, you can command the mouth of the river... You will
66 “The Capture o f  the Slaver Orion," New York Herald, 02/17/1860.
67 Ibid.
178
retain that position, except when in chase, under further orders; and you will not fail to 
visit and examine every American Vessel arriving and departing.” Inman’s very 
specific orders, after the ordeal with the repairs, did not sit well with Armstrong. Upon 
arriving at Shark’s Point, Armstrong spotted the Orion and gave chase. Finding the 
officers of the Mystic still on board, Armstrong left the Orion, and steamed into Kabenda, 
thirty miles north of the Congo, where the San Jacinto spent four days watering the ship, 
despite having a thirty days’ supply already on board.
Armstrong clearly was frustrated with the way Inman disregarded his concerns 
over the state of the steamship, but there were other reasons why Armstrong did not 
immediately return to his post at Shark’s Point. Firstly, in Kabenda’s harbor, several 
British ships were at anchor, including the HMS Pluto and Archer, as well as the U.S.S. 
Portsmouth and the Mystic. The deck logs of the Portsmouth and San Jacinto show 
active telegraphic communication between the ships as well as many visitations between 
officers and crew of the several ships. Captain Le Roy of the Mystic had lost track of the 
Orion and his crew, so, according to Armstrong, he was glad to hear about the 
whereabouts of the ship. Because the Orion had been boarded so recently by so many of 
the ships in that harbor, it must have been a topic of conversation during those next few 
days, and it appears as though the commanders of the ships, including those of the 
British, had ample time to discuss the problems of seizing suspected slavers.69
68 Inman to Toucey, relaying Inman’s orders to Armstrong, Nov 28, 1859, Letters to the Secretary 
o f  the Navy, National Archives, Reel 110.
69 This information comes from the logbooks o f  the San Jacinto and Portsmouth, both housed at 
the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Unfortunately, this author has not been able to locate 
the logbooks for the M ystic or the Constellation, nor information on how to translate these 
specific signals. Many thanks to Paul Cora, curator at Historic Ships in Baltimore, for his help in 
the matter.
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Orion: The Second Capture
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Figure 7: Cruising Ground o f  the U.S.S. Yorktown 
While it is not clear when the Mystic received its officers back from the Orion, 
there is evidence that action was taken to catch the slaver with slaves on board or, at the 
very least, force the bark to give up on its mission. The Mystic returned to the Congo 
and seems to have proceeded further south from there. The Portsmouth sailed out to sea 
on a circular route to try to catch slave ships sailing out from the coast. Leaving on 
November 22, she would be back at Shark’s Point on November 29, before sailing south 
to St. Paul de Loanda. The San Jacinto meanwhile, completed the watering of the ship 
and returned to Shark’s Point on the 22nd but not before Inman could arrive at Shark’s 
Point and find the post abandoned.
When the Constellation arrived at Shark’s Point with the steamer San Jacinto 
nowhere in sight, Inman must have seen it as the last straw in Armstrong’s attempt to 
undermine his authority. Armstrong’s decision to chase the Orion may not have been 
against Inman’s direct orders, but his four-day “liberty” was. This latest insult 
compounded the dispute between the two men over the serviceability o f San Jacinto's
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propellers and rudders. When the San Jacinto returned, Inman immediately ordered the 
Constellation and San Jacinto to sail 300 miles south to St. Paul de Loando, ironically 
ordering the San Jacinto to abandon her post at Shark’s Point. William Armstrong was 
later court martialed for neglect of duty and would never again command a naval ship. 
On November 22, the day the Constellation allegedly boarded the Orion, the U.S. ships
sailed to St. Paul’s, thus removing all American Navy ships from a coastline where a
7n
suspicious slaver lurked. The Congo River was at last free of American Navy ships.
During this window, Thomas Morgan of the Orion, now recovered from his fever, 
may have sailed back up the Congo to secure a shipment of slaves. Then, on the night of 
the 28th of November, Morgan anchored in a bay twenty miles north of Shark’s Point and 
just south of Kabenda, and loaded nearly 900 enslaved Africans aboard. The slaver had 
escaped relentless inspections by U.S. cruisers, but now, with slaves on board, the U.S. 
flag could no longer protect it from Britain’s superior fleet.
Within twenty-four hours, the H.M.S. Pluto spied the Orion over one hundred 
miles out to sea and pounced. According to an account aboard the Pluto, the Orion 
continued to sail with American colors but, when the British threatened to board anyway, 
she struck her colors and surrendered.71 All the protection Morgan had had from the 
American court could not save him. For the 108 Africans who died below decks while 
the captured Orion was taken to St. Helena, the seizure came too little, too late.72 The
70 The Constellation  boarded the Orion on November 22nd, but there was not enough evidence for 
conviction, although there are no deck logs available for this time period. Inman to Toucey, 
December 15,1869. H.E.D. No. 7, 36:2, 585.
71 “The Capture o f  the Slaver Orion," New York Herald, 02/17/1860.
72 “The Slave Trade,” New York Times, 3/3/1860.
181
fate of the survivors is unknown, although David Eltis suspects that they were brought to 
the West Indies for Britain’s “apprentice” program.73
The capture of the ship earned the captain and crew of the Pluto substantial prize 
money. The Orion’s crew was released, which was common practice by the British, 
while the brig was condemned and destroyed. The fate of Thomas Morgan and his 
mates, Chamberlain and Dunning, would be quite different. They were delivered to 
Boston for trial, where they would be sentenced to two years each in prison. For Rudolph 
Blumenberg, the man who posted the bond for the Orion on August 6, a sentence of five 
years was given, but this relatively harsh sentence was imposed because of his inability to 
post the bond from the first court case rather than for his participation in the slave trade. 
He, too, was released in two years.74
The Failure of the U.S. Navy
Figure 8: Capture of the Orion by the HMS Pluto 
The Illustrated London News (April 28,1860), vol. 36, p. 409
73 See http://hitchcock.itc.virginia.edu, for the above image o f  the capture o f  the Orion by the 
Pluto published in the Illustrated London News, and a caption quoting Eltis. Accessed August 9, 
2012 .
74 Howard, American Slavers, 176.
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Although the Orion was eventually captured and condemned, many voiced their
frustrations over the inability of the United States to stop the slave trade. The court
system was clearly at the root of the problem: from Judge Betts’s ruling that slaves had to
be on board a ship in order to condemn it, to the unwillingness of judges and juries to
sentence a man to death for participating in the slave trade. At sea, this translated to a
nearly impossible task, even for a squadron so recently bolstered by steamships and
improved efficiency. The seamen aboard the Navy ships saw first-hand how ineffective
their mission could be. Aboard the U.S. Squadron ships, Isaac Mullen penned the words
to his poem concerning the empty slavers, and Henry Eason, a sailor aboard the Marion
when it captured the Orion in April wrote:
We heard that our slavers we sent home had been acquitted because the 
jury could not find substantial evidence to condemn them. The Orion 
came out on the coast as a trader the second time & the consequence was 
that the American Commodore detained her for six days but could find 
nothing to condemn her & a short time after the English Steamer Pluto 
captured her with 808 slaves on board & took her to St. Helena. This will 
make our people at home pull their eyes out at an American ship capturing 
slavers & sending them home for triale & get honorably acquitted and then 
come & load up with slaves three months later. The Orion had everything 
that is needed on board of slavers.75
The frustration from Mullen and Eason is obvious, but the question does remain: 
was Inman’s order to abandon the busy slave trading coastline issued in order to draw the 
Orion out and catch her with slaves on board or was Inman too caught up in following 
the proper order of the law, thus considering a court martial on a charge of neglect of 
duty more important than patrolling the coast for slavers? While Inman’s true motives
75 Eason, Journal aboard the Marion, see also Calvin Lane, “The African Squadron,” in Log o f  
M ystic Seaport, Vol. 50, 86-99.
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can only be speculative, his character, previous behavior, and overall mission, seem to 
point to the latter.
By November 1859, Inman had only been flag officer of the African Squadron for 
five months. He was, nevertheless, a diligent letter-writer, keeping Secretary of the Navy 
Isaac Toucey up to date on all the machinations of the squadron. An intense micro­
manager, Inman felt it his duty to keep tabs on all the squadron ships, personally 
inspecting all of the cruisers that fall, issuing orders such as when to celebrate a day of 
Thanksgiving, and, most importantly, ensuring that all his orders were carried out 
efficiently.76 When Inman found anything out of order, he ensured that proper procedure 
was carried out to correct the problem.
There is some evidence that, by abandoning Shark’s Point, Inman was setting a 
trap for Thomas Morgan. The Orion had, after all, been on the coast for six weeks and 
had been boarded numerous times with slaving equipment, but no slaves, on board. 
Everyone involved knew that she would have to be captured with human cargo in order 
to be condemned. The British intelligence in the area was quite strong and the deck logs 
of the San Jacinto, Portsmouth, Marion, and Vincennes all record frequent boardings and 
communications between the U.S. and British ships. Both nations knew what was at 
stake and that catching a slaver with her human cargo would be a challenge. It is possible 
that, between November 16 and November 21, the captains of the various British and 
American Navy vessels in Kabenda discussed strategies in luring the Orion into loading 
her cargo. Before Inman became Flag Officer, the captains generally had a free hand in
76 See Canney, Africa Squadron, 202, 207.
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their day-to-day decisions while on patrol.77 The fact that the U.S.S. Portsmouth departed 
Kabenda to sail a large half circle patrol 150 miles off the coast focusing on the areas 
affected by the Congo River’s current, does indicate that the Portsmouth aimed to catch a 
slaver at sea. The Mystic too, cruised directly down the coast, anchored at St. Paul de 
Loando, before sailing northward again to Princes Island, covering a larger area of the 
slaving coast. Inman may very well have been in discussion with the British about the 
necessity of American ships vacating the area in order to capture the slavers.
This reasoning does not bring into account the overall goals of Inman’s African 
Squadron: to protect U.S. interests off the coast. Abandoning their posts meant that the 
British ships in the area would be the ones to detain and board the suspected slavers 
flying the American flag. For the U.S. sailors, a British capture meant that the U.S. 
captain and crew would not receive prize money, which was, perhaps, the only perk to 
the entire post.
Even though Inman did receive orders to cooperate with the British to an extent 
and the deck logs show that captains did frequently meet with British officers, Inman 
himself believed that war with the British was imminent. While he was certainly not the 
only one who perceived British/U.S. tension over the right-of-search issue as a true 
threat, it does appear that this conviction came more from government officials rather 
than the captains and crews sailing off the coast. Inman’s aloofness removed him from 
the daily operations in which Squadron captains actually seemed to keep slave trade 
suppression as their goal. Instead, at the end of January 1860, Inman issued a 
confidential general order to squadron captains that:
77 See McBlair’s cruise down the coast, refitting the ship and disguising the brig as a English 
ship-of-war, in Canney, Africa Squadron, 185.
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complications exist in the relations between the U.S. and Great Britain. It 
is possible that these may result in war of which one may not hear of 
immediately... you will endeavor to keep on hand a supply of provisions 
and water for three months... You will use every means in your power to 
be constantly informed of the condition of our foreign relations and after 
you are satisfied that war was taken place between the U.S. and Great 
Britain... you are authorized to return home, without further orders.78
When the Squadron was ordered home, it was not because of war between the U.S. and
Britain, but because of civil war in the United States.
Based on this information, it seems that Inman prioritized proper Navy procedure
over capturing the Orion. Perhaps he believed that the Portsmouth would be able to
capture the Orion at sea, or perhaps he believed the Orion's crew was still too ill to carry
out its plans. When he learned about the British capture of the Orion at least two weeks
afterwards, Inman was uncharacteristically silent, appearing quite ambivalent about the
capture, saying only that the U.S. ships had been “necessarily withdrawn” from Shark’s
Point. More characteristic, however, is the flurry of correspondence he sent in order to
reclaim the captain, crew, and ship of the Orion from the British consul in St. Helena in
January I860.79
Another problem Inman faced stemmed from a direct result of capturing slave 
ships with slaves on board: what to do with the recaptured Africans. The mortality rates 
on a slave ship even after it had been captured by the Navy could be astronomical. When 
the Echo, Wildfire, and Storm King, were captured and sailed to Key West and 
Charleston, the death rates of the weakened enslaved Africans appalled citizens and
78 Order Confidential, Inman, Jan 27 ,1860, in Letters to the Secretary o f  the Navy, Reel 111.
79 While the Armstrong court martial takes up at least thirty pages o f  microfilm, the capture o f  the 
Orion referring to the U.S. ships being “necessarily withdrawn” is accomplished in one, single­
page letter. See Reel 110. The letters sent to coordinate the return Thomas Morgan and the 
Mates comprises several pages on Reel 111.
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politicians alike. When slave ships were captured off the coast of Africa by the U.S. 
Navy, protocol stipulated that all those aboard should be sailed to the nearest U.S. port. 
With poor sanitation, inadequate food and water, and general poor health of those aboard, 
this often cost many lives. Inman was able to secure orders to the Squadron to sail 
recaptured Africans immediately to Liberia instead. Shortening the time spent on the
AA
disease-ridden ships saved countless lives.
During its nineteen-year history, the U.S. African Squadron worked effectively 
only in its last two years of existence. Only after 1859 did the squadron have enough 
firepower and the organized patrolling system needed to catch slavers in the act on a 
regular basis. This period also marked an increase in the U.S. government’s attention to 
the American complicity in the slave trade because of the sectional crisis and highly 
publicized landings of slaves on U.S. soil. Statistics show that most of the seizures under 
the Act of 1820 took place in the year before the outbreak of the Civil War, which shows
A I
that sectional crisis motivated the Buchanan administration to improve its Navy patrols. 
Effective change took place in the Navy Department only after Americans began 
accepting responsibility for some of the slave trade and the government was more willing 
to allocate sufficient funds for the African Squadron. But, as historian Donald 
Fehrenbacher argued, the United States was still a “slaveholding republic,” and it was an 
entirely different thing to sentence Americans to death for participating in the trade.
80 McNeilly, U.S. Navy, 226, see also Letters to the Secretary o f  the Interior, National Archives.
81 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 200.
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As the case of the Orion showed, the courts could not convict a suspected slaver 
unless it had slaves on board, and even then, this too was not a guarantee. When slave 
traders like Thomas Morgan were convicted, sentences were light and the fines relatively 
low. Both the public, and the judges, were reticent to find slavers guilty and face the 
death penalty over what many still felt to be a minor offence.
Even after the Civil War began, Abraham Lincoln, the so-called Great 
Emancipator, seems not to have been willing to categorize a slave trade conviction as a 
capital offence. When Thomas Morgan wrote the President in December 1861, appealing 
for a pardon, Lincoln jotted a note on the reverse of the letter, that “the gentleman who 
brings me this letters says it is a ‘slave trade’ conviction of a minor grade.”82 From the 
Newburyport jail, Morgan solicited recommendations from the law offices of Beebe, 
Dean & Donahue, who had defended Morgan and many other accused slave traders, and 
from the manager of the jail itself. All called the two-year, $2000 sentence “extreme.” 
With the Civil War raging, Morgan offered his service to the federal government, 
highlighting his twenty-five-year career at sea. On March 11, 1863, despite the 
existence of the anti-slave trade laws, despite having twice been accused of sailing on a 
slave ship, and, more importantly, despite being caught with 900 slaves on board a ship 
he commanded, Thomas Morgan received a pardon from Abraham Lincoln. Morgan’s 
fine was eventually waived and, since he had already completed his two-year sentence for
Q-)
slave trading, Morgan was set free from the Newburyport jail.
82 “Letter from Thomas Morgan at Newbury port gaol”, December 1,1861 to Abraham Lincoln, 
Record Group 204, Records o f  Pardon Attorney, Box 10, 358. National Archives.
83 Ron Soodalter, Hanging Captain Gordon (New York: Atria Books, 2006), 1-2; Presidential 
Pardons, CD-Rom, Office o f  the Pardon Attorney, Washington, DC, 2004.
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Although the Orion never again sailed the high seas, the ship’s history illuminates 
the challenges the Navy faced in capturing slave ships. Even when the Squadron 
received enough funding to create a stronger military force, the captures of slave ships 
did not guarantee conviction. Perhaps, as Donald Fehrenbacher argued, the laws against 
the slave trade deterred many Americans from participating in the trade. Statistics show, 
however, that the foreign slave trade thrived under the American flag and the illegal trade 
to the United States was becoming more prominent as the sectional crisis escalated. The 
crisis over slavery and rumors of the reopening of the slave trade to the United States in 
the 1850s led to increased efforts against the slave trade. Slaving voyages like that of the 
Wanderer, which reportedly landed slaves on U.S. soil, just north of Amelia Island in 
Florida, were trumpeted by abolitionists as flagrant attacks against U.S. security and as 
evidence of the South’s disregard for federal authority.84
The U.S. Navy became more effective at stopping slave ships, but the courts 
continued to be lenient towards violators of the slave trade acts. From Maine to Florida, 
district court judges dismissed slave trading cases owing to lack of evidence and, if 
convicted, all citizens, except for the case of Nathanial Gordon in 1862, received 
sentences much less severe than the law stipulated. As the next chapter analyzes, even if 
slave ships were caught red-handed while preparing to off-load slaves, conviction could 
be impossible and, as in the case of the Echo, would lead to the declaration by a District 
Judge that the piracy law was unconstitutional. In the meantime, the Navy would
84 Howard writes that “conservative slaveowners and law-abiding men were shocked by this gross 
defiance o f  federal law, and by the fact that the government could do nothing to punish it,” 
American Slavers, 147
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continue to sail the coast of Africa, with orders to protect U.S. commerce and being
Of
“there when there [are] empty slavers [and]... never there when the slavers are full.”
85 Issac Mullen, Ship Journal.
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CHAPTER V
“PIMPS OF PIRACY": THE SLAVE TRADE AND CHALLENGES FROM WITHIN
On August 1, 1860, the town of Geneva, New York celebrated the anniversary of 
West Indian emancipation. In addition to a steamboat ride on Seneca Lake and a ball 
held that evening, Frederick Douglass, a prominent African-American abolitionist, 
delivered a three-hour keynote speech. His first speech since the death of his ten-year old 
daughter five months before, Douglass’s passionate presentation focused on slavery, the 
history of abolition, and the domestic and foreign slave trades. Even though the U.S. 
Navy had increased its surveillance of slave traders on the high seas, Douglass argued 
that “the American Government is worse than winking at the slave trade, and slavers are 
fitted out in sight of our business men’s prayer meetings.”1 He continued to chastise the 
North for allowing the Southern Slave Power to spread and strengthen. While only 
twenty years before, slavery had been confined to the South, now the disregard for 
federal laws and slavery’s expansion had created a government of apologists and 
accommodators. Douglass’ somber note would cast a pall over the event.
Douglass was not the only Northerner concerned about the state of slavery and the 
slave trade. From the increasingly radicalized South came calls to reopen the slave trade, 
something that had not seriously been heard since South Carolina overturned its own
1 Frederick Douglass, “Slavery and the Irrepressible Conflict,” August 1 ,1860, in The Frederick 
Douglass Papers, Series One, vol. Ill, ed. John. W. Blassingame (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1985), 369.
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anti-slave trade laws from 1803-1807. While some justified its reopening in order to 
“democratize” slaveholding and reduce the high prices of slaves in the U.S., according to 
one newspaper, others argued that “the measure ...[had been] proposed...for the purpose 
of effecting dissolution.”2 The small, but vocal, minority of Southerners in favor of 
legalizing the slave trade allied themselves with disunionists, promoting Southern 
agitation, pro-states’ rights ideology, and an anti-nationalist fervor. Amid the fault lines 
of a nation ripping apart, direct challenges to the federal anti-slave trade laws would 
threaten federal sovereignty from within and result in a stronger federal government that 
would reassert its authority as the Civil War era dawned. It was within this new 
Republican-controlled government that slavery, and with it the slave trade, would at last 
become a national priority.
In the 1850s, the political, economic, and social divisions between the Northern 
and the Southern states that had simmered since before the founding of the United States 
erupted into crisis, and, by 1861, open military conflict. These points of crisis included 
the Compromise of 1850, which brought California into the Union as a free state, closed 
slave markets in Washington, D.C., and increased federal involvement in the return of 
fugitive slaves. In 1854 came the Kansas-Nebraska Act, overturning the Missouri 
Compromise, allowing any new state to determine its slave status, and leading to 
Bleeding Kansas or the Kansas Civil War. The Dred Scot case of 1857 also fomented 
public agitation by upholding and protecting slavery in the Union. Until the Civil War 
broke out, politicians continually used compromise to resolve the problems between 
Northern and Southern sentiments, which, although it diffused the situation, seemed to
2 “The African Slave Trade,” The National Era, May 14, 1857.
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only prolong the inevitable. The two main centers of conflict were slavery’s expansion 
into U.S. territories, particularly after the Mexican War, and tensions over state versus 
federal authority.
It was during the 1850s when several outspoken South Carolinians linked the 
federal government’s suppression of the slave trade with the abolitionists’ goal of 
extirpating slavery. These southerners, called “slave traders” not because they traded in 
slaves but because of their support for reopening the trade, were a vocal minority in 
South Carolina’s political circles yet their message alarmed abolitionists while adding 
fuel to the fire of secession which was threatening to boil over by the late 1850s. The 
“slave traders’” connection between the slave trade and slavery with regard to federal 
authority allied them with white Southerners even though most Southerners had 
traditionally opposed the slave trade. Even though the slave traders never gained enough 
of a following to actually reopen the slave trade, their alarmist message spread like 
wildfire through American newspapers.3
There is a misconception today that all southern slave owners supported the 
international slave trade. Previous chapters have shown that generally the opposite was 
true. Most slave owners supported the suppression of the slave trade because they felt 
that it increased the value of their property and protected them from the so-called 
“dangerous” Africans and West Indians who they considered more prone to violent 
insurrection.4 Scholarship has shown the extent to which Northerners, particularly New
3 Manisha Sinha, The Counterrevolution o f  Slavery (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 2000). Sinha does an excellent job at linking the slave trade to pro-southern nationalism 
during the 1850s. See her introduction and chapter 6.
4 W .E.B. Du B ois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade (N ew  York: Schocken B ooks, 1969), 7.
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Yorkers and Rhode Islanders, benefitted from the slave trade, with their participation in 
the foreign slave trade increasing exponentially into the 1850s.5
On the home front, Southern protection of slavery began expanding to question 
federal authority over the slave trade. While this did not mean that Southerners began 
supporting the slave trade, there was a small minority o f pro-states’ rights Southerners 
who called for the reopening of the slave trade. This temporary association should not be 
construed as a unified effort by Southerners to reopen the U.S. slave trade. As Don 
Fehrenbacher has stated, the ineffectiveness of the U.S. suppression of the slave trade 
“bear[s] some marks of southern influence, though not of deliberate southern intent.”6 
Fehrenbacher’s nuanced argument will be unpacked in this chapter. The claim that the 
South wanted to revive the slave trade stems from a pro-states’ rights agenda and a small, 
vocal, radical minority. As Southerners challenged federal laws in the court system, the 
Constitutionality of the slave trade as piracy was also scrutinized. Northern abolitionists 
took this as a challenge to the slave trade laws and, with the very public landing of slaves 
on U.S. soil, the Buchanan administration eventually had to take a firmer stance on the 
U.S. suppression of the slave trade.
In general, anti-federalist Southerners considered the pro-slave trade advocates as 
too narrow-minded and single-issued for fostering Southern nationalism, and, by the late
5 See Jay Coughtry, Notorious Triangle, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981); Anne 
Farrow et. al, Complicity, (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005). Both books aim to formulate a 
better picture o f  the extent to which the Northern economy was connected to the illegal slave 
trade.
6 Donald Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, (New York : Oxford University Press, 2001), 204, 
emphasis added
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1858s, had largely distanced themselves from the slave traders’ message.7 Where the 
anti-federalists and the slave traders had found common ground was in the federal anti­
slave trade laws, specifically the 1820 Anti-Piracy Law. These forces would combine to 
challenge the laws in the court system, publically showing that the 1820 law was not only 
inoperable but, more importantly, unconstitutional. No state was more up to challenging 
the federal government than South Carolina. It was from this center of turmoil that 
challenges to the federal laws against the slave trade were generated, bearing the marks 
of a southern-influenced attack on anti-slave trade laws. Two of these test cases, the 
Echo and the Wanderer, focused on the 1820 federal anti-piracy law. Ultimately, the 
ruling that reversed the 1820 law was founded on anti-federal rather than pro-slave trade 
arguments.8 This chapter focuses primarily on the cases surrounding the capture of the 
slave ship Echo, and how the pro-slave trade-led defense successfully convinced the 
jurors not only to dismiss the case, but also to lay the groundwork for challenging the 
anti-piracy law, which the South Carolina district court would then declare 
unconstitutional in the Wanderer trial. Challenged repeatedly on the high seas by Britain,
7 The terms “disunionist” and “anti-federalist” come from Manisha Sinha’s book, 
Counterrevolution o f  Slavery. Both are terms that refer to the growing southern secessionist 
movement in the 1850s. Disunionist refers to someone who favored secession, while an anti­
federalist would have been more o f  a states’ rights advocate, and not necessarily a secessionist.
8 Sinha, 137-9; see also Lacy K. Ford, Deliver us from  Evil, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); William W Freehling, The Road to Disunion. Vol. II, Secessionists Triumphant, 1854- 
1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); D.T. Gleeson, “Securing The Interests o f  the 
South: John Mitchel, A.G. Magrath, and the Reopening o f  the Transatlantic Slave Trade,” 
American Nineteenth Century History, v l 1 n3 (2010 09 01), 279-297; Greg Hambrick, “Dark 
Days: A 200-year Anniversary Brings Charleston's Slave-trading Past into the Light,” Charleston 
City Paper, March 2007 http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/feature-zwnj-dark- 
days/Content?oid=l 109028, accessed October 31,2012; J Jordan, “Charles Augustus Lafayette 
Lamar and the Movement,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly. 93, no. 3, (2009): 247-290; 
Ronald Takaki, “The Movement to Reopen the African Slave Trade in South Carolina,” South 
Carolina H istorical Magazine, 66 (January 1965): 38-54; Ronald Takaki, A Pro-Slavery 
Crusade: The Agitation to Reopen the African Slave Trade (New York: The Free Press, 1971).
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U.S. federal authority was also being challenged from within, and the government’s anti­
slave trade laws were targeted although from the opposite side of the debate over slavery.
This momentum could have continued to overturn all anti-slave trade laws on the 
basis of challenging federal authority, particularly since few slavers had ever been 
convicted and none had yet been convicted of piracy in any court in the United States. 
The outbreak of the Civil War stopped the courts’ momentum and granted the federal 
government additional war powers to outlaw the slave trade, and ultimately slavery, once 
and for all. One of the last slave trading court cases would result in the first and only trip 
to the gallows for a luckless sea captain. Lincoln’s government would triumph.
By 1858, the U.S. government finally was starting to admit to Britain’s charges 
that American participation in the foreign slave trade was increasing. With the increase 
in Naval patrols off the African coast and in the Caribbean, accounts of more captures of 
American slave ships reached government officials and the general public. In fact, no 
fewer than 189 voyages occurring between 1850 and 1866 had some direct U.S. 
affiliation, either through the flag that the vessel flew, the ownership of the vessel, or the 
nationality of its crew members. These 189 voyages carried a minimum of 85,501 slaves. 
In 1859 and 1860 alone, at least ninety sailing vessels with American affiliation were 
associated with the slave trade. This can be compared to the 117 voyages and 34,000 
enslaved Africans aboard American-affiliated ships between 1808 and 1849, inclusive. 
This is an annual average increase from 790 slaves per year to 5,300 per year after 1850.9
9 Slave trade database, http://www.slavevoyages.org, search August 29, 2012. Manual search o f  
U.S. affiliation. It must also be kept in mind that not all slave voyages are recorded in this 
database, and many more U.S. affiliated ships delivered their human cargoes undetected. I realize 
that some may take issue with my definition o f  “U.S. affiliated” since ships sailing under false
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The link between the slave trade and slavery had been maintained by abolitionists 
who had initially campaigned for the abolition of the slave trade in order to promote the 
gradual abolition of slavery. They used the near universal “abhorrence” of the slave trade 
to gain support for the extermination of slavery.10 After Britain formally abolished 
slavery in its territories in 1833 and began to pressure other nations to do the same, some 
slave-owning southerners raised some alarm. There was concern that the abolition of 
slavery would spread and interfere with their way of life. Those who expressed these 
concerns were easily placated, however, as British and American textile mills demand for 
slave-produced cotton increased dramatically. Slavery in established states appeared 
well-protected and most slaveholders were quick to distance themselves from the brutal 
West Indian slavery and the middle passage. The question of slavery in the territories 
caused widespread conflict, polarizing the nation, and, eventually, leading to Civil War.
colors did not necessarily have Americans involved in the voyage. To this I would point out that 
it was the United States’ refusal o f  right-of-search that enabled these voyages to proceed. These 
statistics also include captured vessels, which one could argue should not be counted because 
they were not successful voyages, but I argue that these voyages were nonetheless organized with 
the intent to be successful with large amounts o f  capital invested. Additionally, it also partially 
reveals the scope o f  the slave trading networks and the high probability that other voyages were 
successful and have disappeared from any record.
10 For the history o f  U.S. abolition, see: Richard H. Abbott, Cotton & Capital: Boston 
Businessmen and Antislavery Reform, 1854-1868 (Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 
1991); Herbert Aptheker, Abolitionism: A Revolutionary Movement (Boston: Twayne, 1989); 
Ashworth, John. Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic. Vol. 1 o f  2; (New  
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995); Thomas Bender, John Ashworth, Robin Blackburn, The 
American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation And Human Rights (New York: Verso, 2011); David 
Brion Davis, and Thomas L. Haskell, eds. The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism  
as a  Problem in H istorical Interpretation. University o f  California Press, 1992; David Brion 
Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall o f  Slavery in the New World (Oxford and New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Paul Goodman, O f One Blood: Abolitionism and the 
Origins o f  Racial Equality (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1998); Carlton Mabee, 
Black Freedom: The Nonviolent Abolitionists from  1830 through the Civil War. London: 
Macmillan, 1970; and Henry Mayer, All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition o f  
Slavery, (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1998) among others.
197
It was during these debates in the 1850s that a minority of pro-states rights, proslavery, 
southerners sent out the call for the revival of the slave trade in order to protect the 
institution of slavery and southern aristocracy. South Carolina proved to be the ideal 
location for challenging slave trade laws.
South Carolina had a long history of both pro-slave trade and anti-federalist 
tendencies. Its low-country (coastal) rice plantations subjected its slaves to hard labor 
and disease at a rate that barely kept up with the birth rate. Historically, South Carolina 
had levied taxes to manage the slave trade in the hopes of preventing slave insurrection 
and it had been the last state to permit the trade before its federal prohibition in 1808. 
Unlike Virginia, which enjoyed a profitable domestic slave trade, the rise of cotton 
production in the rest of the South Carolina kept demand for slaves, and thus prices, high. 
The slave trade did prove profitable for many plantation owners, and most slave owners 
did not condone the slave trade, but the political circumstances within South Carolina set 
the stage for the pro-slave trade movement.11
South Carolina also had a long history of anti-federal government agitation. 
Many Constitutional compromises involved South Carolina delegates. Outspoken 
politicians, like John C. Calhoun, supported a weaker federal government. During the 
1830s, while Andrew Jackson was President, the South Carolina state legislature declared 
two federal tariff acts null and void, resulting in the Nullification Crisis, which led to a
11 Manisha Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 10. For the history o f  slavery in South Carolina, 
see S. Max Edelson, Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); Larry E. Tise, Proslavery: a History o f  the Defense o f  Slavery in 
America, 1701-1840  (Athens: University o f  Georgia Press, 1987); Lacy K. Ford, Origins O f  
Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860 (New York : Oxford University 
Press, 1988); and John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community: Plantation Life in The 
Antebellum South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), among others.
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military threat to the state by Jackson and, eventually, a compromise. Few of the South
ICarolinian elites who had controlled state politics would forget that battle.
By the 1850s, in South Carolina, the old proponents of the nullification crisis of 
1830 intermingled with those of the new generation pushing for the expansion of slavery. 
In the middle of the melee was Leonidas Spratt, who joined Maxcy Gregg, Edmund 
Bellinger, and John A. Calhoun in their support for reopening the slave trade. They used 
clever propaganda to ally themselves with the growing “southern nationalist rhetoric and 
spread beyond South Carolina.”13 During the late 1850s, Spratt was at the forefront of 
the southern nationalist “slave traders” who encouraged state legislators to overturn the 
federal prohibition of the slave trade. Forty-years old in 1858, he spearheaded the 
campaign for reopening the slave trade. His activism had fallen short in state legislatures, 
and it was only in South Carolina that his crusade had gained more than a minor 
following. Attorney and owner of the Charleston Mercury, Spratt collaborated with 
many like-minded southerners, including South Carolinian governor, James H. Adams, to 
encourage southerners that the trade in slaves was essential to the future prosperity of the 
region. Arguing that the slave trade supported the overall values of a proslavery, 
aristocratic south, the “slave traders” hoped to gain followers throughout the southern 
states.
12 See Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 19-61, see also Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: 
Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987); William W. Freehling, Prelude to  Civil War: The Nullification 
Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Merrill 
D. Peterson, Olive Branch and Sword: The Compromise o f 1833 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982).
13 Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 142. See also Erik Calonius, The Wanderer (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 2006), 39.
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Spratt’s desire to reopen the African slave trade was rooted in his belief that the 
South prospered through slave labor and the elevation of the white planter class. Anti­
democratic and pro-slavery, Spratt argued that all men were not created equal and that 
slavery was the African race’s natural state. Reopening the slave trade would allow for 
the South to continue to prosper, and capitalize on the increasing cotton trade.14
Leonidas Spratt tried to spread his pro-slave trade ideology by speaking in many 
southern state legislatures and conferences. Although the slave traders gained some 
support, including that from the South Carolina governor, the slave traders’ propositions 
“[met] with little favor in the slave States.”15 The Charleston Mercury, having received 
letters to the editor demanding clarification of its stance on the subject of the slave trade, 
published an article stating that the reopening of the slave trade was “impractical,” 
although two months later it published an editorial proclaiming that the legalization of the 
trade would reduce the mortality rate of the middle passage.16 The New York Herald 
proclaimed that “the revival of the slave trade is a moral impossibility and there is no 
need of any farther discussion of the subject,” however the real cause for concern was 
South Carolina’s agitation and refusal to compromise. A particularly illuminating 
passage in the Herald described South Carolinians as “bold, original, and logically 
consistent, even to the most startling conclusion... they are direct and adventurous 
[and]... they have striven to stake the fortunes of the war on the issue of a single
14 Leonidas Spratt, Speech upon the Foreign Slave Trade before the Legislature o f  South Carolina, 
(Columbia, 1858), 7-8; see also Ronald Takaki, “The Movement to Reopen the African Slave 
Trade in South Carolina,” South Carolina H istorical Magazine, 66 (January 1965).
15 “Protests Against the Policy o f  South Carolina,” Baltimore Sun, 12/10/1858.
16 “Our Consistency,” Charleston Mercury, 06/12/1858 and “The South and the African Slave 
Trade,” Charleston Mercury, 08/03/1858.
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battle.” 17 South Carolina’s mistrust of federal authority would directly affect the 
enforcement of slave trade laws in the courtroom.
Many southerners who were against the slave trade supported Spratt’s endeavor 
mostly because they saw Spratt’s protests as a challenge to federal authority and Northern 
aggression. As the public agitation over the expansion of slavery increased, many white 
Southerners advocated for increased state sovereignty, or, more extreme, complete 
secession from the Union.18 In Spratt’s mind, an important step in his crusade would be 
to protect slave traders from the U.S. piracy law. As an attorney, he used his knowledge 
of the law to question the constitutionality of the slave trade acts. His attacks would lend 
themselves to the increasing polarization of the nation, and spread the alarm across the 
nation, in a very public way, that the federal government was incompetent in enforcing its 
own laws. For a young country still experiencing growing pains, the internal usurpation 
of its laws was a national embarrassment on an international level.
Enforcement problems with the anti-slave trade acts had been apparent before the 
ink comprising the Act of 1794 was fully dry. The American Convention for Promoting 
the Abolition of Slavery commented in 1796 that the anti-slave trade law was 
“defective,” and that slave traders were easily evading the law.19 The Act of March 22, 
1794 prohibited anyone from fitting out a slave voyage from the United States to Africa 
with the intent to sell enslaved Africans in a foreign port, with a $2,000 maximum 
penalty. In 1800, the Act was extended by adding a maximum of $2,000 and two years
17 “The African Slave Trade,” New York Herald, 12/01/1856.
18 Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 132-4.
19 American Convention fo r  Promoting the Abolition o f  Slavery, and Improving the Condition o f  
the African Race, (Philadelphia, 1796)8.
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imprisonment, which included all crew members knowingly participating. The 1807 Act 
prohibited the slave trade altogether (except the domestic trade), and the 1818 Act set a 
maximum fine of $5,000 and seven years prison sentence. In 1820, Congress declared 
the slave trade, that is, the act of having Africans on board a ship with the intent to sell 
them as slaves, an act of piracy.20 There were, however, significant problems in the 
enforcement of these laws in the court system, leading one Judge, Andrew Magrath, to 
retort “had... a verdict of guilty been rendered [under the Piracy Act of 1820], I do not 
believe that any Judge of the United States would have hesitated in directing a new 
trial.”21 Magrath took issue with the specific wording of the Act of 1820, as will be 
discussed later. For most judges and juries, the main problems lay in proving guilt as 
well as in the reticence of judges and juries of convicting their own citizens in a trade 
they considered a low national priority. After the Act of 1820 which declared the slave 
trade to be piracy, carrying with it a capital punishment, judges preferred to convict 
American slave traders of violating the Act of 1800 which stipulated fines and a 
maximum two year prison sentence if they were to convict men at all. Slave ships were 
more often condemned and sold at auction. The original owners generally were able to 
re-purchase these vessels at a fraction of their value. Even when a ship was condemned, 
more often than not, slave traders were acquitted in the courtrooms.
Protecting American borders from smugglers and pirates and controlling 
immigration in order to prevent slave insurrection were the main focal points of the
20 Warren S. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1963), 26.
21 Andrew Magrath, Slave Trade not Declared Piracy, (Charleston, 1860), 15.
22 Howard, American Slavers, Appendix B, 224-235.
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federal slave trade prohibition. The 1820 Act, which the federal government used so 
extensively in diplomatic negotiations, was intended to extend Congress’s protection of 
commerce.23 The piratical designation only extended to the officers and crew of the slave 
ship, thus excluding the real on-shore slave trade networks o f U.S. and foreign citizens 
dotting the coasts of Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, and U.S. ports like New York City. 
As slave trading networks grew more complex in order to escape British and American 
slave patrols, slave trading organizations hired powerful attorneys like New York based 
Beebe, Bean & Donahue to defend those who found themselves in court. Most 
convictions were made under the Acts of 1800 or 1818 and, until 1861, all cases 
involving the 1820 Act were thrown out by the courts.
American juries were hesitant to convict their own but slave traders were also a 
wily bunch whose vast intelligence networks spread across the Atlantic world and 
beyond. Finding proof admissible in court that a ship was, indeed, an American slaver 
was generally impossible, even if slaves were found on board. Ships were owned by 
holding companies, where captains and owners changed depending on if they were 
sailing east or west and, if caught, most men involved could point a finger at another, 
claiming their own ignorance of the ship’s intent. Legal and illegal ships carried similar 
cargoes to the coast of Africa, with “auxiliary” ships and disguised slavers throwing the 
navy off their trail. If a suspected slaver was caught, even the presence of slaves on
23 The Act is partially entitled “An Act to continue in force ‘an Act to protect the commerce o f  the 
United States.” Statute I, Chap. CXIII, May 15, 1820.
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board did not always translate to conviction especially as the movement to challenge 
federal authority spread.24
In the North, as well as the South, it became increasingly difficult to convict slave 
traders, a fact that became all the more apparent when the Navy sent increasing numbers 
of captured slave ships to the United States for adjudication. Judge Samuel R. Betts and 
Justice Samuel Nelson presided over the U.S. Circuit Courts in New York during the 
1850s. Betts had served in Congress as a Democratic-Republican before being 
nominated as a Southern N.Y. District Court Judge by John Quincy Adams in 1826. 
Nelson served as an associate U.S. Supreme Court Justice, nominated by President Tyler, 
and filled in for Judge Betts if he was unavailable. In a case against a suspected slave 
trader in 1856, Betts argued that the 1818 law which prohibited citizens from preparing a 
ship for the slave trade could only be enforced if it could be determined that the trader 
was in full control of the vessel. Because the slave ship had had many owners and 
supercargoes, the man could not be convicted under Betts’s construction of the law. 
Betts and Nelson would extend this interpretation to the Act of 1794 later on in 1856. 
The result of this led to an increasingly narrow interpretation of the anti-slave trade laws, 
applying only to captains, owners, and supercargo, and only if they had been in full 
control of the ship rather than sharing duties with others. Additionally, prison sentences 
were all but eliminated if a trader was convicted. Between 1856 and 1861 there were no 
prison sentences for slave traders in the Southern District of New York, the hub of the
24 Howard provides an overview o f  this in American Slavers, 18-23; see also chapters 4, 12, and 
13. Auxiliary ships acted as decoys for slave trading ships, often carrying supplies for the slave 
trade, but were not actually intended for human cargo.
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illegal slave trade.25 Despite the renewed efforts of the U.S. Navy in capturing slave
ships, it had become readily apparent that the laws themselves had become
unenforceable. The prevalence of slave trade corruption in the courts led one editor of
the New York Times Tribune to complain:
It is a remarkable fact that the slave-traders in this city have matured their 
arrangements so thoroughly that they almost invariably manage to elude 
the meshes of the law. Now they bribe a jury, another time their counsel or 
agents spirit away a vital witness... To effect [abolition] it will be 
necessary to purge the Courts and offices of these pimps of piracy.
The New York courts, in bed with the slave trading companies the city had become 
infamous for, capitalized on legal grey area and opened up large loopholes in the 
language. In New York, a game of legal semantics played by judges and defense 
attorneys alike made the slave trade laws laughable. To be sure, these “pimps” 
understood the law and had many resources, networks, and money tied up to protect their 
profits and keep the trade going.
The impotence of the laws had the same legal impact in both New York and 
South Carolina, but the impetus stemmed from radically different sources. The sectional 
crises of the 1850s brought the ineffectiveness of the federal government’s prohibition of 
the slave trade into sharp relief. Newspapers acknowledged the Northern pimps of piracy 
but were far more concerned with the cries for reopening the slave trade by a vocal 
minority of Southerners. The public agitation generated from the so-called “slave- 
traders” led by Leonidas Spratt spilled over into the courtroom. There was a difference, 
however, between those, like Spratt, who truly supported the reopening of the slave trade 
and those who protested federal laws. In South Carolina, slave trade cases were used to
25 Howard, American Slavers, 156-169, case o f  Rudolph Lasala, registered owner o f  Horatio.
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challenge federal authority over states. This provided an opportunity for the “slave 
traders” to collaborate with disunionists and other federal agitators to manipulate the 
court system which, in the south, was dominated by propertied, slave-owning elites. The 
first test case for South Carolina was that of the Echo, captured off the coast of Cuba.
The Capture of the Echo:
The capture of the Echo began with Lieutenant Maffitt, in command of the U.S.S. 
Dolphin sailing off the coast of Cuba.26 His orders were to protect U.S. merchant vessels 
from being searched by British ships, and, if applicable, to stop American slaving vessels. 
On August 21, 1858, sailors on watch detected a brigantine entering the cove of an island 
to the North of Cuba. Since this was a well-known area for the disembarkation of slave 
ships, Lieutenant Maffitt ordered his ship change course to investigate. The Dolphin 
commenced a short chase before overtaking and capturing the vessel, finding over three 
hundred enslaved Africans chained in the hold. That slave ship, identified as the Echo 
but later determined to be legally named Putnam, was hauled to Key West before it was 
taken to Charleston, South Carolina. There, the Africans were taken to Castle Pinckney 
for safekeeping and the crew was thrown into the Charleston jail to await trial. Maffitt 
sailed on to Boston with the captain of the Echo, who eventually was ordered back to 
Key West to stand trial.27
26 Interestingly enough, Mafitt would later become famous for his daring escapades as a 
Confederate blockade-runner, ultimately capturing twenty-four vessels and blasting through 
Union lines on the Mississippi River.
27 Paul Finkelman, ed., Slavery in the Courtroom: An Annotated Bibliography o f  American Cases, 
“In re Bates, 2F. Cas. 1015 (D.C.S.C. 1858),” (Washington: Library o f  Congress, 1985) 239.
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From the start, people reacted strongly to the case. Editorialists from the 
Charleston Mercury argued that the naval officers had made too many assumptions about 
the ship in declaring it a slaver. For starters, there were no records left aboard and the 
naval officers only assumed that a man named E.C. Townsend was the captain. 
Additionally, as one editorial in the Mercury mentioned, there was no way to prove that 
the crew members or the ship were American, and no way to prove that the captives had 
just come from Africa and were held with the intent to make them slaves. The fact that 
the U.S.S. Dolphin had also been sailing under false British colors to draw out American
n o
slavers also suggested dishonesty on the part of the U.S. Navy.
The Fate of the Africans 
Many newspapers, upon hearing of the captured slave ship, printed descriptions of 
those aboard. The brig Echo had left African waters carrying an estimated 455 captives 
in the spring of 1858. By the time she was captured, after forty-seven days at sea, over 
140 aboard had died, according to one crew member who eventually cooperated with the 
prosecution. The Baltimore Sun wrote that most of the captives were between the ages of 
eight and sixteen and while “some of them were able-bodied, good sized and in good 
case... the greater part were half-grown children only, weak and worn.”29
When the Echo was captured, Dr. Brown, of the U.S.S. Dolphin discovered that 
most of the Africans were “afflicted with diseases of the eye and the skin, and 
dysentery.”30 The doctor recommended that the sick be taken to Key West since he did
28 “Who are the Pirates?” Charleston Mercury, 9/15/1858.
29 “Further from the Captured Slave Brig,” The Sun, Baltimore, 9/02/1858.
30 Bates and Woodruff, Report o f  the Trials in the Echo Cases, (Columbia, S.C. Steam-power 
Press o f  R.W. Gibbes, 1859), 9.
207
not think that many would survive the sail to New York. When the Dolphin and the Echo 
reached Key West, it became clear that the conditions on land were unfavorable for the 
arrival of the sick Africans because of a yellow fever outbreak, so the ships sailed on to 
Charleston harbor. By the time the recaptured Africans reached Castle Pinckney in 
Charleston, another dozen lives had been lost. The young captives were so weak with 
disease and starvation that many of them had to be carried off the ship in Charleston. 
Many more were sickened when hunger drove them to eat raw shellfish on the beaches. 
Their arrival created a stir in the already agitated city. People came to see the spectacle 
of the exotic Africans as well as to voice sympathy for the crew members.
Because of the high mortality rate of the captives and the excitement their 
presence caused in Charleston, U.S. Marshall D. H. Hamilton was anxious to have the 
Africans taken out of his hands as soon as possible. On September 8, 1858, the U.S. 
Secretary of the Interior ordered Hamilton to supply the captives with blankets and, two 
days later, informed him that the steam ship Niagara was on its way to Charleston to 
transport the captives back to Africa.31 Like in New Haven with the 1840 Amistad trials, 
the exoticism, and suffering, of the Africans drew crowds. Many watched as the captives 
were transported from the quarantine station to Charleston harbor, and all witnesses could 
see the effects of the middle passage.
Until the arrival of the Echo captives, U.S. Marshal Hamilton had been an ardent 
supporter of the slave trade. After he saw the deplorable condition of the “human cargo” 
and dealt with the disposal of the dead, he had an immediate change of heart. As he tried
31 Thompson to Hamilton, Sept. 8 and Sept. 10,1858, Record Group 45, Records o f  the Office o f  
the Secretary o f  the Interior relating to the Suppression o f  the African Slave Trade, Register o f  
Letters Received, 1858-1872, National Archives,.
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to supply the captives with necessary supplies, he also advocated for their rapid return to 
Africa.32 Within two weeks, the surviving captives of the Echo were taken aboard the 
Niagara, as the 1819 law stipulated, to Liberia under the direction of the U.S. Navy. 
Despite better treatment in Charleston and aboard the Niagara on its way to Africa, over 
a hundred more captives died before the survivors reached Liberia. In the spring of 1859, 
Reverend Seys, of the African Colonization Society, received the 200 survivors in the 
settlement Monrovia, where the American Colonization Society maintained a missionary 
society that was paid by the U.S. government for each recaptured African who arrived.33
Newspaper articles published across the country reveal the heated debate over the 
legalities of the act and what was the best course of action to take. The crux of the 
arguments focused on the labeling of the captured “cargo,” and whether or not the 
captured Africans should be considered property or freemen. The debate concerning the 
constitutionality of the captives’ return to Africa continued for months, long after their 
placement in Monrovia. Several slave owners, including soon-to-be famous Charles 
Lamar, placed bids for the purchase of the Africans, and some residents protested the 
federal government’s claim to them. The state Attorney General argued that since these 
Africans were residing at Castle Pinckney, which was federal property, the 1835 law did 
not apply. The tightening of the slave codes and the Fugitive Slave Trade Act of 1850 
showed that free blacks, particularly in the South, were not welcome. High slave prices 
fed the protests against what many saw as the federal government’s denial of one’s right
32 Thompson to Hamilton, ibid.
33 HED 28, 37-3;. see also: Calonius, The Wanderer, or Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery.
209
to slave ownership.34 Others argued that the President had done what was the best for the
victims. All agreed that it would be detrimental to society if the Africans were released
as freemen on U.S. soil.35
An editorial from the Sunday Delta from New Orleans captures the sentiments of
those against the captives’ return to Africa:
[The President] surely can not send them back to their own tribe, for they 
have doubtless been captured and brought from the center of the continent, 
or at least from some considerable distance in the interior. To place them 
on the coast, amid the coast tribes, would insure their being massacred, or 
sold again to another slaver.36
Other critics were shocked at how quickly the captives were returned to Africa, 
even before the trials had begun and before the origins of the captives had been 
determined. One particularly vocal resident of Charleston in an editorial series asked “is 
it not premature to determine upon the disposal of these negros before their status has 
been judicially ascertained?”37 The author ridiculed the federal government for not 
making broader inquiries into the actual status of the Africans, suggesting that not only 
could they have been immigrants coming to the United States as freemen but they also 
could have been previously enslaved and personally owned by members o f the captain or 
crew. If the captives had already been enslaved, who then were the pirates, the author
34 Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 157.
35 “Further from the Captured Slave Brig,” The Sun, 9/2/1858.
36 “The Captured Africans.” The Sunday Delta, 9/12/1858.
37 “Who are the Pirates?” The Charleston Mercury, 9/17/1858. Vol. LI Issue 10340 pg. 2.
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asked? Perhaps, the author concluded, the real pirates were not the crew members behind 
bars, but the government itself who had stolen their property from them.
There were legitimate reasons for the federal government’s haste in returning the 
captives to Africa. Increased numbers of captured slave ships caused the temporary 
shelters, particularly at Key West, to overflow with captives, adding to government 
expense and raising the already high mortality rate. Nor could the government merely 
release the captives in South Carolina where they would immediately be enslaved. The 
arrival of the Echo captives brought both the conflict over slavery and debate over state 
versus federal authority into sharp relief. Thousands of people viewed the captives, and 
debate over the trial agitated the already strained relations between Northern and 
Southern states. President Buchanan most likely “made haste” in this matter in order to 
ease tensions and avoid criticism over excessive expenditures. Congress allocated funds 
to send the captives to Liberia and paid the American Colonization Society $100 for each 
recaptured African sent to the colony.39
38 Professor Frederick A. Porcher, a.k.a. F.A.P. wrote in the 9/21/58, issue o f  the Charleston  
Mercury, that “If the vessel is not condemned, i f  the crew is not hanged, the government is guilty 
o f  piracy.”
39 As with much o f  the history o f  the slave trade, the voices o f  the recaptured Africans themselves 
are silent. Reverend Seyes, head missionary in Liberia sent many updates about the Echo 
Africans to the federal government over the next several years, but he made no mention o f  the 
individuals involved in the ordeal. See Records o f  the Office o f  the Secretary o f  the Interior 
Relating to the Suppression o f  the African Slave Trade and Negro Colonization, 1854-1872, Rolls 
3 & 10, National Archives, Microfilm Publication M l60.
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The Echo’s Trials Part One: The Indictment of the Crew
Figure 9: James Moore Wayne and Andrew Gordon Magrath40
The arrival of the Echo fit brilliantly into the agenda of the “slave traders,” led by 
Leonidas Spratt. His main focus since 1850 had been for the reopening of the slave trade, 
and, once he allied his goals with that of the disunionists and pro-state sovereigntists, 
Spratt felt confident that he could facilitate the change he desired. At the time, South 
Carolina was the only state whose legislature had seriously considered reopening the 
slave trade. The Echo case, the first slave trade case held in the South Carolina federal 
court system since the capture of the Panther in June 1846, and the first considering the 
Piracy Act of May 15, 1820, would provide the perfect test case for the “slave traders.”41 
Immediately, Leonidas Spratt and other proponents of the slave trade gathered to build a 
case for the defense. All offered their services pro bono.
The capture of the Echo produced three criminal trials: a case against Captain 
Townsend, tried in April 1859 in Key West, and two separate trials for the crew members
40 Wayne image from Juliette Gordon Low website and Magrath image courtesy o f  South 
Carolina Library, University o f  South Carolina.
41 The Panther case resulted in an indictment under the Act o f  1800 and the captain was acquitted. 
The previous year saw two indictments under the Act o f  1818, which resulted in three years’ 
imprisonment and a fine, however both o f  these prisoners received full pardons one year later.
See Howard, American Slavers, Appendix B, 226.
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who were divided according to their perceived nationality. Indictment proceedings in 
front of the Grand Jury were held in succession in November 1858, which was then 
followed by a motion by the defense for a writ of habeus corpus to release the crew 
immediately.
On November 26, 1858 the U.S. Circuit Court in Columbia, S.C. met to review 
the bills posted against the crew of the Echo. South Carolina Attorney General and 
prosecutor in the case, Isaac W. Hayne, “impressed] upon the jury the duty of 
impartially discharging their oaths of office, and, while avoiding unfounded accusations, 
to suffer no personal sentiments or private feelings to deter them from presenting for 
investigation every case where reasonable evidence of guilt exists.”42 He encouraged the 
jury to rule according to the law, not judge the law itself. Hayne was also quick to argue 
that this case did not concern sectionalism, stating that “there is no conflict of jurisdiction 
between the State Sovereignties and the General Agency in this matter” and, in fact, all 
the American crew members “hailed from North of the Potomac.”43 Issac Hayne was an 
ardent states’ rights advocate who publicly questioned the power of the federal 
government. His appointment as prosecuting attorney appears puzzling given his 
political leanings, but historian Paul Finkelman suspects that this was part of the Attorney 
General’s plan. By placing Hayne as counsel, the prosecutors hoped to distance the case
42 “The Latest N ew s,” New York Herald, 11/28/1858.
43 Isaac W. Hayne, “Argument before the United States Circuit Court,” (NY: Weed, Parsons &Co, 
1859), 24.
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from the states’ rights circle and, at the same time, demonstrate that they were not above 
prosecuting crew members (who were a motley crew of Northerners and foreigners).44
Spratt and his friend and fellow slave trader, F. D. Richardson, offered their legal 
services free to the crew members. During the proceedings, the attorneys for the 
prisoners argued that the crew should be discharged and that the 1820 Act of Piracy be 
declared unconstitutional.45 From Maine to Louisiana and Wisconsin to South Carolina, 
newspaper reporters waited for the word from the Grand Jury. On December 1, news 
came that shocked most Northerners: the jury had found no bills of indictment against the 
crew of the Echo.
The decision launched a slew of editorials in Northern newspapers and fueled 
rumors that the South Carolina slave trade had been reopened. In the Trenton State 
Gazette, a reporter admonished the south, writing “the laws of the United States against 
the African Slave Trade are not heeded... [and] the people there have determined that 
they shall not be enforced.”46 Northern states were particularly alarmed at the ruling, 
combined with the vocal threats by the “slave traders,” and were quick to spread rumors 
of the reopening of the slave trade.
The Grand Jury’s decision posed problems to both those who wanted to convict 
the men and those who hoped to challenge the piracy law for constitutional reasons. 
Without a trial, the law could not be tested. U.S. Supreme Court Judge James Wayne and
44 Finkelman, Paul ed., Slavery in the Courtroom: An Annotated Bibliography o f  American Cases, 
“In re Bates, 2F. Cas. 1015 (D.C.S.C. 1858),” Washington: Library o f  Congress, 1985, 241.
45 “The Latest News,” New York Herald, 11/28/1858; and New York Herald, “The Case o f  the 
Crew o f  the Slave Brig Putnam,” 12/4/1858.
46 “Southern Regard for the Law,” Trenton State Gazette, 12/08/1858.
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circuit court judge Andrew Magrath overruled the Grand Jury’s decision and ordered that 
the crew members be put on trial in April 1859.
Judges Wayne and Magrath figured prominently in several slave trade cases 
during the late 1850s, including the Echo and Wanderer cases. Both judges were strict 
constitutional constructionalists, yet their differing views concerning the power of the 
federal government would lead their careers in drastically divergent paths. Justice Wayne 
was originally from Georgia and had been educated at the College of New Jersey (which 
is now Princeton University). A proslavery southerner, he was a strong nationalist, who 
had supported Andrew Jackson in his Indian Removal policy and in the South Carolina 
nullification crisis of 1830. He believed that the federal government was responsible for 
upholding the institution of slavery, and the Constitution had been designed to do just 
that. Choosing Unionism over the Confederate cause, he later moved to D.C. at the onset 
of the Civil War in 1861. He was the only man involved in the Echo case to do so.47
Wayne’s tempered conservatism contrasted with Judge Andrew Gordon 
Magrath’s fiery secessionalism. Magrath clearly aimed to declare the 1820 Piracy Law 
unconstitutional, and, by 1860 would issue a ruling that did just that. Wayne’s federalist 
stance would moderate Magrath during the Echo case, but once he was left alone to judge 
a Wanderer case, he would strike at the very heart of the Piracy law. A staunch states’ 
rights supporter, upon hearing of the election of Abraham Lincoln on November 7, 1860, 
Magrath ceremoniously removed his robes and stamp on them in front of the court before 
dramatically resigning his position as District Court Judge. He would become South 
Carolina’s last Confederate Governor. In 1858, Magrath, who frequented the same
47 Paul Finkelman, “Wayne, James Moore,” American National Biography Online, February 2000, 
Accessed October 3 ,2012 .
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circles as Spratt and Calhoun, saw the Echo case as an opportunity to test the 1820 Piracy 
law, and therefore was eager to see the case taken to trial.48
The Echo’s Trials Part Two: The Trials of the Crew
Based on a straight-forward interpretation of the U.S. slave trade laws, this should 
have been an easy case for the U.S. Attorney General of South Carolina, a twenty-nine 
year old lawyer named James Conner, into whose hands the prosecution of the Echo case 
fell. But Conner was wary of the anti-federal activism in the state and knew very well 
what Spratt was planning; furthermore he, himself, supported secession. Because of 
recent demands to reopen the trade, coupled with a strengthening pro-Southern nationalist 
movement, Conner did not feel as though he had victory within his grasp. In a letter to 
U.S. Attorney General Jeremiah S. Black on November 26, 1858, he wrote that the jurors 
“are nearly to a man in favor of the slave trade movement and opposed to the 
prosecution.”49 Instead of examining the evidence found on board the slave ship Echo, 
Conner knew that politics would interfere in the case. He was right.
Attorney General Black, continued to reassure Conner, writing, “I have no doubt 
whatever that the prisoners are guilty.”50 Black, a Northerner, believed that if South 
Carolina had issues over the legality of the U.S. laws, the court room of a criminal trial 
would not be the proper place to voice these concerns. He could not have been more
48 Sobel, Robert & John Raimo, eds., Biographical D irectory o f  the Governors o f  the United 
States, 1789-1978, (Westport, CT: Meckler Books, 1978), 1413-1414. David Gleeson provides a 
detailed depiction o f  Magrath and his pro-Irish, pro-Southem politics in his article, “Securing The 
Interests o f  the South,” 280-283.
49 Daniel Lewis, Letters Received from  the Attorney General: Southern Law and Order, Reel 4, 
District o f  South Carolina, Bethesda, MD.
50 Black to Conner, October 1858, quoted in Frederick Calhoun, The Lawmen: U.S. M arshals and  
their Deputies (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990), 80-1.
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wrong. Conner’s goal was to establish that the crew was guilty of piracy under the 1820 
law. The prisoners were tried separately in two groups although the testimony is 
generally the same.51 All of the counts against the prisoners were consistent with the 
1820 Act of Piracy and, Conner argued, this law had been upheld in many courts. The 
fact that the ship had just come from Africa was supported by the testimony of a crew 
member, as well as the Echo’s confiscated charts which showed a route directly from 
Africa to Cuba.52 This evidence should have been all the jury needed to convict someone 
of participating in the slave trade. It seemed as though this would be a relatively easy 
trial since the incriminating evidence existed for all to see. The refusal of the Grand Jury 
to accept the bills against the crew was a sign of things to come.
On the other side of the aisle, the attorneys for the defense were all active “slave 
traders,” led by Leonidas Spratt. The defense’s strong argument was a two-pronged 
approach: one questioning the evidence in the case and the other questioning the 
constitutionality of the 1820 law. Maxcy Gregg, Esq, who had just published a 
“secessionists’ manifesto,” began his argument by disputing what he determined were 
twelve allegations against the prisoners.53 In order for a guilty verdict to be reached, he 
argued, all of the prisoners needed to be found guilty of all twelve allegations.54 He cast 
doubt on the claim that the prisoners were all crew members, suggesting they might have 
been passengers on the ship. Gregg also argued that there was no proof that the prisoners
51 Bates and Woodruff, Report, 8.
52 Ibid, 9, although the defense claimed that all documents had been thrown overboard.
53 Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery 193.
54 Bates and Woodruff, Report, 15.
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confined, detained, or aided and abetted in capturing the African. Gregg denied that there 
was any proof that the prisoners had participated in these offenses and argued that the 
map charting the course of the Echo could not be counted as evidence because it easily 
could have been planted on board.
Gregg argued that in order to convict the prisoners of piracy, it had to be proved 
that all of them were members of the Echo's crew. Pointing out that while the prisoners 
did help sail the vessel and care for the African captives after the vessel was captured, 
this was not enough evidence to prove that the prisoners were crew members. 
Furthermore, one of the prisoners, a man named Henrys, had demonstrated that he was a 
passenger on the ship and should therefore not be prosecuted as a crew member. Because 
the first count had to show that all prisoners were crew members, Gregg argued, Henrys, 
and perhaps others, should not be put on trial.
Gregg further declared it impossible to determine who was the true owner of the 
Echo. All ship’s records had been thrown overboard and thus were not available to the 
court. According to bills o f sale, the ship belonged to a man named E. C. Townsend, of 
New Orleans. Even though there was an E. C. Townsend aboard the Echo at the time of 
her capture, Gregg argued that it could not be proven that the E.C. Townsend aboard, 
who claimed to be from Rhode Island, was the same one who was the captain and owner 
of the ship. Because of this “uncertainty” concerning ship ownership, there was “no 
evidence against [the] third parties on trial for their lives,” according to the defense.55 It 
was impossible to determine ownership of the vessel, and consequently its nationality, 
therefore the charges of the prosecution could not stand.
55 Ibid, 16.
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The defense asserted that it was impossible to make the claim that “the negroes 
found on the captured vessel were not held to service or labor by the laws of any of the 
United States.”56 In South Carolina, Gregg argued, all people of African descent were 
assumed to be enslaved, however the laws of South Carolina respected the status of 
freemen of foreign countries. If a free black man arrived from England, he was 
considered free in South Carolina. But, Gregg argued, “so far as the condition of the 
negroes in Africa is known, from the accounts of travelers, slavery is the general 
condition of the population, and freedom the exception.”57 The crew members could not 
be charged with kidnapping free Africans with the intent of enslaving them if the 
Africans had already been enslaved in Africa. If that were the case, and Gregg argued 
that this was the most likely scenario, the crew members were merely transporting 
property, not committing acts of piracy. Without the ship’s logs, it was impossible even 
to prove that the Echo had indeed come from Africa, as the prosecution claimed. Perhaps 
the Echo was transporting slaves within the Caribbean only.58 After submitting these 
arguments, Gregg then turned to the constitutionality of the 1820 Act of Congress.
Gregg’s argument against the constitutionality of the Act of Congress centered on 
the idea that Congress’s power to regulate commerce did not allow it the power to 
prohibit commerce altogether. If Congress had the right to prohibit the trading of slaves, 
then what could prevent it from prohibiting the cotton trade, or any other legitimate
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, 17.
58 Another attorney for the defense also took up this question in more detail. Bellinger argued 
that it was impossible to prove that the ship was from Africa, especially since it was closer to 
America than Africa, and could have been transporting slaves from one end o f  Cuba to the other, 
see ibid, 69.
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trade?59 It was the duty of the jury to prevent such abuse of power, and decide for 
themselves if this act was constitutional. Even though the Judge asserted that this Act 
was constitutional, Gregg pressed upon the jury that this was up to the jury, and the jury 
only, to determine.60
The arguments for the defense proceeded, captured verbatim in Bates and 
Woodruffs publication of the trial. Evidently talked out, Gregg turned the floor over to 
Edmund Bellinger, another attorney for the defense and fellow secessionist.61 He 
outlined the role of the Federal Government and argued that it, “unlike the British 
Parliament, was not omnipotent.”62 It was not under the jurisdiction of the federal 
government to interfere with state power and, by making comparisons to the very 
government from which the United States had broken free, Bellinger made an effective 
argument in favor of limited federal authority. If the founding fathers had intended to 
call the slave trade piracy, Bellinger reasoned, why would they have allowed it to 
continue for twenty years? According to this argument, the founding fathers never would 
have allowed continuing anything that they considered illegal; therefore, the intent of the 
Constitution was to keep the question of slavery up to the states, and not under the 
jurisdiction of Congress’s regulation of commerce.63 Appealing to the slave owners in 
the jury, Bellinger added that among other misuses of power, “if Congress could make
59 Gregg’s arguments (ibid, 21-22) echo that o f  that o f  “The Pirates o f  the Echo” published in the 
Charleston Mercury, 3/16/58-3/23/58, by Von Tramp a.k.a. Lucius Sargent
60 Bates and Woodruff, Report, 19.
61 Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 113. Bellinger and Gregg had been part o f  the first group 




the foreign slave trade piracy, Congress could make the domestic slave trade piracy.”64 
The defense argued that if the crew members were found guilty then this had proved that 
“Congress has usurped the functions of a jury.”65
Up to this point, few slavers had been captured so close to United States soil and
fewer with slaves aboard. The 1820 Act of Congress had been in place for thirty-eight
years and never had anyone been prosecuted to the fullest extent o f the law. For the
prosecution, this was the time to finally achieve a conviction. Yet they seemed to
underestimate the power of the state’s rights argument. Mr. Bellinger stated “this case
would serve as a precedent for other times... [and] was one of deep interest and
paramount importance.”66 The defense, at least, understood what was at stake in this
case, and chose it as a way to challenge the law itself.
While Bellinger’s speech declared that this was not to be a political case but a
legal one, Leonidas Spratt’s arguments aimed to appeal to the southern property
owners—men who formed the jury. He opened his speech by reiterating how important
the case was and what larger issues were in question:
The North has numbers, and shares a government in which numbers 
tell on legislation. They execrate us, and their execrations are 
applauded. They have the power to pass what laws they please, and 
they have passed them... They have abolished the trade in slaves 
within the limits of the Capitol. They are preparing to suppress the 
trade between the States.. .One step in that direction they have taken.





enforcement is now the last remaining step at which aggression 
trembles... and that question is dependant on your verdict.6
In this speech one can read that the Echo case was much more than the sum of its
parts. It was not merely a case of piracy, as the prosecution tried to show. In that court
room, and later in the newspapers, the case came to represent a rejection of Northern
supremacy, a call to reassert the southern status quo, and to be the torchbearer for the
Constitution against tyrannical Northern leadership. The jury was charged not only to
uphold justice “to these poor men” but also to keep the South from bending to a “hostile
law.” Spratt maintained that it was “repulsive to the feelings of the South, that men shall
be hanged for trading in slaves.”68 In this speech, Spratt effectively appealed not to the
law but to the sentiments of southern plantation owners facing a challenge to their own
way of life.
On the bench, one can only speculate over the content of the discussions between 
pro-nationalist Wayne and secessionist Magrath. Magrath knew that Wayne would never 
challenge the constitutionality of the May 15,1820 Piracy Law, but the aging Wayne was 
also content to defer opinion to the junior Magrath. Whereas the fiery “slave traders” 
centered their Echo defense strategy on the unconstitutionality of the 1820 Act, Magrath 
stayed silent. It is highly probable that at this point Magrath wanted to distinguish his 
pro-southern states’ rights stance from that of the more radical and less popular pro-slave 
trade faction, since the defense attorneys were so clearly “slave traders.” Magrath 
deferred to Wayne, who laid out arguments for the jury before sending them out to 




for less than an hour before returning the verdict of not guilty. The entire crew was 
discharged. The backlash from the verdict was immediate. For the South, this was a 
triumph while, for the North, this was a miscarriage of justice. The anti-slave trade acts 
could not be enforced in a court of law.
The Echo's Trials Part Three: Townsend’s Trial
Meanwhile, the accused captain of the Echo was going through his own legal
ordeal. When the Echo was captured off the coast of Africa all its papers had
mysteriously disappeared, including information on the owner, captain and crew of the
ship. Therefore, Captain Maffitt of the U.S.S. Dolphin received no aid in determining
who was in charge of the ship, although his belief that Townsend was the captain did not
seem to be contested. Townsend was immediately separated from the crew, apparently
ill, and kept in irons for the duration of the trip.
Upon landing in Charleston in August 1859, the Dolphin was immediately
ordered with Townsend to New York, then Boston, despite the fact that the law stated
that trials should take place in the district closest to the ship’s capture. Apparently there
was some confusion as to where Townsend should be tried, and it was determined that,
being listed as residing in Rhode Island, he should be sent to the closest District Court
which was in Boston.69 An article in the Boston Journal, reprinted in the Charleston
Mercury, gives clues to why, perhaps, Maffitt’s orders were to bring the Captain north:
The question of jurisdiction is undoubtedly an important one to the prisoner, 
for here [Boston] the offence with which he is charged is viewed as a crime 
of the blackest dye... In Charleston or Key West, on the other hand, he 
would be looked upon as a gentleman who had been a little unfortunate in
69 See “The Captain o f the Slaver,” from the Boston Journal, reprinted in the Charleston Mercury,
9/15/1858.
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his business arrangements, but who is entitled to admission into the most 
respectable society of the place... and he would escape punishment.70
This was the opportunity to tiy a captain, caught red-handed with slaves, and finally 
convict him of piracy. By this time, in the eyes of Northern abolitionists, Southern 
courts could no longer be trusted in cases concerning slavery although statistics show 
that both Northern and Southern courts had enforcement issues. For Maffitt, he knew he 
and his crew could only receive prize money if the captain and ship were convicted 
under the slave trade acts. With New York being a slave-trading den, Boston was his 
best bet.
In mid-September, nearly three weeks after the capture of the Echo, the Dolphin 
arrived in Boston, and Townsend was brought into the court to stand before C.W. 
Loring, U.S. Commissioner. Lieutenant Maffitt, commander of the Dolphin, submitted 
his deposition to the court, giving a description of the capture and explaining how he had 
arrived in Boston.71 Despite this justification, Judge Loring determined that Townsend 
would have to be tried in Key West, which was the first port of contact after the capture 
of the Echo. By January, Captain Townsend had been taken back down to Key West, 
where he was held. His trial began in May 1859.
Not much is known about E. C. Townsend. While it seemed as though he had a 
wife and children in New England, the owner of the Echo had listed himself as residing 
in New Orleans. For the prosecution for both Townsend’s trial and for the crew, this was 
enough to cast doubt upon the ownership of the ship. Nevertheless, the Columbus
70 Ibid.
71 “Arrival o f the Captain o f the Captured Slaver Echo,” from Boston Journal, reprinted in
Sunday Delta, 9/26/1858.
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Ledger, in Georgia, printed an article that quoted Captain Townsend as saying, “the 
captives in the Echo would prefer a life on a plantation, to the sufferings they endured at 
the hands of their enemies in the barracoons [in Africa].”72 If this was truly a statement 
from Captain Townsend, then it is a printed admission of guilt according to the 1820 Act 
of Piracy because he admitted that he was both the captain of the Echo, and that the Echo 
had sailed from Africa with the intent to make its captives slaves. Townsend’s trial did 
not focus on this aspect. As he waited in a Key West prison, his crew was acquitted of 
all charges in the Charleston court. His trial a month later seemed to be a mere 
formality.
On May 19, 1859, Captain E. C. Townsend stood trial for piracy under the Act of 
1820. District Attorney John L. Tatum attempted to postpone the trial as a witness in 
New Orleans had not yet been subpoenaed and therefore material was missing for the 
trial. Why the District Attorney had not been able to submit the order in the five months 
Townsend had been in Key West is unknown. The Judge refused this motion and the 
trial began. Lieutenant Maffitt testified that Townsend had been on board the Echo with 
318 slaves aboard and crew members identified him as the captain. The Deputy Marshal 
of Rhode Island proved that Townsend was a United States citizen. The prosecution 
submitted both a register from the port of New Orleans and a bill of sale for the Putnam 
now Echo, both of which had Townsend’s name on it. The court rejected both the 
register and bill of sale on the grounds that their authenticity could not be proved. At 
this time the Judge then ordered the Jury to find the prisoner not guilty because of lack of
72 “The Captain o f the Slave Ship,” Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, 9/14/1858.
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evidence. Without leaving their seats, the Jury then voted and dismissed all charges
7 ^against Townsend. The trial was over and Townsend was discharged.
Perhaps this ruling was not a surprise given the crew’s verdict in Charleston. 
Many Northern abolitionists could not help but see this as an abuse of the system, 
declaring the problem to be a sectional issue and ignoring the reputation of Northern 
courts with regard to the slave trade. The Ohio State Journal printed a scathing report 
titled, “How Trials are Conducted in the United States Courts in the South” not long after 
the Townsend trial concluded. Not only was the north more “civilized” than the south, 
the article argued, but Northern courts conducted themselves with “mathematical 
precision” while in the South there is a “lamentable uncertainly of the law... and human 
reason still struggles on blindly.”74 In the South it was not considered a crime to 
transport slaves and Captain Townsend was seen as a “benevolent, self-sacrificing and 
praiseworthy missionary”75 for saving the Africans from their fate in Africa. What 
should be remembered, however, is that despite the animosity felt between the North and 
the South, the ship itself had been built in Baltimore and outfitted by a captain who 
resided at least part of the time in Rhode Island. Even some of the crew were originally 
from the Northern states. Even though all the evidence seemed to point towards a certain 
conviction, it was a Northern judge who decided the Townsend trial had to take place in 
the South and a federal judge who threw out the case. Not one case up to that point,
73 There are no existing court records for this trial, however the Barre Gazette, o f  Barre, MA  
printed a summary o f  die trial on June 10,1859. Several other papers printed the verdict o f  the 
trial over the week o f  May 29th, 1859.
74 In Ohio State Journal, 6/07/1859.
75 Ibid.
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either in the North or South, had resulted in the full conviction of a captain or crew on 
the charge of piracy.
For Judge Magrath, the Echo crew trials had shown that the federal policies 
against the slave trade were unenforceable. He saw that the next step would involve 
putting the 1820 Piracy Act on trial.76 Claiming to be against the slave trade, he 
nevertheless questioned the role of the federal government in the suppression of the 
trade. Elite Southerners agreed with him and, “while slave traders may have been in the 
minority, many Carolinian planter politicians accepted their rationale, if  not their 
demand, for the immediate reopening of the African slave trade.”77 As the nation 
polarized, particularly as the South reacted to the new Republican Party’s call for the 
stricter enforcement of slave trade laws and for the prohibition of slavery in the 
territories, Southerners like Magrath, aimed to roadblock the federal government’s power 
at every turn. While the court waited to hear the Echo trial, the landing of slaves directly 
on U.S. soil would capture the attention of the nation.
The Wanderer
In mid-October 1858, two months after the Echo was caught off the coast of 
Cuba, another slave trading voyage left the coast of Africa. This time, the ship escaped 
detection, and the human cargo were successfully landed on Jeckyl Island, in Georgia. 
William Corrie, master of the ship and a South Carolinian socialite, had collaborated with
76 The story o f  the Echo did not end there. It was sold by the U.S. government in January 1859 
for $2300 cash. In July she was advertised for sale in New York and listed as a Baltimore built 
brig that had just been renovated. In 1861, in a twist o f  irony, she was renamed the Jefferson 
Davis and sailed as a Confederate privateer during the Civil War before sinking in Charleston 
harbor, see Charleston Mercury, “Echo,” 1/07/1859 and “The Slave Brig Echo,” 7/22/1859.
77 Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 172.
227
Charles Lamar, another prominent southerner, to carry slaves directly from Africa to the 
United States. They succeeded. Their ship, the yacht Wanderer, sailing the flag of the 
New York City Yacht Club, had fitted out for the voyage in New York earlier that year 
and returned with 487 slaves on board. Corrie had entertained British sea captains along 
the African coast as he waited for his illegal cargo to reach the coastline, wining and 
dining the men aboard the luxurious, sleek vessel. Once on board, the swift Wanderer 
made for open waters, sailing gracefully past Captain Totten aboard the U.S.S. Vincennes, 
who must have paused to see the yacht in African waters, but whose frustrations over a
7Rrecent British boarding of an American vessel occupied his mind.
Figure 10: The Wanderer 
U.S. Naval Historical Image, The Dictionary o f  American Naval Fighting Ships
Arriving on Jeckyll Island on November 28 after a forty-two day voyage, Corrie 
unloaded the weakened Africans, now numbering close to 400, where they were 
dispersed around Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina to be sold. Suspicious of Lamar 
and Corrie’s activities, eventually the U.S. marshal seized the Wanderer and arrested the
78 Description o f  the Wanderer on the African coast comes from Calonius, The Wanderer, 97-103. 
Captain Totten was searching for the royal navy ship Viper, to protest its boarding o f  the Rufus 
Soule. According to Calonius, the Wanderer, with slaves on board, sailed so close to the 
Vincennes that there was nearly a collision.
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owners and crew. Whereas the Echo case had been a test to set the scene, the Wanderer 
cases would demonstrate the limits of federal power on the eve of the Civil War, not 
because of the public’s support for the slave trade, but because o f the growing distrust of 
the federal government.
The Wanderer was the perfect venue within which to question the 
constitutionality of the 1820 Piracy Act. Judge Magrath saw that South Carolina would 
be the best state in which to hold these trials, therefore, in January 1859, even before the 
Echo trial in April, Magrath ruled that Georgia could not try the case even though it had 
been the state in which the enslaved Africans had been landed. His repeated denial of 
Georgia’s jurisdiction over the cases lends support to historians’ suspicion that Magrath 
was seeking to place the 1820 Piracy Act on trial. A previous slave trading case against 
the crew of the Brothers, captured by the U.S.S. Marion in late 1858, found, once again, a
70Grand Jury refusing to indict the crew. Even those southerners who had been against 
the importation of slaves into the United States supported the abolition of the piracy law. 
The jury in the Georgia trial against Charles Lamar stated that they had been forced to 
indict him and that they, the jury, denounced the slave trade laws “because they directly 
or indirectly, condemn this institution [slavery], and those who have inherited or maintain 
it.”80 On November 23, 1859, in the Georgia District Court presided over by Justice 
Wayne who instructed the jury to rule according to federal law, the jury found three 
Wanderer crew members not guilty under the Piracy Act of 1820.
79 Howard, American Slavers, Appendix, 230.
80 Quoted in Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 168. A wonderfully entertaining recount o f  the 
Wanderer can be found in Erik Calonius’s book o f  the same name.
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Magrath saw that the slave trade laws, and thus the sovereignty of the federal 
government, could never be directly challenged if juries continued to dismiss the cases. 
In May 1859, a month after the Echo crew was released, the captain of the Wanderer, 
William Corrie, stood before the Grand Jury in South Carolina, who, unsurprisingly, 
refused to indict him. The day after the Grand Jury’s opinion, the jury decided to alter its 
stance, and the jurists themselves charged Corrie in the violation of the Act of May 15, 
1820, a highly unusual maneuver. It is impossible to determine if this surprising move 
was directly influenced by Magrath, but, based on Magrath’s determination to keep
a  |
Corrie in South Carolina for trial, making this assertion would not be a stretch.
The Corrie case dragged on, carrying into the 1860 court session. Meanwhile, in 
South Carolina, Magrath authorized Corrie’s release on bail, despite being charged for a 
capital crime. James Conner had been brought in to prosecute, and was directed to enter 
a nolle prosequi (refusal to prosecute), by the U.S. Attorney General who planned to then 
re-arrest Corrie to stand trial in Georgia. Magrath, of course, refused. James Conner, 
who seemed to be in support of Magrath’s plan, motioned to discharge the Grand Jury 
several months later in June 1860. Justice Wayne, now presiding over the case with 
Magrath, agreed to this and ordered that the jury be dismissed.82 Corrie was released and, 
perhaps because of the turmoil resulting from the 1860 election, Corrie was never re­
arrested.
Magrath then released an opinion in the case, in response to Northern outcry that 
slave trade laws were unenforceable in Southern courts. Essentially arguing semantics,
81 Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 170.
82 Wells, The Wanderer, 60-1.
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Magrath opined that the Piracy Law did not extend to slave trading, nor was the law 
“consistent with any previous legislation.” 83 Indicative of his strict constitutional 
constructionist interpretations of the law, Magrath also stated that, although the slave 
trade was prohibited by federal law, nowhere did it stipulate that the law was to be “tried 
and punished in its courts.”84 Accordingly, Magrath stated that the slave trade could not 
be declared piracy. While the implications were obscured by the election of 1860, the 
ruling nevertheless undermined federal authority, and the anti-piracy law could have been 
overturned if  Lincoln not been elected.
The convoluted nature of the Wanderer case highlights the unraveling of federal 
authority in the Southern states. Slave trade cases had never been well enforced in the 
federal courts, but, until the late 1850s, courts would at least convict slave traders of 
minor offenses if there was evidence that a vessel had been used for slave trading. The 
increased southern agitation, sectional polarization, and direct challenges to federal 
authority by southern politicians and judges, would further decrease the effectiveness of 
the slave trade laws. While the Republican Party increased its pressure on the federal 
government to make a stand against secessionists and slavery and as the federal 
government strengthened its African Squadron resulting in more captures of American 
slaving vessels, the Southern challenges stood out in sharper relief. Arguing that the 
founding fathers never intended to have the slave trade prohibited by the federal 
government, even Southerners against the slave trade at least tacitly supported the “slave 
traders’” claims.
83 Magrath, Slave Trade not D eclared Piracy, 18.
84 Ibid, 17.
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The polarization of the United States over slavery had direct consequences for the 
U.S. suppression of the slave trade. The campaign to challenge federal authority over the 
trade by linking it to the states’ rights agenda gained followers even among those 
opposed to the trade. Reformulating the slave trade, not as a crime against humanity, but 
as a means with which to preserve southern slavery and culture, proved effectual. Laws 
had always been lax and, thanks to cases like the Echo, Orion and the Wanderer, were 
now shown to be ineffective. As the North and South drew more distinct ideological 
lines and issues became more divergent, the U.S. government took a bolder stance in the 
suppression of the slave trade, resulting in a stronger, more efficient Navy, and bills
O f
introduced in Congress for the “more effectual prohibition of the African slave trade.” 
The newly formed Republican Party maintained that slavery should remain under the 
control of state governments, but it expressly condemned the reopening of the slave trade 
and promised to limit slavery in the territories.86
During the Presidential campaign of 1860, Democrats failed to agree over the 
issue of slavery and divided into Northern and Southern factions. This, along with the 
growing popularity of the Republican Party, allowed Abraham Lincoln to win the 
election. Upon hearing the news, southern states began seceding from the Union. Isaac 
Hayne read the Order of Secession at the convention in Charleston and was sent by the 
Confederate governor to act as a special envoy to the United States over the Fort Sumter 
crisis. James Conner, former U.S. Attorney general in South Carolina, meanwhile joined 
the ranks in the siege of the fort, and Echo defense attorney Maxcy Gregg became a
85 in Sinha, Counterrevolution o f  Slavery, 175.
86 “Republican National Party Platform,” 1860 in Henry Steele Commager, ed, Documents o f  
American H istory, 8th ed. (New York, 1968), 363-65.
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Brigadier General for the CSA before being killed at Fredericksburg in December 1862. 
Spratt would denounce the Confederate States of America when its government 
condemned the slave trade, while Magrath became a Confederate governor. These men, 
caught up in the complexities and nuances of the slave trade laws on the eve of 
insurrection, nevertheless found common ground in supporting their state of South 
Carolina.
The Wanderer case and the public declaration that the U.S. slave trade laws were 
a “dead letter” had embarrassed the new administration. Despite renewed efforts to 
patrol its coastline, the blatant disregard for the laws and successful landing of enslaved 
Africans in Georgia showed the world that the U.S. government was impotent against 
slave traders. The fact that the Wanderer had been so widely publicized by newspapers
8*7(and the slave traders themselves), added fuel to accusations against the government. 
The U.S. stance towards the slave trade, particularly as it pertained to U.S. imports, 
would change with the onset war.
Nathanial Gordon and the Trial of the Erie 
In 1862, Nathanial Gordon, became the only person in the United States hanged 
for participating in the slave trade. His swift execution appears incongruous when 
compared to the long history of slave trade acquittals and lenient sentences. What had 
changed in those three years? There were still bribes being taken by U.S. Attorneys and 
Marshalls to turn a blind eye to the trade, but there was a new crop of abolitionists and 
lawyers ready to prosecute slave traders. In addition, the verdicts of the Echo and the 
Wanderer were so egregious, the newly Republican-led government was forced to make
87 Canney, Africa Squadron, 205; Du Bois, Suppression o f  the Slave Trade, 179.
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a stand against those who would challenge federal law. Amid the turmoil of the 
increased number of slave trade captures and subsequent acquittals in court, Gordon, 
veteran slave trader, made preparations in Cuba to sail to Africa for a cargo of slaves. 
When he set sail, there was no indication that he, Nathanial Gordon, would be the first 
and only man hanged for the crime of piracy, a direct result of the Echo and Wanderer 
cases.
Gordon had been bom in Portland, Maine to a family that could trace its ancestry 
back to passengers on the Fortune, arriving in Massachusetts Bay colony in 1621. 
Nathaniel Gordon’s father was a sea captain, who mainly kept to the legal trades. He 
had been brought to trial for slave trading in the 1840s but had been acquitted. Gordon 
followed in his father’s footsteps, and, according to some overly dramatic newspaper 
accounts of his life, he had commanded at least four previous slaving voyages. In 1860, 
Gordon left his wife and child in Boston and sailed for Cuba, where he outfitted the Erie 
for a slave voyage. By the time he returned from his voyage to the Congo, the Civil War 
had erupted, and the United States laws against the slave trade were more effective than 
they had been for the previous eighty years. Without his realizing it, Gordon’s luck had 
run out and he would become the example for this new, more powerful, federal 
government.88
The court records state that the vessel was owned by a Mr. Post and Mr. 
Knudsen, both American citizens, in March 1860 when the ship was in Havana, Cuba. 
Four crewmen testified against the Captain, saying they were employed as regular 
seamen and the ship was fitted out with liquor, bread, rice, supplies for making barrels,
88 Soodalter, Hanging Captain Gordon, 21-23.
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as well as pork and beef.89 If the crew had been suspicious of the legality of the cargo, 
none of them voiced any concerns. Liquor and meat were common trade items and, on 
their own, were not enough to cause alarm. According to the crew testimony, about thirty 
days en route to Africa, several members of the crew approached the captain with their 
suspicions that the ship carried provisions used in the slave trade. Captain Gordon 
dismissed these claims and made it clear that this topic was not to be mentioned again.
When the ship sailed up river in the Congo, the climate immediately changed 
aboard the ship. Maintaining command of the ship, Gordon allegedly ordered the 
boarding of African captives—nearly 900 in number. According to their testimony, the 
crew had voiced concerns to the captain, but Gordon promised them one dollar each for 
every slave that arrived in Cuba and then ordered them to continue with their duties that 
they had signed a contract to perform. Fifteen days later, on August 8, 1860, the Erie 
was captured by the U.S. naval steamer Mohican, about fifty miles off the coast of 
Africa. The Africans were taken to Liberia, while the Erie, her captain, and crew were 
sent to New York for trial.90
Once captured, Gordon was taken to New York where he was charged with 
violating the 1820 Act of Congress, which District Judge Magrath had declared 
unconstiutional but which still remained a federal law. The prosecutors in the Erie trial 
had to prove either that 1) Captain Gordon was an American and had sailed with the 
intent to make Africans slaves, or, that 2) the ship was owned by Americans and was on 
a slaving voyage. These were charges that had been held against the captains and crews
89 25 F. Cas. 1364.
90 “Execution o f  Gordon, the Slave-Trader,” H arper’s Weekly Magazine, 3/8/1862.
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of many alleged American slaving vessels. The jury of the circuit court of the Southern 
District of New York heard the testimony of the captain, crew, and other witnesses as 
news filtered in about the blood spilled at Bull Run and the public realized that the Civil 
War would last much, much longer than the anticipated few weeks. This made all the 
difference.
As it happened during the trial of E. C. Townsend of the Echo, Gordon’s 
attorneys argued that his nationality could not be proved, since he was the son of a 
captain and he was supposedly bom at sea. Additionally, they argued that it could not be 
proved that the ship itself was American, since the records might not have been up to 
date. As in the Echo case, the defense tried to blur the facts and to call into question the 
reliability of the ship’s register. In Gordon’s case, however, the crew members stood 
against the captain and four of them gave testimony against him, perhaps because they 
felt that they had been coerced into an illegal sailing trip, or perhaps because they were 
saving their own necks. The crew of the Erie provided damning evidence against 
Gordon and absolved themselves of all blame. On November 30, 1861, Gordon was 
convicted of piracy and sentenced to hang.91 Gordon’s attorney’s appealed the 
conviction, but the Supreme Court rejected the motion. A petition signed by 25,000 
people was sent to President Lincoln asking for clemency, but Lincoln refused to grant it. 
On February 21, 1861, after a failed suicide attempt, Nathaniel Gordon became the first 
and only person hanged for participation in the slave trade, an example of the federal
91 25 F. Cas. 1364.
92 66 U.S. 503.
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government’s increasing vigilance and a warning to all other would-be slave traders.93 
This case made it clear that federal laws against the slave trade would now be upheld and 
enforced in the wake of secession.
The three cases of the Echo, Wanderer, and Erie show the radical shift in federal 
priorities from 1858 to 1861. Cases like that of the Echo reflect the complacency of the 
federal court system over the enforcement of the slave trade laws. Although anti-slave 
trade in word, in deed, few could condone the conviction of fellow citizens for slave 
trading under the Piracy Law. The Wanderer case, which challenged federal law 
directly, crossed the line for many who denounced the South’s anti-federalist protests. 
The highly publicized case cast the sovereignty of the federal government into a critical 
light and stood as a direct defiance against the government. Just as important, whereas 
the Echo had been transporting slaves to a foreign country, the Wanderer deposited 
enslaved Africans onto U.S. soil, demonstrating that the federal government could not 
control its own borders. This very public failure of national security stood as an 
embarrassment to the nation amid a highly volatile, political atmosphere.
As a direct response to Magrath’s Wanderer verdict, Nathanial Gordon was 
hanged—the first victim under a then-forty year old law. The death of Gordon was, as 
historian Ron Soodalter asserts, a fluke, but it did reflect the changing political climate 
where the abolition of the slave trade finally aligned itself with national priorities.94 
Because of the internal challenges to federal authority from within the United States, the
93 “The Execution o f  Nathanial Gordon,” New York Times, 2/22/1862.
94 Soodalter, Hanging Captain Gordon, 242.
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federal government was forced to take a strong stand against the slave trade. The rise of 
the Republican Party and the outbreak of the Civil War turned the tide against the U.S. 
participation in the slave trade.
The rise of the Confederacy, ironically, ended the calls to reopen the slave trade 
and made the laws against the participation in the foreign slave trade enforceable. The 
Confederate Congress adamantly opposed the traffic, not only passing laws against the 
trade but also “requiring congressional legislation to enforce the ban.”95 Despite the 
strong objections of a small minority, southern states maintained anti-slave trade 
policies, for economic and humanitarian reasons, and, at the onset of war, to encourage 
Britain to back its cause and encourage Virginia and Maryland to join the Confederacy. 
The natural population increase of slaves continued to meet the demand for laborers, and 
the domestic slave trade flourished. In the North, the onset of war allowed the federal 
government to redouble its border patrols, primarily against blockade-runners, and, most 
importantly, to enter into agreement with Britain over the right-of-search. Finally, after 
decades of resistance, the war ended American participation in the slave trade. The 
foreign slave trade to Cuba and Brazil would continue into the 1860s, but the U.S. flag 
would cease to protect those involved in the illicit traffic. The generations-old feud 
between Britain and her former colony, and among Americans themselves, would finally 
be put to rest.
95 Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 203. This was decided partly because o f  lingering fears 




The onset of the Civil War marked a turning point in the federal suppression of 
the slave trade. Abraham Lincoln and the Republican-led Congress were committed to 
restoring the Union with or without the abolition of slavery,1 but the suppression of the 
slave trade coincided with other federal priorities. Lincoln agreed to sign a belligerent 
right-of-search agreement with Britain to stop the trade, as well as prevent Confederate 
smuggling and a Confederate/British alliance. In 1861, the United States formally 
abandoned its participation in the African Squadron and its ships were called to patrol 
along the Southern blockade of the Confederacy. The Civil War moved the Union’s 
priorities closer to home, with a goal of restricting the Confederacy’s resources by 
denying them access to slave labor.
Even after the Civil War, American ships and citizens continued to transport 
enslaved Africans to the few areas still reliant on slave labor, although documentation is 
all but impossible. The Civil War, however, enabled the U.S. government to enter into 
agreement with Great Britain to allow the right-of-search during wartime. This did more 
to halt the American participation in the slave trade than previous efforts, as it took the 
protection of the American flag away from slave traders who sought to slip through the 
British African blockade. International cooperation, as the British had been arguing for 
decades, proved to be essential in eliminating the illegal traffic.
1 “Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley, “in Roy P. Basler, ed, Collected Works o f  Abraham  
Lincoln, Volume 5, 388 -  389.
239
The Civil War also brought about another essential change in American attitudes 
toward the trade. Until the war, the federal government was committed to protecting 
slavery. Previous chapters have demonstrated that slavery and the slave trade were 
separate issues, with the majority of Americans, North and South, against the latter. The 
federal government’s commitment to protecting Southern slavery effectively prevented it 
from enforcing laws against the slave trade. Political leaders focused instead on 
preserving the Union and protecting U.S. commercial interests, at home and abroad.
These two factors, preserving the Union and protecting commercial interests 
directly and indirectly affected the slave trade, both in improving efforts to suppress the 
trade as well as in allowing the trade to continue to flourish depending on the situation. 
In the 1790s, the federal government’s attempt to protect its neutrality led to the enacting 
of the first anti-slave trade laws, as chapter one discusses. In addition, in response to 
threats to American shipping along the Gulf Coast and Southern Florida in the wake of 
the Spanish American wars of independence, the federal government stepped up its 
efforts to prevent piratical attacks and illegal smuggling, which in turn improved controls 
against slave importations into the United States.
The United States did make some contributions to the suppression of the slave 
trade, and, after 1820, the importation of enslaved Africans into U.S. territory was 
minimal although we will never know the exact numbers of those smuggled onto 
American shores. Based on personal accounts and state and federal law, most Americans 
denounced the African slave trade from the 1780s onward. Only a few outspoken 
proponents would admit to supporting the trade. The fact that the United States had a 
naturally increasing slave population most likely had more to do with the abolition of the
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American slave trade than any abolitionist sentiment, as is evidenced by so many 
Americans participating directly or indirectly in the foreign slave trade. Then, as now, 
profit and the protection of American interests guided American policy far more than 
pure altruism. That the slave trade continued to such a great extent for decades after both 
the United States and Britain outlawed is testament to the prioritization of national 
interests above international cooperation and humanitarian efforts.
The African slave trade did end. Despite Africa’s continued turmoil stemming in 
part from centuries of colonization and slave trading, and despite the continued existence 
of the slave trade and slavery, the nineteenth century stands as an example of a rapid shift 
in labor systems along the Atlantic, from that of general acceptance of slavery to a free- 
labor system stemming from industrialization. The immigration of “free” people to the 
Americas dwarfed that of forced immigration in the nineteenth century, although the 
virtual enslavement of African and Asian “apprentices” in the Caribbean was, even then, 
widely criticized. Plantation slavery in Brazil and Cuba continued into the late nineteenth 
century.
The abolition of the slave trade was a nineteenth century phenomenon, and a 
result of monumental, multinational collaboration. Conceptions of human ownership 
changed in those short years, “so that today no state sanctions slavery or slave trading.”2 
The idea that slavery was immoral grew out of the Enlightenment and Revolutionary 
periods, and blossomed during the reform movements of the nineteenth century. Yet, for 
all the so-called radical talk, the United States and its rise to international power relied 
upon the labor of enslaved Africans and the federal government’s commitment to
2 David Eltis, “The Abolition o f  the Slave Trade,” New York Public Library, 
http://abolition.nypl.org, accessed October 12,2012.
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protecting slavery.3 The founding fathers had had an uneasy relationship with the slave 
trade, a step-sibling of slavery. The horrors of the middle passage could not be denied 
and the desire of the federal government to control its borders, maintain its national 
sovereignty, and protect Southern interests, all fueled anti-slave trade sentiments.
For the first half of the nineteenth century, U.S. laws enacted against the slave 
trade existed usually in name only and did little actually to prevent American 
participation in the transatlantic slave trade. More effective against illegal imports was 
the strong domestic slave trade that fueled western agricultural expansion. The naturally 
increasing domestic slave population kept imported slave demand to a minimum. It was 
political conflict that sparked the Southern cry for the revival o f the slave trade, although 
even the conflict was grossly exaggerated by the Northern press. Meanwhile, it was 
primarily Northerners who participated and profited from the transatlantic slave trade.4 
Until the Civil War forced the federal government to take a stand against slavery, the 
policy towards the slave trade remained primarily designed to protect American interests 
and assert federal power within the international community.
Instead of focusing on protecting U.S. interests in Africa against Britain, the 
domestic turmoil of Civil War forced the federal government to address the problems of 
union, and the institution of slavery itself. Ironically, despite the withdrawal of federal 
efforts to suppression the international slave trade, it was only war that led to Anglo- 
American cooperation and the subsequent abolition of the slave trade. War strengthened
3 See David Ericson, Slavery in the American Republic (Lawrence: University Press o f  Kansas,
2011); Don Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001); David Waldstreicher, S lavery’s Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009); and Eliga 
Gould, Among the Powers o f  the Earth, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
4 Anne Farrow, et. al, Complicity.
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the power of the federal government in a way that even the federalists could not have 
foreseen.
The U.S. suppression of the transatlantic slave trade was both dependent on and 
was influenced by the changing cultural, diplomatic, and political climate leading up to 
the Civil War. In the end, the Founders were proved wrong when they asserted that 
ending the slave trade would end slavery. Time would tell that abolition had to occur at 
home, rather than on the high seas. Without the demand for slaves, the supply was 
rendered obsolete and the Middle Passage finally ceased to exist, a full seventy years 
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APPENDIX A: ACT OF 1794 
“An Act to Prohibit the Carrying on the Slave Trade from the United States to any
Foreign Place or Country”
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That no citizen or citizens of the United States, 
or foreigner, or any other persons coming into, or residing within the same, shall, for 
himself or any other person whatsoever, either as master, factor or owner, build, fit, equip, 
load or otherwise prepare any ship or vessel, within any port or place of the said United 
States nor shall cause any ship or vessel to sail from any port or place within the same, 
for the purpose of carrying on any trade or traffic in slaves, to any foreign country; or for 
the purpose of procuring, from any foreign kingdom, place or country, the Inhabitant' of 
such kingdom, place or country, to be transported to any foreign country, port, or place 
whatever, to be sold or disposed of, as slaves And if any ship or vessel shall be so fitted 
out, as aforesaid, for the said purposes, or shall be caused to sail, so as aforesaid, every 
such ship or vessel her tackle, furniture, apparel and other appurtenances, shall be 
forfeited to the United States; and shall be liable to be seized, prosecuted and condemned, 
in any of the circuit courts, or district court for the district where the said ship or vessel 
may be found and seized..
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That all and every person, so building, fitting out, 
equipping, loading, or otherwise preparing, or sending away, any ship or vessel, knowing 
or intending that the same shall be employed in such trade or business, contrary to the 
true intent and meaning of this act, or any ways aiding or abetting therein, shall severally 
forfeit and pay the sum of two thousand dollars, one moiety thereof to the use of the 
United States, and the other moiety thereof to the use of him or her who shall sue for and 
prosecute the same.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the owner, master or factor o f each and every 
foreign ship or vessel, clearing out for any of the coasts or kingdoms of Africa, or 
suspected to be intended for the slave trade, and the suspicion being declared to the 
officer of the customs, by any citizen, on oath or affirmation, and such information being 
to the satisfaction of the said officer, shall first give bond with sufficient sure ties, to the 
treasurer of the United States, that none of the natives of Africa, or any other foreign 
country or place, shall be taken on board the said ship or vessel, to be transported, or sold 
as slaves, in any other foreign port or place whatever, within nine months thereafter.
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That if any citizen or citizens of the United States shall, 
contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, take on board, receive or transport any 
such persons, as above described, in this act, for the purpose of selling them as slaves, as 
adores said, he or they shall forfeit and pay, for each and every person, so received on 
board, transported, or sold as aforesaid, the sum of two hundred dollars, to be recovered 
in any court of the United States pro per to try the same; the one moiety thereof to the use 
of the United States, and the other moiety to the use of such person or persons, who shall 
sue for and prosecute the same.
1 Stat. 348". United States Statutes at Large.
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APPENDIX B: ACT OF 1800 
“An Act in Addition to the Act Untitled "An Act to Prohibit the Carrying on the Slave 
Trade from the United States to any Foreign Place or Country."
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United 
States, or other person residing within the United States, directly or indirectly to hold or 
have any right or property in any vessel employed or made use of in the transportation or 
carrying of slaves from one foreign country or place to another, and any right or property, 
belonging as aforesaid, shall be forfeited, and may be libelled and condemned for the use 
of the person who shall sue for the same; and such person, transgressing the prohibition 
aforesaid, shall also forfeit and pay a sum of money equal to double the value of the right 
or property in such vessel, which he held as aforesaid; and shall also forfeit a sum of 
money equal to double the value of the interest which he may have had in the slaves, 
which at any time may have been transported or carried in such vessel, after the passing 
of this act, and against the form thereof
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United 
States or other person residing therein, to serve on board any vessel of the United States 
employed or made use of in the transportation or carrying of slaves from one foreign 
country or place to another: and any such citizen or other person, voluntarily serving as 
aforesaid, shall be liable to be indicted therefor, and on conviction thereof shall be liable 
to a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and be imprisoned not exceeding two years. 
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That if any citizen of the United States shall 
voluntarily serve on board of any foreign ship or vessel, which shall hereafter be 
employed in the slave trade, he shall, on conviction thereof, be liable to and suffer the 
like forfeitures, pains, disabilities and penalties as he would have incurred, had such ship 
or vessel been owned or employed, in whole or in part, by any person or persons residing 
within the United States.
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for any of the commissioned 
vessels of the United States, to seize and take any vessels employed in carrying on trade, 
business or traffic, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this or the said act to which 
this is in addition; and such vessel, together with her tackle, apparel and guns, and the 
goods or effects, other than slaves, which shall be found on board, shall be forfeited, and 
may be proceeded against in any of the district or circuit courts, and shall be condemned 
for the use of the officers and crew of the vessel making the seizure, and be divided in the 
proportion directed in the case of prize: and all persons interested in such vessel, or in the 
enterprise or voyage in which such vessel shall be employed at the time of such capture, 
shall be precluded from all right or claim to the slaves found on board such vessel as 
aforesaid, and from all damages or retribution on account thereof: and it shall moreover 
be the duty of the commanders of such commissioned vessels, to apprehend and take into 
custody every person found on board of such vessel so seized and taken, being of the 
officers or crew thereof, and him or them convey as soon as conveniently may be, to the 
civil authority of the United States in some one of the districts thereof, to be proceeded 
against in due course of law.
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That the district and circuit courts of the United States
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shall have cognizance of all acts and offences against the prohibitions herein contained. 
SEC. 6. Provided nevertheless, and be it further enacted, That nothing in this act 
contained shall be construed to authorize the bringing into either of the United States, any 
person or persons, the importation of whom is, by the existing laws of such state, 
prohibited.
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That the forfeitures which shall hereafter be incurred 
under this, or the said act to which this is in addition, not otherwise disposed of, shall 
accrue and be one moiety thereof to the use of the informer, and the other moiety to the 
use of the United States, except where the prosecution shall be first instituted on behalf of 
the United States, in which case the whole shall be to their use.
APPROVED, May 10,1800.
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APPENDIX C: ACT OF 1807
Act Of 1807
An Act to prohibit the importation of slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction 
of the United States, from and after the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one 
thousand eight hundred and eight.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That from and after the first day of January, one thousand eight 
hundred and eight, it shall not be lawful to import or bring into the United States or the 
territories thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or 
person of colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of such negro, mulatto, or person of 
colour, as a slave, or to be held to service or labour.
(Importation of slaves into the U.S. forbidden after Jan. 1, 1808. Forfeiture of vessels 
fitted out for the slave trade after Jan. 1, 1808.)
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That no citizen or citizens of the United States, or any 
other person, shall, from and after the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, for himself, or themselves, or any other person 
whatsoever, either as master, factor, or owner, build, fit, equip, load or otherwise prepare 
any ship or vessel, in any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, nor 
shall cause any ship or vessel to sail from any port or place within the same, for the 
purpose of procuring any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, from any foreign kingdom, 
place, or country, to be transported to any port or place whatsoever, within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, to be held, sold, or disposed of as slaves, or to be held to 
service or labor; and if any ship or vessel shall be so fitted out for the purpose aforesaid, 
or shall be caused to sail so as aforesaid, every such ship or vessel, her tackle, apparel, 
and furniture, shall be forfeited to the United States, and shall be liable to be seized, 
prosecuted, and condemned in any of the circuit courts or district courts, for the district 
where the said ship or vessel may be found or seized.
(Penalties for being engaged in such expeditions.)
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That all and every person so building, fitting out,
equipping, loading, or otherwise preparing or sending away, any ship or vessel, knowing
or intending that the same shall be employed in such trade or business, from and after the 
first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eight, contrary to the true intent and 
meaning of this act, or any ways aiding or abetting therein, shall severally forfeit and pay 
twenty thousand dollars, one moiety thereof to the use of the United States, and the other 
moiety to the use of any person or persons who shall sue for and prosecute the same to 
effect.
(Forfeitures and penalties for importing slaves from Africa, &c. after Jan. 1,1808. 
Distribution of the forfeitures. Slaves imported to remain subject to regulations of the 
states.)
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, If any citizen or citizens of the United States, or any 
person resident within the jurisdiction of the same, shall, from and after the first day of 
January, one thousand eight hundred and eight, take on board, receive or transport from 
any of the coasts or kingdoms of Africa, or from any other foreign kingdom, place, or
264
country, any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, in any ship or vessel, for the purpose of 
selling them in any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States as slaves, or 
to be held to service or labour, or shall be in any ways aiding or abetting therein, such 
citizen or citizens, or person, shall severally forfeit and pay five thousand dollars, one 
moiety thereof to the use of any person or persons who shall sue for and prosecute the 
same to effect; and every such ship or vessel in which, such negro, mulatto, or person of 
colour, shall have been taken on board, received, or transported as aforesaid, her tackle, 
apparel, and furniture, and the goods and effects which shall be found on board the same, 
shall be forfeited to the United States, and shall be liable to be seized, prosecuted, and 
condemned in any of the circuit courts or district courts in the district where the said ship 
or vessel may be found or seized. And neither the importer, nor any person or persons 
claiming from or under him, shall hold any right or title whatsoever to any negro, mulatto, 
or person of colour, nor to the service or labour thereof, who may be imported or brought 
within the United States, or territories thereof, in violation of this law, but the same shall 
remain subject to any regulations not contravening the provisions of this act, which the 
legislatures o f the several states or territories at any time hereafter may make, for 
disposing of any such negro, mulatto, or person of colour. (See notes to act of March 
22,1794, chap.l 1, vol. i. 347,348.)
(Further penalties on citizens and residents, &c. for bringing slaves to the U. S. from any 
foreign place. Imprisonment and penalty not to exceed $10,000.)
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That if any citizen or citizens of the United States, or 
any other person resident within the jurisdiction of the same, shall, from and after the first 
day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eight, contrary to the true intent and 
meaning of this act, take on board any ship or vessel from any of the coasts or kingdoms 
of Africa, or from any other foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or 
person of colour, with intent to sell him. her, or them, for a slave, or slaves, or to be held 
to service or labour, and shall transport the same to any port or place within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, and there sell such negro, mulatto, or person of colour, 
so transported as aforesaid, for a slave, or to be held to service or labour, every such 
offender shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and being thereof convicted 
before any court having competent jurisdiction, shall suffer imprisonment for not more 
than ten years nor less than five years, and be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars, 
nor less than one thousand dollars.
(Penalties for buying slaves from the neighbouring territories, &c. Forfeiture not to 
extend to the seller or purchaser of any slave sold under the regulations of the legislature 
of any state.)
SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, from 
and after the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eight, purchase or sell 
any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, for a slave, or to be held to service or labour, 
who shall have been imported, or brought from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, 
or from the dominions of any foreign state, immediately adjoining to the United States, 
into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, after the last day of 
December, one thousand eight hundred and seven, knowing at the time of such purchase 
or sale, such negro, mulatto, or person of colour, was sought within the jurisdiction of the 
United States, as aforesaid, such purchaser and seller shall severally for fee and pay for 
every negro, mulatto, or person of colour, so purchased or sold as aforesaid, eight
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hundred dollars; one moiety thereof to the United States, and the other moiety to the use 
of any person or persons who shall sue for and prosecute the same to effect: Provided, 
that die aforesaid forfeiture shall not extend to the seller or purchaser of any negro, 
mulatto, or person of colour, who may be sold or disposed of in virtue of any regulation 
which may hereafter be made by any of the legislatures of the several states in that 
respect, in pursuance of act, and the constitution of the United States.
(Vessels may be seized, having slaves on board. Naval force of the U. States may be 
employed for the purpose of enforcing this act. Penalties, fine and imprisonment.
Proceeds of prizes divided between the U. States and the officers and men making the 
seizures. Every negro and mulatto found on board any vessel captured to be delivered to 
persons appointed by the respective states to receive them. An account to be transmitted 
to the governors of the respective states.)
SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That if any ship or vessel shall be found, from and 
after the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eight, in any river, port, bay, 
or harbor, or on the high seas within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or 
hovering on the coast thereof, having on board any negro, mulatto, or person of colour for 
the purpose of selling them as slaves, or with intent to land the same, in any port or place 
within the jurisdiction of the United States, contrary to the prohibition of this act, every 
such ship or vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the goods or 
effects which shall be found on board the same, shall be forfeited to the use of the United 
States, and may be seized, prosecuted, and condemned, in any court of the United States, 
having jurisdiction thereof. And it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, 
and he is hereby authorized, should he deem it expedient, to cause any of the armed 
vessels of the United States to be manned and employed to cruise on any part the coast of 
the United States, or territories thereof, where he may judge attempts will be made to 
violate the provisions of this act, and to instruct and direct the commanders of armed 
vessels of the United States, to seize take, and bring into any port of the United States all 
such ships or vessels, and moreover to seize, take, and bring into any port of the United 
States all ships or vessels of the United States, wheresoever found on the high seas, 
contravening the provisions of this act, to be proceeded against, according to law, and the 
captain, master, or commander of every such ship or vessel, so found and seized as 
aforesaid, shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be liable to be 
prosecuted before any court of the United States, having jurisdiction thereof; and being 
thereof convicted, shall be fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and be imprisoned 
not less than two years, and not exceeding four years. And the proceeds of all ships and 
vessels, their tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the goods and effects on board of them, 
which shall be so seized, prosecuted and condemned, shall be divided equally between 
the United States and the officers and men who shall make such seizure, take, or bring the 
same into port for condemnation, whether such seizure be made by an armed vessel of the 
United States, or revenue cutters thereof, and the same shall be distributed in like manner, 
as is provided by law for the distribution of prizes taken from an enemy: Provided, that 
the officers and men, to be entitled to one half of the proceeds aforesaid, shall safe keep 
every negro, mulatto, or person of colour, found on board of any ship or vessel so by 
them seized, taken, or brought into port for condemnation, and shall deliver every such 
negro, mulatto, or person of colour, to such person or persons as shall be appointed by the 
respective states, to receive the same; and if no such person or persons shall be appointed
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by the respective states, they shall deliver every such negro, mulatto, or person of colour, 
to the overseers of the poor of the port or place where such ship or vessel may be brought 
or found, and shall immediately transmit to the governor or chief magistrate of the state 
an account of their proceedings, together with the number of such negroes, mulattoes, or 
persons of colour, and a descriptive list of the same, that he may give directions 
respecting such negroes mulattoes, or persons of colour. (The district courts have 
jurisdiction under the slave trade acts, to determine who are the actual captors under a 
state law, made in pursuance of the 4th section of the slave trade act of 1807, and 
directing the proceeds of the sale of the negroes to be paid, "one moiety for the use of the 
commanding officer of the capturing vessel." The Josefa Segunda, 10 Wheat.312; 6 
Cond. Rep. 11 l.The offence against the laws of the United States under the 7th section of 
the act of 1897, is not that of importing or bringing into the United States, persons of 
colour, with intent to hold such persons as slaves, but that of hovering on the coast of the 
United States with such intent. And although it forfeits the vessel and any goods or 
effects found on board, it is silent as to disposing of the coloured persons found onboard, 
any further than to impose a duty upon the officers of the armed vessels who make the 
capture to keep them safely to be delivered to the overseers o f the poor, or the governor 
of the state, or persons appointed by the respective states to receive diem. United States v. 
Preston, 3 Peters, 57.The persons sold as slaves under an order of the district court of 
Louisiana, in a case where the decree was afterwards reversed, were illegally sold, and 
they are freed. Ibid.)
(Slaves not to be transported in vessels under forty tons burthen, to be disposed of, &c. 
Penalties. This section not to prohibit taking on board or transporting on any river or bay 
within the jurisdiction of the U. States.)
SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That no captain, master or commander of any ship or 
vessel, o f less burthen than forty tons, shall, from and after the first day of January, one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, take on board and transport any negro, mulatto, or 
person of colour, to any port or place whatsoever, for the purpose of selling or disposing 
of the same as a slave, or with intent that the same may be sold or disposed of to be held 
to service or labour, on penalty of forfeiting for every such negro, mulatto, or person of 
colour, so taken on board and transported, as aforesaid, the sum of eight hundred dollars; 
one moiety thereof to the use of the United States, and the other moiety to any person or 
persons who shall sue for, and prosecute the same to effect: Provided however, That 
nothing in this section shall extend to prohibit the taking on board or transporting on any 
river, or inland bay of the sea, within the jurisdiction of the United States, any negro, 
mulatto, or person of colour, (not imported contrary to the provisions of this act) in any 
vessel or species of craft whatever.
(Vessels of larger burthen, sailing coastwise, to have the names of slaves for sale inserted 
in their papers, &c. The shipper to swear the negroes were not imported into the U. States 
after January 1, 1808. Penalties on departing without such list. Penalty for negro or 
mulatto taken on board.)
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That the captain, master, or commander of any ship or 
vessel of the burthen of forty tons or more, from and after the first day of January, one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, sailing coastwise, from any port in the United States, 
to any port or place within the jurisdiction of the same, having on board any negro, 
mulatto, or person of colour, for the purpose of transporting them to be used or disposed
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of as slaves, or to be held to service or labour, shall, previous to the departure of such 
ship or vessel, make out and subscribe duplicate manifests of every such negro, mulatto, 
or person of colour, on board such ship or vessel, therein specifying the name and sex of 
each person, their age and stature, as near as may be, and the class to which they 
respectively belong, whether negro, mulatto, or person of colour, with the name and place 
of residence of eveiy owner or shipper of the same, and shall deliver such manifests to 
the collector of the port, if there be one, otherwise to the surveyor, before whom the 
captain master, or commander, together with the owner or shipper, shall severally swear 
or affirm to the best of their knowledge and belief, that the persons therein specified were 
not imported or brought into the United States, from and after the first day of January, 
one thousand eight hundred and eight, and that under the laws of the state, they are held 
to service or labour; whereupon the said collector or surveyor shall certify the same on 
the said manifests, one of which he shall return to the said captain, master, or commander, 
with a permit, specifying thereon the number, names, and general description of such 
persons, and authorizing him to proceed to the port of his destination.
And if  any ship or vessel, being laden and destined as aforesaid, shall depart from the 
port where she may then be, without the captain, master, or commander being first made 
out and subscribed duplicate manifests, of every negro, mulatto, and person of colour, on 
board such ship or vessel, as aforesaid, and without having previously delivered the same 
to the said collector or surveyor, and obtained a permit, in manner as herein required, or 
shall, previous to her arrival at the port of her destination, take on board any negro, 
mulatto, or person of colour, other than those specified in the manifests, as aforesaid, 
every such ship or vessel, together with her tackle, apparel and furniture, shall be 
forfeited to the use of the United States, and may be seized, prosecuted and condemned in 
any court of the United States, having jurisdiction thereof; and the captain, master, or 
commander of every such ship or vessel, shall moreover forfeit, for every such negro, 
mulatto, or person of colour, so transported or taken on board, contrary to the provisions 
of this act, the sum of one thousand dollars, one moiety thereof to the United States, and 
the other moiety to the use of any person or persons who shall sue for and prosecute the 
same to effect.
(Manifests to be delivered to officers of customs where such slaves carried coastwise are 
landed. Penalty for landing a negro or mulatto without a permit.)
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That the captain, master, or commander of every ship 
or vessel, of the burthen of forty tons or more, from and after the first day of January, one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, sailing coastwise, and having on board any negro, 
mulatto, or person of colour, to sell or dispose of as slaves, or to be held to service or 
labour, and arriving in any port within the jurisdiction of the United States, from any 
other port within the same, shall, previous to the unloading or putting on shore any of the 
persons aforesaid, or suffering them to go on shore, deliver to the collector, if there be 
one, or if not, to the surveyor residing at the port of her arrival, the manifest certified by 
the collector or surveyor of the port from whence she sailed, as is herein before directed, 
to the truth of which, before such officer, he shall swear or affirm, and if the collector or 
surveyor shall be satisfied therewith, he shall thereupon grant a permit for unlading or 
suffering such negro, mulatto, or person of colour, to be put on shore, and if the captain, 
master, or commander of any such ship or vessel being laden as aforesaid, shall neglect 
or refuse to deliver the manifest at the time and in the manner herein directed, or shall
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land or put on shore any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, for the purpose aforesaid, 
before he shall have delivered his manifest as aforesaid, and obtained a permit for that 
purpose, every such captain, master, or commander, shall forfeit and pay ten thousand 
dollars, one moiety thereof to the United States, the other moiety to the use of any person 
or persons who shall sue for and prosecute the same to effect.
APPROVED, March 2,1807.
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APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTAL SLAVE TRADE ACTS
Act of March 3,1819, Relative to the Slave Trade.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, 
in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, 
authorized, whenever he shall deem it expedient, to cause any of the armed vessels of the 
United States, to be employed to cruise on any of the coasts of the United States, or 
territories thereof, or of the coast of Africa, or elsewhere, where he may judge attempts 
may be made to carry on the slave trade by citizens or residents of the United States, in 
contravention of the acts of Congress prohibiting the same and to instruct and direct the 
commanders of all armed vessels of the United States to seize, take, and bring into any 
ports of the United States, all ships or vessels of the United States, wheresoever found, 
which may have taken on board, or which may be intended for the purpose of taking on 
board, or of transporting, or may have transported, any negro, mulatto, or person of color, 
in violation of any of the provisions of the act entitled "An Act in addition to an act to 
prohibit the importation of slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the 
United States, from and after the first day of January, in the year of Our Lord one 
thousand eight hundred and eight, and to repeal certain parts of the same," or any other 
act or acts prohibiting the traffic in slaves, to be proceeded against according to law: And 
the proceeds of all ships and vessels, their tackle, apparel, furniture, and the goods and 
effects, on board of them, which shall be so seized, prosecuted, and condemned, shall be 
divided equally between the United States and the officers and men who shall seize, take 
or bring, the same into port for condemnation, whether such seizure be made by an armed 
vessel of the United States or Revenue Cutter thereof: And the same shall be distributed 
in like manner as is provided by law for the distribution of prizes taken from an enemy. 
Provided, That the officers and men be entitled to one-half of the proceeds aforesaid, 
shall safe-keep every negro, mulatto, or person of color, found on board of any ship or 
vessel so seized, taken, or brought into port, for condemnation, and shall deliver every 
such negro, mulatto, or person of color, to the marshal of the district into which they may 
be brought, if into a port of the United States, or, if elsewhere, to such person or persons 
as shall be lawfully appointed by the President of the United States, in the manner 
hereinafter directed, transmitting to the President of the United States, as soon as may be 
after such delivery, a descriptive list of such negroes, mulattoes, or persons o f color that 
he may give directions for the disposal of them. And provided further, That the 
commanders of such commissioned vessels, do cause to be apprehended, and taken into 
custody, every person found on board of such vessel, so seized and taken being of the 
officers or crew thereof, and him or them convey, as soon as conveniently may be, to the 
civil authority of the United States to be proceeded against in due course of law, in some 
of the districts thereof.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted. That the President of the United States be, and he is 
hereby, authorized to make such regulations and arrangements as he may deem expedient 
for the safe-keeping, support, and removal beyond the limits of the United States, o f all 
such negroes, mulattoes, or persons of color, as may be so delivered and brought within
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their jurisdiction: And to appoint a proper person or persons, residing upon the coast of 
Africa, as agent or agents, for receiving the negroes, mulattoes, or persons of color, 
delivered from on board vessels, seized in the prosecution of the slave trade, by 
commanders of the United States armed vessels.
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That a bounty of $25.00 be paid to the officers and crew 
of the commissioned vessels of the United States, or Revenue Cutters for each and every 
negro, mulatto, or person of color, who shall have been, as hereinbefore provided, 
delivered to the marshal or agent duly appointed to receive them: And the Secretary of 
the Treasury is hereby authorized and required to pay or cause to be paid to such officers 
and crews, or their agents, the aforesaid bounty, for each person delivered as aforesaid. 
Sec. 4. Be it further enacted, That when any citizen, or other person, shall lodge 
information, to the attorney for the district of any state or territory, as the case may be, 
that any negro, mulatto, person of color, has been imported therein, contrary to the 
provisions of the acts in such case made and provided, it shall be the duty of the said 
attorney forthwith to commence a prosecution by information; and process shall issue 
against the person charged with holding such negro, negroes, mulatto, mulattoes, person 
or persons of color, so alleged to be imported contrary to the provisions of the acts 
aforesaid: And if, upon the return of the process executed, it shall be ascertained, by the 
verdict of the jury that such negro, negroes, mulatto, mulattoes, person or persons of 
color, have been brought in, contrary to the true intent and meanings of the acts in such 
cases made and provided, then the court shall direct the marshal of the said districts to 
take the said negroes, mulattoes, or persons of color, into his custody, for safe keeping, 
subject to the orders of the President of the United States; and the informer or informers, 
who shall have lodged the information, shall be entitled to receive, over and above the 
portions of the penalties accruing to him or them by the provisions o f the acts in such 
case made and provided, a bounty of $50.00, for each and every negro, mulatto, or person 
of color, who shall have been delivered into the custody of the marshal; and the Secretary 
of the Treasury is hereby authorized and required to pay, or cause to be paid, the 
aforesaid bounty, upon the certificate of the clerk of the court for the district where the 
prosecution may have been had, with the seal of office thereto annexed, stating the 
number of negroes, mulattoes, or persons of color, so delivered.
Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the commander o f any armed 
vessel of the United States, whenever he shall make any capture under the provisions of 
this act, to bring the vessel and her cargo, for adjudication, into some of the ports of the 
states or territory to which such vessels, so captured, shall belong, if he can ascertain the 
same; if not, then to be sent into any convenient port of the 
United States.
Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That all such acts, or parts of acts as may be repugnant 
to the provisions of this act, shall be, and the same are hereby repealed.
Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That a sum not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars, 
be, and the same is hereby appropriated to carry this law into effect.
Approved, March 3,1819.
Act of 1820
STATUTE I. May 15,1820.
CHAP. CXIII. -A n  Act to continue in force "An act to protect the commerce of the
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United States, and punish the crime of piracy," and also to make further provisions for 
punishing the crime or piracy.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United Slates of America, 
in Congress assembled, That the first, second, third, and fourth, sections of an act, 
entitled "An act to protect the commerce of the United States and punish the crime of 
piracy," passed on die third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and nineteen, be 
and die same are hereby, continued in force, from the passing of this act for the term of 
two years, and from thence to the end of the next session of Congress, and no longer.
[First, 2d, 3d and 4th sections of act of 3d March, 1819, ch. 77, continued for two years, 
etc.]
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the fiftii section of the said act be, and the same is 
hereby, continued in force, as to all crimes made punishable by the same, and heretofore 
committed in all respects as fully as if the duration of the said section had been without 
limitation. [Fifth section of the act of 3d March, 1819, continued as to crimes heretofore 
committed.]
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That, if any person shall, upon the high seas, or in any 
open roadstead, or in any haven, basin, or bay, or in any river where the sea ebbs and 
flows, commit the crime of robbery, in or upon any ship or vessel, or upon any of the 
ship's company of any ship or vessel, or the lading thereof, such person shall be adjudged 
a pirate: and, being thereof convicted before the circuit court o f the United States for the 
district into which he shall be brought, or in which he shall be found, shall suffer death. 
And if any person engaged in any piratical cruise or enterprise, or being of the crew or 
ships company of any piratical ship or vessel, shall land from such ship or vessel, and, on 
shore, shall commit robbery, such person shall be adjudged a pirate: and on conviction 
thereof before the circuit court of the United States for the district into which he shall be 
brought, or in which he shall be found, shall suffer death: Provided, That nothing in this 
section contained shall be construed to deprive any particular state o f its jurisdiction over 
such offences, when committed within the body of a county, or authorize the courts of the 
United States to try any such offenders, after conviction or acquittance, for the same 
offence, in a state court. [Persons committing robbery, on any ship or vessel, or ship's 
company, etc., or on the high seas, in a roadstead, etc. Conviction in circuit court where 
brought or found. Persons engaged in any piratical enterprise, etc., and committing 
robbery onshore, declared pirates, and to suffer death.]
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That if any citizen of the United States, being of the 
crew or ship's company of any foreign ship or vessel engaged in the slave trade, or any 
person whatever, being of the crew or ship's company of any ship or vessel, owned in the 
whole or part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any citizen or citizens of the United States, 
shall land, from any such ship or vessel, and, on any foreign shore, seize any negro or 
mulatto, not held to service or labour by the laws of either of the states or territories of 
the United States, with intent to make such negro or mulatto a slave, or shall decoy, or 
forcibly bring or carry, or shall receive, such negro or mulatto on board any such ship or 
vessel, with intent as aforesaid, such citizen or person shall be adjudged a pirate; and, on 
conviction thereof before the circuit court of the United States for the district wherein he 
may be brought or found, shall suffer death. [Persons landing on a foreign shore, and 
seizing negroes or mulattoes, not held to service, etc., with intent to make them slaves, or 
decoying, forcibly bringing or carrying, etc., them on board, etc., declared pirates, and to
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suffer death.]
Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That if any citizen of the United States, being of the 
crew or ship's company of any foreign ship or vessel engaged in the slave trade, or any 
person whatever, being of the crew or ship's company of any ship or vessel, owned 
wholly or in part, or navigated for, or in behalf of, any citizen or citizens of the United 
States, shall forcibly confine or detain, or aid and abet in forcibly confining or detaining, 
on board such ship or vessel, any negro or mulatto not held to service by the laws of 
either of the states or territories of the United States with intent to make such negro or 
mulatto a slave or shall on board any such ship or vessel, offer or attempt to sell, as a 
slave, any negro or mulatto not held to service as aforesaid, or shall, on the high seas, or 
any where on tide water, transfer or deliver over, to any other ship or vessel, any negro or 
mulatto not held to service as aforesaid, with intent to make such negro or mulatto a 
slave, or shall land, or deliver on shore, from on board any such ship or vessel, any such 
negro or mulatto, with intent to make sale of, or having previously sold, such negro or 
mulatto, as a slave, such citizen or person shall be adjudged a pirate; and, on conviction 
thereof before the circuit court of die United States for the district wherein he shall be 
brought or found, shall suffer death. [Persons forcibly confining, detaining, or aiding to 




APPENDIX E: LIST OF SLAVE SHIPS CAPTURED BY U.S. AFRICAN
SQUADRON
Vessel Captor Date Location
Uncas U.S.S. Porpoise 1 March 1844 Gallinas
Porpoise U.S.S. Raritan 23 January 1845 Rio de Janeiro
Albert U.S.S Bainbridge June 1845 Bahia
Merchant U.S.S. Jamestown 12 March 1845 Sierra Leone
Spitfire U.S.S. Truxtun 24 March 1845 Pongas R.
Patuxent U.S.S. Yorktown 27 September 1845 Cape Mount
Pons U.S.S. Yorktown 30 September 1845 Kabenda
Panther U.S.S. Yorktown 15 December 1845 Kabenda
Robert Wilson U.S.S. Jamestown 15 January 1846 Porto Praya
Malaga U.S.S. Boxer 13 April 1846 Kabenda
Casket U.S.S. Marion 2 August 1846 Kabenda
Chancellor U.S.S. Dolphin 10 April 1847 Cape Palmas
Susan U.S.S. Perry 6 February 1849 Rio de Janeiro
Excellent U.S.S. John Adams 23 April 1850 Ambriz
Martha U.S.S. Perry 6 June 1850 Ambriz
Chatsworth U.S.S. Perry 11 September 1850 Ambriz
Advance U.S.S. Germantown 3 November 1852 Porto Praya
R.P. Brown U.S.S. Germantown 23 January 1853 Porto Praya
H.N. Gambrill U.S.S. Constitution 3 November 1853 Congo
Glamorgan U.S.S. Perry 10 March 1854 Congo
W.G. Lewis U.S.S. Dale 6 November 1857 Congo
Brothers U.S.S. Marion 8 September 1858 Mayumba
Julia Dean U.S.S. Vincennes 28 December 1858 Cape Coast Castle
Orion U.S.S. Marion 21 April 1859 Congo
Ardennes U.S.S. Marion 27 April 1859 Congo
Delicia Constellation 21 September 1859 Kabenda
Emily Portsmouth 21 September 1859 Loango
Virginian Portsmouth 6 February 1860 Kongo
Falmouth Portsmouth 6 May 1860 Porto Praya
Thomas Achorn Mystic 29 June 1860 Kabenda
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Vessel Captor Date Location
Triton U.S.S. Mystic 16 July 1860 Loango
Erie Mohican 8 August 1860 Congo
Storm King San Jacinto 8 August 1860 Congo
Cora Constellation 26 September 1860 Congo
Bonito San Jacinto 10 October 1860 Congo
Express Saratoga 25 February 1861 Possibly Loango
Nightingale Saratoga 21 April 1861 Kabenda
Triton Constellation 20 May 1861 Congo
Falmouth Sumpter 14 June 1862 Congo
Adapted from Warren S. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837- 
1862,(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1963).
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